(concurring in result):
I concur with the result of the majority opinion, which essentially preserves the status quo and disadvantages neither party vis-a-vis the custody hearing (which may be scheduled within weeks of our decision because of the time it has required to process this appeal), but I cannot join its rationale. The majority opinion suggests that the “temporary” custody order originally of three-years’ duration, later modified to eighteen months, was reasonable and in the best interests of a child who was approximately two years old at the time of the original order. There are no findings by the trial court, nor anything in the record in this case, which support the proposition that such a “temporary” order was reasonable and in the child’s best interest. The original three-year order might possibly have been sustained on the theory that one parent would complete a re-education process in that period, but the arbitrary eighteen-month reduction appears in no way related to the child’s interests. Such an unusual and potentially disruptive protraction of the period of time in which a very young child’s permanent custody remains undecided and uncertain is, in my view, extremely unwise as a general rule. To be sustained, such an order should be supported by extensive evidence and explicit findings. Such evidence and such findings do not exist in this case.
I also note without further discussion my inability to join in the majority opinion’s affirmative reference in footnote 2 to the rule of preference for mothers of young children in disputed custody cases where all other things are equal. Since the majority opinion determines the rule to be inapplicable in this case, I will reserve discussion of its merits for a future case in which they must be reached.