dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The trial court identified the issue in this case as:
Was the defendant Charles A. Mitchell, Principal of Laramie Senior High School, acting within the scope of his employment when he engaged in negotiations to hire the plaintiff, Julian A. Milton, Jr., as a teacher and coach? If so, the claim is barred because suit was not brought by the plaintiff in compliance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (W.S. 1-39-102, et seq.). If defendant exceeded the scope of his employment, then compliance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is not required and plaintiff’s claim is not barred and survives.
*379In making his decision, the trial court analyzed the case and held as follows:
The Superintendent of Schools has the responsibility “to nominate for appointment all personnel employed by the School District (“Policies”, Chapter 11, Section 3)[”]. Furthermore, the Rules provide that: “Whenever possible those who are to be the supervisors of the person to be employed shall be consulted during the selection process,” (Id.) and “... the superintendent has the responsibility to direct a program of recruitment and selection of personnel.” [Id. at (d) ].
The Principal of a school has specific duties and responsibilities outlined in Chapter III of the “Policies.” The Principal serves as “... the supervisor of the teaching in his school.” [Chapter III, Section 1(k) ]. Additionally, under Chapter III, Section 1, subparagraph “t” the Principal shall perform such other duties as the Superintendent may direct.
In this case, there is no question that the defendant was acting on behalf of the school system when he interacted with the plaintiff. He was not acting on his own. Plaintiff argues that while he may have been acting on behalf of the school system, in so doing he exceeded the scope of his prescribed duties. Again, this Court does not agree. Leonard Hall, Assistant Superin[ten]dent, filed an affidavit attesting to the Principal’s role in the employment process. The Court concludes that under the aegis of Chapter III, Section 1, subparagraph “t,” and by virtue of the delegation of the Superintendent, the defendant had the right to participate as he did in the interview process and make recommendations and representations regarding employment of the plaintiff.
Though the defendant may have been inaccurate in his prediction that plaintiff would be employed by the School Board, he was not acting outside the scope of his employment when he made those representations to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the defendant was acting on behalf of the school system and under the expressed delegation by the Superintendent at all times during his contacts with the plaintiff.
I believe that the trial court correctly determined this case. I would affirm his decision.
. Chief Justice, Retired, June 30, 1988.