concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 through 5 but depart from the position taken in Division 6 and perceive no reason to remand for hearing and further ruling.
It is true that under circumstances where new appellate counsel has not had the opportunity to raise the issue of ineffectiveness of *213counsel before the trial court, such as via an amended motion for new trial or an extraordinary motion for new trial, remand may be appropriate. Meders v. State, 260 Ga. 49, 55 (10) (389 SE2d 320) (1990). See Weems v. State, 196 Ga. App. 429 (395 SE2d 863) (1990); Seabolt v. State, 190 Ga. App. 244 (378 SE2d 416) (1989); Hightower v. State, 189 Ga. App. 553, 554 (3) (376 SE2d 717) (1988). Remand was directed even though new appellate counsel had opportunity for remedial action prior to the filing of the appeal.
Remand is not appropriate here because what appellant complains about neither requires a hearing nor constitutes ineffective assistance inasmuch as we have considered the merits of the issues appellant wished to have reviewed in every instance except Division 2. As to the substance of the roadblock issue raised there defendant has not demonstrated that the circumstances of the roadblock ran afoul of the Federal Constitution. See State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 29 (2) (318 SE2d 693) (1984). See also Michigan Dept, of State Police v. Sitz, _ U. S. _ (110 SC 2481, 110 LE2d 412) (1990). Consequently, the facts as to all the alleged instances of ineffectiveness are not in dispute and the law is settled.
Under the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), appellant must show not only deficiency in counsel’s performance but also that the deficiency prejudiced the defense, that is, that there was a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, without counsel’s deficiency. See Thompson v. State, 188 Ga. App. 508, 509 (373 SE2d 292) (1988).
The nature of appellant’s claim of ineffectiveness is that trial counsel failed to preserve for appellate review the aforementioned enumerated errors. While it is true that lack of objection in such instances results in waiver, review of the merits has shown them to be ill-based nevertheless. See Divisions 3, 4, and 5 of the majority opinion and the examination of the roadblock issue above. Therefore, trial counsel’s not excepting to what we have examined and found to be meritless claims of error, could not have prejudiced appellant in that he has not been denied review of these issues and a proper preservation would not have gained a reversal of the conviction. Thus appellant could not show ineffectiveness of counsel under Strickland, as a matter of law. Why remand it when the trial court’s determination could not be otherwise?
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen, Presiding Judge Banke, and Judge Cooper join in this opinion.
*214Decided December 5, 1990 Rehearing denied December 20, 1990 William M. Warner, for appellant. Gerald N. Blaney, Jr., Solicitor, David M. Fuller, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.