(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. The trial court relied on a recent, unanimous decision of this court (State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 639, 564 P.2d 1154 (1977)) in entering sua sponte the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The majority now overrules Smith and disavows the majority of cases which have addressed the issue before us. I do not agree with this wholesale rejection of an established, useful body of law.
The leading case affording a trial court the discretion to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity over the objection of the defendant is Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 818-19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 862 (1965). That court explained the reason for its holding as:
One of the major foundations for the structure of the criminal law is the concept of responsibility, and the law is clear that one whose acts would otherwise be criminal has committed no crime at all if because of incapacity due to age or mental condition he is not responsible for those acts. If he does not know what he is doing or cannot control his conduct or his acts are the product of a mental disease or defect, he is morally blameless and not criminally responsible. The judgment of society and the law in this respect is tested in any given case by an inquiry into the sanity of the accused. In other words, the legal definition of insanity in a criminal case is a codification of the moral judgment of society as respects a man's criminal responsibility; and if a man is insane in the eyes of the law, he is blameless in the eyes of society and is not subject to punishment in the criminal courts.
In the courtroom confrontations between the individual and society the trial judge must uphold this structural foundation by refusing to allow the conviction of an obviously mentally irresponsible defendant, and when there is sufficient question as to a defendant's mental responsibility at the time of the crime, that issue must become part of the case. Just as the judge must insist that the corpus delicti be proved before a defendant who has confessed may be convicted, so too must the judge forestall the conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible for his otherwise criminal acts. We believe then that, in the pursuit of justice, a trial judge must have the discretion to impose an *752unwanted defense on a defendant and the consequent additional burden of proof on the Government prosecutor.
(Footnote omitted.)
Although only a few courts in other jurisdictions have considered the issue of a trial judge imposing a not guilty by reason of insanity plea, most have allowed the trial court this discretion. See State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754 (Me. 1968) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit defendant to withdraw plea of not guilty by reason of insanity); Walker v. State, 21 Md. App. 666, 321 A.2d 170 (1974) (where court has before it competent, uncontra-dicted evidence that the accused was insane at the time of the crime, it would be manifest injustice to permit withdrawal of insanity plea); State v. Pautz, 299 Minn. 113, 217 N.W.2d 190 (1974) (to promote just determination of law, trial judge has authority to raise an insanity defense defendant had not affirmatively pursued). We unequivocally followed this trend in Smith in stating "the judge had inherent power to impose the insanity defense sua sponte over objection of defendant and his counsel." Smith, at 642-43.
The majority disapproves of Whalem and substitutes another formula therefor because it believes two United States Supreme Court decisions require such a result. Those cases are: North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970) and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, 95 S. Ct. 2525 (1975). These two cases were decided prior to our decision allowing the judge to enter the plea in Smith and are irrelevant. Recently, another court in United States v. Wright, 627 F.2d 1300, 1309-10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) fully explained its reasons for rejecting the very argument made by the majority. I agree with that court's analysis:
The government urges this court to reshape the Wha-lem rule in light of North Carolina v. Alford and California v. Faretta. Neither case involved an insanity issue, and for that reason alone their relevance is de minimus. *753When a criminal defendant's sanity is subject to question, doubt is cast not only on his competence to stand trial but also on the very capacity of our legal system to assign blame. The issue becomes whether there is sufficient question to require jury consideration of the defendant's ability to understand the law and conform his conduct to it — that is, whether he can be considered an autonomous, choice-making actor deserving blame for alleged wrongdoing. Protection granted a competent individual's choice has no bearing on this issue, which basically challenges the justification for punishment.
In this light, because Alford and Faretta protect rights of competent defendants, their holdings have little application to society's obligation, through the insanity defense, to withhold punishment of someone not blameworthy. A plainly nonfrivolous challenge to a defendant's mental responsibility requires inquiry because it suggests that the free will presupposed by our criminal justice system cannot be presumed. Thus, Alford's protection of a defendant's right to plead guilty, even while maintaining his own innocence, cannot similarly reserve the insanity plea decision to the defendant. Moreover, Alford itself is limited to permitting the self-claimed innocent's ability to enter a guilty plea. Certainly, this provides no authority for entrusting the entire decision on the insanity defense to the defendant.
Similarly, Faretta's explication of the "right to self-representation" has no bearing on the insanity issue. No defendant, whether acting pro se or through counsel, can restrain the court from considering whether the insanity defense should be raised. Even the right to self-representation at trial does not grant license to reshape the very foundations of our criminal law.
(Footnotes omitted.)
I find no compelling reason to change our established rule affording a trial court discretion to raise sua sponte the not guilty by reason of insanity plea. As stated by Judge Gallagher in his concurrence in the result in Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979), Whalem "seems entirely reasonable, and is there for guidance.” Frendak, at 384. Whalem and other cases following and expanding Whalem are not, contrary to the implications of the major*754ity, insensitive to the wishes of the defendant. For example, the opinion in United States v. Robertson, 430 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1977) fashioned sensible, workable criteria which indicate sensitivity toward a defendant. Those factors are:
[T]he quality of the evidence supporting the insanity defense; the defendant's wish in the matter; the quality of defendant's decision not to raise the defense; the reasonableness of defendant's motives in opposing presentation of the defense; and the Court's personal observations of the defendant throughout the course of the proceedings against him.
Robertson, at 446.
I believe that Whalem, Smith, and other cases permitting a trial court to impose the insanity defense over a defendant's objection better reflect the jurisprudential concerns underlying the insanity defense. I would hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case.
Petitioner further challenges the trial court's refusal to bifurcate the trial into a "guilt" phase and an "insanity" phase. The majority finds prejudice in this refusal. The trial court studiously allowed the prosecution to present the evidence of insanity only after the defense had presented its case of self-defense. I find the trial court acted properly. To hold otherwise would result in an incredible situation. Petitioner was diagnosed as a chronic paranoid schizophrenic, an illness which may cause delusions of a persecutory nature so that a person may perceive as reality threats or dangers which are in actuality imaginary. Persons suffering from this illness may physically assault their fancied persecutor. M. Sim, Guide to Psychiatry 471-72 (1963). To prevail on his claim of self-defense, petitioner had to convince the jury that his apprehension of danger was reasonable and use of force necessary. RCW 9A.16.020; State v. Wanrow, 88 Wn.2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). The jury could not rationally assess the reasonableness of Jones' state of mind without being apprised of his mental illness and his possible paranoid delusions. The jury is entitled to have such *755information in making its determination. Cf. United States v. Lindstrom, 32 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2485 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 1983). (Court held that testimony regarding the mental illness of a prosecutor's witness should have been allowed on cross examination. The jury should, within reason, be informed of all matters affecting a witness' credibility to aid in its determination of the truth.) The claim of self-defense and petitioner's mental illness are inseparable in this case. Thus, the trial court's refusal to grant a bifurcated trial was not error.
Rosellini, Brachtenbach, and Dolliver, JJ., concur with Dimmick, J.