concurring.
The court frames the issue in this appeal as whether the receipt of strike benefits creates an implied contract of employment between a worker and his union. Supra p. 1010. The court believes that this question turns on whether Local 962 conditioned payment of strike benefits to Gernandt on his participation in its demonstrations. Id. The Board found that there was no such contract because the strike benefit “was not paid in proportion to the amount of time spent on the picket line, but was a flat weekly benefit paid by [the union] out of a fund created for that purpose.” The court applies the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual finding and affirms the Board’s conclusion that Local 962 did not employ Gernandt. Supra pp. 1010-1011.
I agree that Local 962 did not employ Gernandt and therefore that APC cannot shift its liability for payment of Gernandt’s workers’ compensation benefits to Local 962. However, I do not believe that this conclusion depends on whether Local 962 conditioned payment of Gernandt’s strike benefits on his participation in its demonstrations. Rather, I believe that the nature of the legal relationship between a union and its members qua members precludes the possibility of the existence of an implied employment contract between them.
The legal relationship between a union and its members is not one of employment, but one of membership and association. Workers are not the agents of their union. Rather, a union is the agent of its members who collectively direct it to serve their interests. This is how the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“Act”) defines the relationship between a union and its members. The Act establishes that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. ...” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). The Act defines a “labor organization” as “any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose ... of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). The Act specifically provides that labor organizations are not employers of their members qua members: “The term ‘employer’ ... shall not include ... any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of *1013such labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 151(2).
Because a union is the agent of its members who collectively direct it, I would hold that a union does not employ its members qua members for purposes of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act (“AWCA”).1 This court recently held that an implied contract of employment under AWCA requires “the manifestation of consent by one party to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.” Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge, 779 P.2d 310, 314 (Alaska 1989). In this case it is the workers who have the legal right to control the union. If anyone is an employer, it is the members, not the union.2
This legal relationship between a union and its members does not depend on whether payment of strike benefits is conditioned on participation in a union demonstration. The worker pays dues to the union for its services. One of these services is to provide benefits in case of a strike. Strike benefits are not wages paid to a worker for participating in a union demonstration, but part of the benefit package purchased with union dues.3 Even if payment of strike benefits is conditioned on participation in a union demonstration, the strike benefit is still a benefit, albeit a conditional one, not a wage.
Under the court’s analysis, the question whether a union employs its members must be decided in an ad hoc manner on the basis of the existence of an implied contract of employment. Because I believe that the legal relationship between a union and its members qua members precludes the possibility of such a contract, I would hold that a union does not employ its members qua members for purposes of AWCA. Employers should not be able to shift to their employees’ agent their duty under AWCA to pay for their employees’ injuries.
. Of course this rule does not apply to union members who are also' hired by their union as union officials or staff members. Such persons clearly are employed by the union. The union’s liability for compensation should be governed by the rules generally applicable to dual employers. See Laborers & Hod Carriers Union Local 341 v. Groothuis, 494 P.2d 808, 813 (Alaska 1972) (where a union and the state employed worker, both held jointly liable for compensation where worker provided at least incidental benefit to the union while primarily on business for the state).
. The relationship between a partner and his partnership is analogous to that between a union member and his union. Virtually every state agrees that the partnership does not employ its partners for purposes of workers’ compensation. 1C A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 54.30 (1986). Professor Larson explains that since "in an ordinary partnership each partner has by law an equal share in management, ... he is as much the employer as anyone can be_” Id. § 54.32.
.It would be accurate to describe strike benefits as insurance benefits to be paid in case of a strike. Part of the union dues is a premium for this insurance.