with whom BURKE, Justice, joins, dissenting.
The court concludes that since Jones’ cause of action is on an express rather than an implied contract, the action is governed by the six year statute of limitations, AS 09.10.050, and not the two year statute, AS 09.10.070. In reaching this conclusion, the court ignores and impliedly rejects a number of our cases interpreting these statutes of limitations. On the strength of cases applying Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania law, the court bases its decision upon a distinction that has no basis in Alaska law. The proper inquiry in applying the statutes of limitations is whether the cause of action sounds in tort or contract. Since I believe that Jones’ cause of action sounds in tort, I would hold that Jones’ claim is barred by the two year statute. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Because contract law has its historical origins in tort law as the writ of assumpsit and because people often have contractual relations with those to whom they owe a duty of care, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish an action sounding in contract from one sounding in tort. However, this court consistently has applied the two year statute of limitations when the gravamen of the dispute is in tort and the six year statute of limitations when the gravamen of the dispute is in contract.1
The court’s decision to apply the six year statute of limitations is based upon Jones’ allegation of an express contract. The court distinguishes our decision in Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981) on the ground that Van Horn involved an implied contract while Jones alleges an express contract. This distinction is plainly at odds with AS 09.10.-050, which states that the six year statute of limitations applies in all actions “upon a contract or liability, express or implied.” (Emphasis added). The relevant inquiry is whether this is an action upon a contract at all. If the action is essentially a tort action, the two year statute of limitations applies regardless of whether the alleged contract was express or implied.2
Reliance upon the dichotomy between tort and contract for the purpose of determining the appropriate limitations period is well placed. In tort cases, recovery is relatively easy. However, because duties arise by operation of law and the outcome is likely to depend upon disputed facts, the statute of limitations grants potential defendants repose and extinguishes stale claims after only two years. Contract law imposes greater obstacles to recovery than tort law.3 The longer limitations period is *1019appropriate because contract duties are assumed voluntarily and contract cases in general are less likely to depend upon testimonial evidence that quickly grows stale.
The gravamen of Jones’ suit is in tort, not contract. Jones’ claim is that Wads-worth is responsible for his case being dismissed because Wadsworth negligently missed a court-imposed deadline. Jones maintains that this claim sounds in contract because Wadsworth specifically agreed to “move the case through the court system to trial expeditiously” and to keep Jones “informed and up to date on all the happenings in court.” In legal malpractice cases, we have held that the six year statute of limitations applies only when there was “an agreement to obtain a particular result or do a particular thing.” Van Horn, 627 P.2d at 643. This must be an agreement to do more than is required by law. See id. As a lawyer, Wadsworth was already bound to proceed expeditiously with Jones’ case and to keep Jones informed.4 Nothing in the record suggests that Wadsworth undertook any greater duties than he otherwise had. Like Van Horn, this case involves an agreement to provide legal services of the same quality that all lawyers have a duty to provide. As indicated above, the court’s effort to distinguish Van Horn on the ground that it involved an implied contract is not principled. This case is essentially a tort action for legal malpractice. Therefore, the action should be barred by the two year statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice cases.
The court’s decision will have several harmful consequences. Perhaps most important, by ruling that Wadsworth’s representations of his professional obligations constituted an express promise actionable under the six year statute of limitations, the court creates an undesirable incentive for lawyers to avoid discussing their professional responsibilities with their clients. Lawyers will be reluctant to discuss their professional obligations knowing that a unilateral representation may extend what otherwise would be a two year limitations period for malpractice actions to six years.
In addition, the court’s opinion inevitably will lead to the development of two separate lines of malpractice cases, one in tort and one in contract. The results of malpractice cases should not turn on the choice between these analytic frameworks. Finally, the court forces the superior court to engage in the highly speculative enterprise of determining whether a contract between Jones and Wadsworth was formed,5 what its terms were, whether it was breached, and what the correct measure of damages is.
*1020In sum, the court’s distinction between express and implied contracts has no basis in law. Its decision to apply the six year statute of limitations where there was no agreement to do anything other than that which is required by law is contrary to our decisions in Van Horn and every other case construing the statutes of limitations. For these reasons I respectfully dissent.
. Wettanen v. Cowper, 749 P.2d 362, 364 (Alaska 1988) (two year period applicable to attorney’s failure to appear at trial); Municipality of Anchorage v. Sisters of Providence in Wash., Inc., 628 P.2d 22, 35 (Alaska 1981) (six year period applicable to "action for money had and received”); Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641, 643 (Alaska 1981) (two year period applicable to attorney's withdrawal immediately before a deadline); Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 444 P.2d 536, 538-39 (Alaska 1968) (two year period applicable to action for "breach of warranty to obtain particular insurance”); Silverton v. Marler, 389 P.2d 3, 4-5 (Alaska 1964) (two year period applicable in personal injury case against innkeeper).
. See Austin v. Fulton Ins. Co., 444 P.2d 536, 538-39 (Alaska 1968) (action on insurance agent’s express promise to provide insurance covering loss by earthquake, which he negligently breached, sounded in tort because it was essentially an action for negligent misrepresentation of a state of facts). Faced with the language of the statutes, which provide a six year limitations period in actions "upon a contract or liability, express or implied,” AS 09.10.050, and a two year limitations period in actions "for any injury to the ... rights of another not arising on contract,” AS 09.10.060, one might also conclude that the six year limitations period should apply to all cases, including malpractice cases, arising out of a contractual relationship. The court implies that it might so hold at some point in the future. See supra p. 1017. I am unwilling to overrule a line of cases dating to the earliest years of this court in order to reach that result.
. W.P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92, at 665-66 (5th ed. 1984). For example, on remand this case must be treated as an action upon an express contract. Therefore, Jones must prove the formation of a contract and its terms by a preponderance of the evidence. "Vagueness of expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms of an agreement, have often been held to prevent the creation of an enforceable contract." Hall v. Add-Ventures, Ltd., 695 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Alaska 1985). If the Agreement of Representation is an integrated writing, the parol evidence rule would prohibit consideration of evidence *1019"of antecedent understandings and neg-ot[ia]tions ... for the purpose of varying or contradicting the writing.” Kupka v. Morey, 541 P.2d 740, 747 n. 9 (Alaska 1975). If a contract was in fact formed, the terms of that contract may have been modified, particularly in conjunction with Jones’ departure for Brazil. See Slaymaker v. Peterkin, 518 P.2d 763, 765 (Alaska 1974). Since this is a contract action and not a tort action, damages may be given only for injuries that are the natural consequences of the breach or probable consequences contemplated at the time of the formation of the contract. Arctic Contractors, Inc. v. State, 564 P.2d 30, 44-45 (Alaska 1977); see also Trimble v. City and County of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 731 (Colo.1985) (damages for mental suffering). Because Jones could not recover punitive damages in tort due to the statute of limitations, he is entitled to punitive damages in contract only if Wadsworth's breach was outrageous or malicious. See Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1286 (Alaska 1985).
. See Alaska Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6 (competent representation); Disciplinary Rule 7-101(A)(1) (lawyer shall not fail to seek client’s lawful objectives), 7-101(A)(2) (lawyer shall not fail to perform contract for professional services); Ethical Consideration 7-7 (client shall make substantive decisions), 7-8 (lawyer should ensure that client’s decisions are informed), 7-9 ("A lawyer should always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his client.”), 7-39 (lawyer shall assist in making tribunals’ decisional processes prompt and just).
. I believe that if the law of contract is applied to Wadsworth's representations, no contract was formed. It is not reasonable to believe that Wadsworth intended an express covenant to do that which he was already obligated to do by virtue of his being a lawyer. Moreover, the alleged agreement is not sufficiently certain to constitute a legally enforceable contract. See Hall v. Add-Ventures, Ltd., 695 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Alaska 1985). Since there was not an enforceable contract, the two year statute of limitations should apply.