(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with much of the analysis *53offered by the majority, I write separately to express my understanding of the proper interpretation of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). It is my opinion that by amending MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) to demand that mental disability claimants establish "actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof,” the Legislature sought to create a standard of causation that incorporated greater substantive objectivity. Because the majority seems to leave intact much of the purely "subjective causal nexus” test created by this Court in Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1, 26; 268 NW2d 1 (1978), abrogated by the Legislature in 1982, I respectfully dissent.
I
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that every word of a statute be given meaning and no word be treated as surplusage or rendered nugatory.1 MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that mental disabilities may be compensable "when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded perceptions thereof.” The majority properly interprets the first part of this phrase (the "actual events” language) as demanding the existence of actual (i.e., not delusional or imaginary) employment events. However, the majority interprets the second part of this phrase (the "unfounded perceptions” language) as merely reiterating the requirement that actual events of em*54ployment have existed.2 This conclusion is problematic.
It is manifestly clear from the unambiguous language of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) that "actual” employment events must exist to recover for a mental disability — recovery is only possible for disabilities "arising out of actual events of employment.” To what, therefore, does the "unfounded perceptions” language refer? The majority’s conclusion that this second requirement simply demands that "actual events” have existed renders the "unfounded perceptions” language superfluous, nugatory, and without independent effect. That "actual events” have occurred is already demanded by the first part of this phrase.
A more practical interpretation — one that gives effect to the clear and unambiguous language of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) — is that "unfounded perceptions” refers not to the existence of an event, but to a claimant’s interpretation or perception of an actual event. This conclusion does not reiterate the "actual events” requirement, but instead demands, as an independent matter and without unnecessary surplusage, that a claimant’s perception of actual events not have been unfounded.3
*55As importantly, this conclusion is consistent with the Legislature’s decision to abrogate the holding in Deziel, supra. The Deziel "subjective causal nexus” test permitted recovery if a claimant honestly perceived that mental injury resulted from an employment event. While the majority explains that "Deziel’s honest perception test permitted] a mental disability claim to be based on imagined, hallucinatory, or delusional events,” ante at 45 (emphasis added), in fact Deziel did not address "events” but, rather, dealt exclusively with "causation” determinations.4 Accordingly, while the Legislature’s 1982 amendment of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), may have added an "actual events” requirement, its motivation was to reverse the causation standard created by Deziel.
So what is "causation” in a mental disability case? Whether a claimant suffers from a preexisting mental infirmity, or whether the problem only surfaces during employment, compensable mental *56disabilities arise from perceptions of events. Being of a psychological origin, the disability affects the mind not the body. The claimant’s mind perceives actual events in such a manner that the compensable mental disability is induced, "contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by” the event in a significant manner. MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). Causation, therefore, in this context is nothing more than the process of perceiving events and reacting to them.
Under Deziel, this process of perception — i.e., causation — was as subjective as the claimant. Delusional, unfounded or imaginary misperceptions of events were, if honestly perceived by a claimant, potentially compensable. The Legislature inextricably altered this approach. Today, a claimant’s interpretation and perception of an actual event must not amount to an "unfounded perception” of that event — causation must be based in part on founded perceptions of actual events. To hold, as does the majority, that the "unfounded perceptions” language of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) refers to the existence of actual events, and not to causation or a claimant’s interpretation of those events, is simply inconsistent with the Legislature’s avowed purpose of invalidating Deziel,5 In fact, the majority holding leaves *57intact much of the "subjective causal nexus” test created in Deziel — once an "actual event” is established a claimant’s delusional, hallucinatory, or imagined perceptions of that event will not prohibit recovery. Thus, in reality, the "focal point” of the majority’s new causation standard continues to be "the plaintiff’s own perception of reality.” Deziel at 26.
II
My interpretation of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) does not create a purely objective approach to mental disability determinations. Nor does this approach abrogate the well-established principle of worker’s compensation law that "employers take employees as they find them, with all preexisting mental and physical frailties.” Ante at 48. In fact, this interpretation of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) demands that a hybrid of subjective and objective considerations be applied to three facets of an individual’s mental disability claim: 1) the existence of the event, 2) the claimant’s perception of the event, and 3) the claimant’s reaction to the event.
Objective analysis is reflected in the requirements that actual events of employment have occurred and that a claimant’s perception or interpretation of those events have been well-founded. This analysis demands both procedural and substantive objectivity. The existence of actual events and well-founded perceptions must be discerned by an objective trier of fact, not by the claimant. The standard of review is also objective — did the event actually occur, and was claimant’s perception of it well-founded?
Conversely, subjective analysis is proper in examining a claimant’s reaction to actual employ*58ment events, perceived in a well-founded manner. A claimant with a psychiatric disability cannot be expected to react to certain events, properly perceived, in a manner entirely consistent with that of a normal, healthy individual. However, neither the Legislature nor the position I advocate here demands such a reaction. While a claimant’s perception of the event must be objectively well-founded, that same claimant’s reaction to the event can be very atypical.6
In short, a mental disability claimant’s perception of actual events of employment must be established as well-founded. Once so established, a claimant’s reaction to the events is judged subjectively, taking into account all claimant’s preexisting infirmities and disabilities. This subjective analysis, individualized to the claimant, insures continued recognition of employers’ general obligation to “take employees as they find them.”
*59In summary, I agree with the majority that MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2), as amended, demands that actual events of employment be proven to an objective trier of fact. Ante at 46. I also agree that this provision requires objective proof of "a significant factual causal connection between the actual events of employment and the mental disability.” Ante at 46-47. However, and for the reasons stated above, I disagree with the majority that the "unfounded perceptions” language of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) simply refers to the existence of an employment event.
hi
GARDNER v VAN BUREN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board in Gardner v Van Buren Public Schools, 197 Mich App 265; 494 NW2d 845 (1992), interpreted and applied MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) consistent with my reading of the statute.7 The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the wcab "did not indicate why an objective person would find significant the two incidents that the wcab found satisfied the requirement of a personal injury.” Id. at 270. This "objective analysis” of causality by the Court of Appeals was erroneous insofar as it failed to distinguish between the objective standard for identifying a precipitating employment *60event and the subjective standard for assessing that event’s effect on a claimant. Once an actual event of employment is properly perceived by the claimant, it is the claimant’s reaction — not a hypothetical "objective person[’s]” — that matters. For this reason, in Gardner I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the wcab.
BOYLE v DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION
The wcab in Boyle v Detroit Bd of Ed, 197 Mich App 255, 261; 494 NW2d 818 (1992), concluded that, while claimant established certain events of employment, these events amounted to nothing more than "general allegations of stress and anxiety” and failed to meet the "actual events” requirement of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). Accordingly, the panel never fully addressed whether claimant’s perceptions of employment events were founded. The Court of Appeals affirmed, explaining that the "actual events” requirement "would become meaningless if the ordinary daily conditions and minutiae of employment were sufficient to support a mental disability claim.” Id. at 260. Like the wcab, the Court of Appeals did not determine whether claimant’s perceptions of employment events were founded. Both the wcab and the Court of Appeals erred.
The wcab is correct that specific employment events must be pleaded, and established, to support a mental disability claim. However, both the wcab and the Court of Appeals err in equating ordinary employment events with common workplace stresses. While this might be the normal reaction for the hypothetical reasonable worker, psychiatric disability claimants are often not such objective persons. What matters is whether an *61employment event occurred, and whether this event was perceived by the claimant in a founded manner. If so, it is then the claimant’s reaction that matters. Accordingly, ordinary and minute "actual events” of employment may, if properly perceived by a claimant, serve as the basis for a mental disability claim.8 I would reverse both the decision of the Court of Appeals and the wcab in Boyle, and remand to the wcab for further proceedings. See Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 225; 501 NW2d 76 (1993) (Riley, J., dissenting).
BACH v FLINT BOARD OF EDUCATION
The wcab in Bach properly interpreted and applied MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) and, accordingly, I would affirm its decision. While the Court of Appeals affirmance is slightly more problematic, I again would affirm.
The Court of Appeals explained that "the wcab found that plaintiff’s reaction, which was dependent on plaintiff’s perceptions, was unfounded.” Bach v Flint Bd of Ed, 197 Mich App 247, 251; 494 NW2d 815 (1992). This is not an accurate statement of the wcab decision or of the inquiry demanded by MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). The wcab found that claimant’s perception of actual employment events was unfounded. Accordingly, the wcab never considered whether claim*62ant’s subjective reaction significantly "contributed to or aggravated or accelerated” her mental condition. Further, and contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, claimant’s perception had to be founded; claimant’s reaction did not.
With this clarification, and because the remainder of the Court of Appeals opinion is accurate, I would affirm its decision in Bach.
Baker v General Motors Corp, 409 Mich 639, 665; 297 NW2d 387 (1980), (After Remand), 420 Mich 463; 363 NW2d 602 (1984), aff’d 478 US 621; 106 S Ct 3129; 92 L Ed 2d 504 (1986); Stowers v Wolodzko, 386 Mich 119; 191 NW2d 355 (1971); Klopfenstein v Rohlfing, 356 Mich 197; 96 NW2d 782 (1959); Wyandotte Savings Bank v State Banking Comm’r, 347 Mich 33; 78 NW2d 612 (1956); Baird v Detroit Election Comm, 316 Mich 657; 26 NW2d 346 (1947); United Ins Co v Attorney General, 300 Mich 200; 1 NW2d 510 (1942).
Specifically, the majority explains:
The statute [MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2)], by excluding "unfounded perceptions” of the actual events of employment, excludes situations in which the claimed events never occurred (i.e., where they are imagined, hallucinatory or delusional). [Ante at 49.]
This is just another way of saying that the existence of the event must be objectively proven — that the "unfounded perception” or belief in an occurrence is not an "actual event” within the meaning of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). Notably, however, this conclusion places no substantive limitations upon how the event must be perceived or interpreted by the claimant in order to recover benefits.
The requirement that an "actual event” have occurred is, in this *55sense, a condition precedent to further inquiry under the "unfounded perception” prong of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2). Under both this interpretation and the majority analysis an "actual event” will seldom be difficult to establish. In Bach, for example, "actual events” would have included such everyday occurrences as claimant having to inform callers that her supervisor was unavailable and the standard job evaluations that claimant received. In Boyle, "actual events” would include student absenteeism and declining interest, low student passage rates, curriculum cutbacks, and student disrespect for instructors. In Gardner, claimant’s grievance hearing, increased workload, and personal conflict with co-workers would suffice as "actual events.”
The Deziel Court defined the scope of its inquiry as follows:
This Court views the real problem underlying these three cases to be whether the wcab identified and correctly applied the legal standard for establishing legal causation in workers’ compensation cases involving mental and nervous injuries. More succinctly, the Court must decide whether the wcab properly states the causal nexus to be established by plaintiffs who allege that their disabilities and injuries are psycho-neurotically or psychotically rooted .... [Id. at 21. Emphasis in original.]
Interestingly, at least one passage from the legislative history of SB 1044 (which became 1980 PA 357), cited as supportive by the majority, in fact suggests that the "unfounded perceptions” language of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2) was intended to implicate not specific employment events but other aspects of the employment relationship, such as how an employee interpreted those events:
"After December 31, 1981 . . . [mjental disability will be compensable if it arises out of actual events of employment; an employee’s unfounded perceptions of the employment and its relationship to a mental disability will not be sufficient to substantiate a claim for compensation.” [Ante at 40-41, quoting Senate Analysis Service, SB 1044, Second Analysis, January 7, 1981. Emphasis added.]
Because the line between perception and reaction is arguably difficult to discern, I offer the following example to illustrate this important distinction.
Claimant One, who suffers from acute paranoia and a constant fear of death, is a postal worker who sorts mail at a branch office. One day, while at work, the claimant is caught in the cross fire of a shooting spree instigated by a disgruntled former postal employee. The claimant is physically unharmed and understands that the shooting is an isolated incident. Nevertheless, the shooting reinforces the claimant’s fear of death and, as a result, the claimant is unable to continue work for the Postal Service or any other employer. Because the claimant’s perception of this actual event was founded, his reaction is assessed subjectively. If the claimant can show that the event "contributed to or aggravated or accelerated” his mental disability in a significant manner, he is entitled to recovery.
Claimant Two, who also suffers from acute paranoia and a constant fear of death, is a postal worker sorting mail in a different branch office. One day, while at work, a fellow employee accidentally drops a heavy box onto the floor. The claimant, standing nearby, hears the loud bang and mistakes it for gunfire. Believing the incident to be a warning that he will soon be shot and killed, the claimant is unable to continue work for the Postal Service or any other employer. Because the claimant’s perception of this actual event is unfounded, his reaction is irrelevant and the claimant is not entitled to recover for a mental disability.
Specifically, the Gardner panel concluded that claimant had established a psychiatric disability significantly aggravated by two work-related actual events. Notably, the panel did not make an express finding that claimant’s perception of these events was founded. Rather, the panel concluded — on the basis of the testimony of three third-party witnesses, not on claimant’s testimony — that these events actually occurred as maintained in the complaint for benefits.
It is clear from these findings of fact that the Gardner panel implicitly found claimant’s perception of actual events not to have been unfounded.
While I acknowledge probable and understandable frustration of the Court of Appeals with "ordinary daily conditions and minutiae of employment” serving as the basis for a mental disability claim, it is nevertheless clear that the Legislature has only demanded that "actual” employment events, not objectively significant, abnormal, or uncommon incidents, serve as the basis for a mental disability claim. The concerns expressed by the Court of Appeals are more properly infused and analyzed under the "significant manner” causation requirement, not the "actual events” demand, of MCL 418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301)(2).