I respectfully dissent and would vacate appellant’s death sentence and remand for resentencing.
In my view the charge as a whole was confusing and could lead a juror to conclude incorrectly that the state satisfies its burden by proving at least one statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt and then the burden shifts to appellant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he *220should not be sentenced to death. State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301, 345 S.E.2d 481 (1986) (capital defendant has no burden of proof).
The trial judge stated in part:
[A]ny decision you make with regard to sentence for the defendant must be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt....
Also, you must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence you have decided to impose is the appropriate sentence in light of the record of the case.
A capital jury needs to understand the following concepts: (1) it could recommend life imprisonment even if it found the existence of one or more statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) it need not find a mitigating circumstance in order to impose life imprisonment; and (3) it could recommend a life sentence for any reason or no reason at all. State v. Atkins, 303 S.C. 214, 399 S.E.2d 760 (1990); State v. Tyner, 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E.2d 559 (1979). The judge did not instruct the jury on the first and third concepts. Furthermore, the judge instructed the jury at least twice that any sentencing decision must be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Considering the jury instructions as a whole, I believe a reasonable juror could have been confused and misled by the instruction and given the impression that there was a burden upon appellant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury should recommend mercy in the sentencing. Under these instructions, a reasonable juror could conclude the burden was on appellant to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he should not be sentenced to death.
Accordingly, I would vacate appellant’s death sentence and remand for resentencing.