We granted this application for interlocutory appeal to decide whether the Motor Carrier Act violates the state equal protection clause by permitting an injured person to sue the insurance carrier in the same action brought against the motor carrier. Adhering to our previous decisions that the joinder does not violate equal protection, we affirm.
A. B. Grissom was driving a tractor-trailer truck owned by Dixie Hauling Company when he struck and killed Edward P. J. Gleason. Melanie Gleason, as sole heir and administrator of her father’s estate, sued Grissom and Dixie Hauling for negligence. She also sued Integral Insurance Company, which provided liability insurance to Dixie Hauling in lieu of a bond, as provided under OCGA § 46-7-12. Grissom *375and Dixie Hauling moved to drop Integral as a defendant on the grounds that OCGA § 46-7-12 (e) violates equal protection under this court’s decision in Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41 (402 SE2d 269) (1991). The trial court denied the motion and issued a certificate of immediate review.
1. OCGA § 46-7-12 (e) provides:
It shall be permissible under this article for any person having a cause of action arising under this article in tort or contract to join in the same action the motor carrier and its surety, in the event a bond is given. If a policy of indemnity insurance is given in lieu of bond, it shall be permissible to join the motor carrier and the insurance carrier in the same action, whether arising in tort or contract.
This joinder provision does not make an arbitrary or unreasonable classification in violation of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II of the Constitutions of Georgia of 1877 and 1945 or the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Lloyds America v. Brown, 187 Ga. 240, 243 (200 SE 292) (1938); Harper Motor Lines v. Roling, 218 Ga. 812, 818 (130 SE2d 817) (1963). In Harper Motor, as in this case, the motor carrier argued that the joinder provision prejudiced it by injecting the matter of insurance into the case and was an unreasonable classification without any rational basis. Finding that the Lloyds decision controlled, we held that the joinder of the motor carrier and its insurer in the same action did not violate the equal protection or due process clauses of the Georgia Constitution. Id. We find nothing new in Dixie Hauling’s argument that would change our previous holdings.
2. Dixie Hauling, however, contends that our prior decisions are no longer controlling because of changes in the equal protection clause of the Constitution of Georgia of 1983. The equal protection clause in prior Georgia Constitutions provided: “Protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government and shall be impartial and complete.” Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (§ 2-203) (1976); Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (§ 2-102) (1945); Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (§ 2-102) (1877). The 1983 Constitution contains a second sentence in the paragraph, which states: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws.” Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (1983).
The addition of the second sentence to the second paragraph of the 1983 Constitution does not require a new equal protection rule in this state. See Horton v. Hinely, 261 Ga. 863, 864 (413 SE2d 199) (1992). Prior to the adoption of the 1983 Constitution, this court interpreted the “impartial and complete” provision as comparable to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. State v. Sanks, 225 Ga. 88, 91 (166 SE2d *37619) (1969); Georgia R. &c. Co. v. Wright, 125 Ga. 589, 601 (54 SE 52) (1906), rev’d on other grounds, 207 U. S. 127 (1907). Since the adoption of the 1983 Constitution, we have reiterated that the protection of the equal protection clause in the 1983 Georgia Constitution and the United States Constitution is coextensive. Ambles v. State, 259 Ga. 406 (383 SE2d 555) (1989).1
We disapprove of Denton v. Con-Way to the extent that it suggests a new equal protection analysis. Despite the concurring opinions’ invocation of stare decisis, the Denton decision is an aberration in this court’s interpretation of the equal protection provision. A fundamental problem with the Denton opinion, which neither special concurrence addresses, is its failure to provide a standard for applying the “impartial and complete” provision. The opinion does not explain what the provision means, to whom it applies, or how it offers more protection than the explicit guarantee of equal protection immediately following it.
Moreover, the legislative history of the 1983 Constitution does not support the Denton opinion’s conclusion that “impartial and complete” must mean something different than equal protection.2 The legislative history shows that a primary conflict concerning the equal protection clause was between supporters of the “impartial and complete” language and advocates of an explicit guarantee of equal protection. See, e.g., Select Comm, on Constitutional Revision, Transcripts of Meetings, Dec. 17, 1979 at 11-21, 39-41; Jan. 9, 1980 at 42-44, 51-55; Legis. Overview Comm., June 17, 1981 at 103-117. The Article I and Select Committees recommended an express prohibition *377against the denial of equal protection.3 See Comm. to Revise Art. I, Nov. 9, 1979 at 6-8; Select Comm., Dec. 17, 1979 at 52-53. The Legislative Overview Committee, however, deleted the recommendation and reinserted the “impartial and complete” provision from the 1976 Constitution. See Legislative Overview Comm., Vol. I, June 17, 1981 at 111-117. The Georgia General Assembly adopted both provisions as one paragraph entitled “Protection to person and property; equal protection.” See 1981 Ga. Laws, Extraordinary Session, pp. 142, 143. Therefore, the paragraph presented to voters was a compromise between the two views on the best language to guarantee equal protection in the State Constitution. Since this legislative history does not support giving a new meaning to “impartial and complete” protection, we reject the recent analysis adopted in the Denton opinion.
3. Because no fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the disparate treatment between motor carriers and other defendants must meet only the rational relationship test. See Wilson v. Zant, 249 Ga. 373, 384-385 (290 SE2d 442) (1982). Under that test, statutory classifications are permitted when the classification is based on rational distinctions and bears a direct relationship to the purpose of the legislation. Home Materials v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 250 Ga. 599, 600 (300 SE2d 139) (1983).
The differential treatment of motor carriers and other insured defendants is based on a rational distinction directly related to the purpose of the Motor Carrier Act. The statute’s purpose is to protect the public against injuries caused by the motor carrier’s negligence. OCGA § 46-7-12 (a). The statute requires motor carriers to obtain a security bond or, in lieu of the bond, self-insurance or indemnity insurance, “for the benefit of . . . any person who shall sustain actionable injury or loss.” OCGA § 46-7-12 (b), (c), and (d). The carrier’s insurance policy “is not one of indemnity against loss as that term is generally understood[,] but is a direct and primary obligation to any person who shall sustain actionable injury or loss.” Great American Indem. Co. v. Vickers, 183 Ga. 233, 236 (188 SE 24) (1936). The injured person may sue the insurer directly on the insurance contract, as in an action against a surety on a surety bond. Id. at 237; see Farley v. Continental Ins. Co., 150 Ga. App. 389, 390-391 (258 SE2d 8) *378(1979). Permitting joinder of the carrier and insurer in the same action enables injured persons to recover compensation more efficiently and quickly and encourages insurers to resolve legitimate claims by settlement. Because the joinder provision of the Motor Carrier Act bears a reasonable relationship to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting the public, the statute does not violate the state’s equal protection clause.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Bell, P. J., Benham and Sears-Collins, JJ., who concur specially, and Weltner, C. J., who dissents as to Divisions 1, 3 and the judgment.We do not foreclose the possibility that this court may interpret the equal protection clause in the Georgia Constitution to offer greater rights than the federal equal protection clause as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 671 (398 SE2d 547) (1990) (finding 1983 Georgia Constitution provides broader protection than the First Amendment); Green v. State, 260 Ga. 625, 627 (398 SE2d 360) (1990) (finding State Constitution grants a broader right against self-incrimination than the U. S. Constitution); Fleming v. Zant, 259 Ga. 687, 690 (386 SE2d 339) (1989) (holding state constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is more extensive than federal constitutional standard).
The comments from the committee meetings on the equal protection paragraph are inconclusive about the meaning of “impartial and complete.” For example, some individuals thought the two “equal protection” sentences were logically connected. See, e.g., Comm. to Revise Art. I, Oct. 5, 1979, at 61 (statement of Gene Guerrero) (the statement “is saying that the fundamental duty of government is to protect individuals, persons and property and that in that protection each citizen is entitled to equal protection”). Some persons thought the two sentences said the same thing. See, e.g., Comm. to Revise Art. I, Oct. 25, 1979, at 10 (statement of F. H. Boney) (“You’re getting extremely close to equal when you say ‘shall be complete and impartial.’ I don’t know what it would mean if it didn’t mean that.”). Finally, some people thought the first sentence meant nothing. See, e.g., Select Comm., Jan. 9, 1980, at 55 (statement of House Speaker Thomas B. Murphy) (“I think that particular paragraph of our Constitution is a magnificent statement of nothing.”).
Advocates of the explicit guarantee of “equal protection” disagreed on whether to add a specific reference to “race, sex, national origin, religion or ancestry.” For example, the Article I Committee proposal stated:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of civil rights nor be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, sex, national origin, religion or ancestry.
See Article I Comm., Nov. 9, 1979 at 6-8. The Select Committee’s proposal deleted all of the words after “thereof.” See Select Comm., Jan. 9, 1980 at 42-43.