dissenting:
The petition for habeas corpus filed by Coleman in this case alleged that his rights had been violated by the following administrative action taken at the Idaho State Correctional Institution: (1) that the state had failed to provide him with the rules and regulations of the correctional institution; (2) that he had been found guilty of a disciplinary offense, i.e., possessing an 8-inch knife in his cell when he was not responsible for its being there; and (3) that he was denied meaningful access to the courts in order to contest the disciplinary action and sanctions imposed upon him for the possession of the 8-inch knife.
The magistrate, to whom the case was assigned for hearing, reviewed the administrative record and found that the record before the hearing officer at the correctional institution supported the administrative action taken against Coleman. Specifically, on the only issue now before the Court on this appeal, the magistrate found that under Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), “The state must provide an adequate law library or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” The magistrate found that Coleman had access to the courts based upon assistance from a person trained in the law, and therefore the curtailment of Coleman’s access to the law library was not a constitutional violation, citing and relying upon the federal case of Seibert v. McCracken, 387 F.Supp. 275 (E.D.Okla.1974). Additionally, based upon the admin*905istrative record, the magistrate found “that the 10-day exclusion from the law library is not unreasonable and is a valid restriction which the state may impose on those inmates who do not comply with the regulations of the institution.”
On appeal, the district court affirmed all the magistrate’s findings and conclusions except those relating to the access to the law library. The district court acknowledged that Bounds v. Smith, supra, had held that access to adequate law libraries is only “one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts,” and that other “alternative means may be used.” The district court specifically quoted the following statement from Bounds:
“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.Ct. at 1498 (emphasis added).
The district court in this ease recognized that petitioner Coleman did have adequate assistance from an experienced inmate law clerk (Dean Schwartzmiller), and thus he was able to obtain his constitutional right of access to the courts through the “adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” This is the approved alternative method described in Bounds v. Smith, supra. Nevertheless, the district court held that “[t]he blanket ten-day limitation on access to the law library for inmates in disciplinary detention is unconstitutional.” However, its order concluded that “in this case the particular inmate did gain access to an inmate clerk and was not harmed by the rule. He is, therefore, not entitled to relief.” Although the state agrees with the district court’s conclusion that petitioner Coleman did receive access to the courts, and therefore he “is not entitled to relief,” as the magistrate had earlier held, the state appeals from the district court’s conclusion that “[t]he blanket ten-day limitation on access to the law library for inmates in disciplinary detention is unconstitutional.”
The majority opinion correctly acknowledges that “[i]t is well established that a habeas corpus petition must demonstrate not only that some statute, procedure or action was unconstitutional, but also that the petitioner was adversely affected — or prejudiced — by the constitutional violation. (Citing numerous cases.)” Ante at 902, 762 P.2d at 815. While both the district court and the majority of this Court have thus acknowledged that the petitioner must prove that he personally was adversely affected, not merely that someone else might be affected, the majority nevertheless states, without citing any authority, that “a prison policy can be found to be facially unconstitutional even though specific relief, i.e., library access in this instance, need not be awarded.”1 Ante at 902, 762 P.2d at 815. Aside from the fact that no authority is cited for that proposition, the statement ignores the constitutional doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court in Bounds v. Smith, supra. The Court there held that it is access to the courts, not access to a law library, which the Constitution guarantees. The Supreme Court of the United States expressly stated in Bounds that:
“[WJhile adequate law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here, as in Gilmore, does not foreclose alternative means to achieve that goal.” 430 U.S. at 830, 97 S.Ct. at 1499 (emphasis added).
Since there is no constitutional right to access to a law library, but only a constitu*906tional right to access to the courts, a prison policy which limits a prisoner, convicted of a disciplinary offense, from access to a law library for ten days is not a constitutional violation. As the Supreme Court noted in Bounds, a law library for prisoners could be eliminated entirely if other “alternative means to achieve that goal” were provided. As the Supreme Court expressly held in Bounds, one such alternative is “adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” That is what petitioner Coleman received in this case.
As both the magistrate and the district court specifically found, and as this Court acknowledges on appeal, Coleman did gain adequate access to the courts and thus was not harmed by the disciplinary action which restricted him to his cell for ten days. Accordingly, as the district court acknowledged, his constitutional right to access to the courts was not violated, and "[h]e is, therefore, not entitled to relief.” While his access to the library was restricted, that was not a constitutional violation. Only if Coleman’s constitutionally guaranteed right of access to the courts was violated would he have been entitled to relief. In this case there was no violation of Coleman’s access to the courts.
In an attempt to justify their result, the district court and the majority opinion have shifted the burden of proof from petitioner Coleman and placed it on the state, contrary to our prior decisions. In any habeas corpus case, the burden is upon the petitioner to prove that his constitutional rights have been violated and that he is entitled to relief. Jackson v. State, 87 Idaho 267, 392 P.2d 695 (1964), reh’g denied 1964. Accord Eagles v. United States, 329 U.S. 304, 314, 67 S.Ct. 313, 319, 91 L.Ed. 308 (1946). See In re Klor, 64 Cal.2d 816, 51 Cal.Rptr. 903, 415 P.2d 791 (1966) (en banc); Hithe v. Nelson, 172 Colo. 179, 471 P.2d 596 (1970) (en banc), reh’g denied 1970; McGee v. Crouse, 190 Kan. 615, 376 P.2d 792 (1962); In re Hart, 178 Mont. 235, 583 P.2d 411 (1978), reh’g denied 1978; Roberts v. Staples, 79 N.M. 298, 442 P.2d 788 (1968); Phillips v. Page, 451 P.2d 23 (Okla.Crim.App.1969); State ex rel. Gilmore v. Cupp, 1 Or.App. 22, 458 P.2d 711 (1969); Home v. Turner, 29 Utah 2d 175, 506 P.2d 1268 (1973). See also 39 Am.Jur.2d Habeas Corpus § 152 (1968 & Supp.1987). Idaho’s Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act is an expansion of, and in many respects a replacement for, the writ of habeas corpus, Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 459 P.2d 1017 (1969), and our post conviction cases all state that the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations upon which his petition is based. State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1988); Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d 983 (Ct.App.1983). The magistrate correctly placed the burden of proof on the petitioner Coleman and, based upon the administrative record which was before the magistrate, ruled that “the court finds that the ten-day exclusion from the law library is not unreasonable and is a valid restriction which the state may impose on those inmates who do not comply with the regulations of the institution,” citing Seibert v. McCracken, 387 F.Supp. 275 (E.D.Okla.1974). However, the district court, and now this Court on appeal, shifts the burden of proof to the state by stating that, “Where the government seeks to deprive persons of fundamental rights, it must prove to the Court that the law is necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest.” Ante at 903, 762 P.2d at 816 (emphasis added). However, the government did not seek to deprive Coleman of a “fundamental right.” There is no “fundamental right” of access to a law library.2 What the Constitution guarantees is the right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, supra. As the Supreme Court held in Bounds, “[L]aw libraries are [only] one constitutionally acceptable method to assure meaningful access to the courts____” There are other “alternative *907means to achieve that goal.” 430 U.S. at 830, 97 S.Ct. at 1499. Since the ten-day ban on access to the library did not violate any of Coleman’s constitutional rights, facially or otherwise, see footnote 1, the government did not have to “prove to the court that the law is necessary to promote a compelling or overriding interest,” as the majority opinion alleges. Ante at 903, 762 P.2d at 816. In any event, the magistrate who reviewed this case on the administrative record, which this Court doesn’t have, specifically found that “the ten-day exclusion from the law library is not unreasonable and is a valid restriction which the state may impose on those inmates who do not comply with the regulations of the institution.”
In conclusion, it bears repeating that there is no constitutional or “fundamental right” of access to a law library by a prisoner; only a constitutional right of access to the courts is mandated. As the magistrate and the district court found, and as the majority opinion acknowledges, this petitioner, Coleman, was accorded his constitutional right of access to the courts. His own evidence demonstrates that none of his constitutional rights were violated.
Accordingly, the decision of the magistrate court dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs.. The majority's statement that “a prison policy can be found to be facially unconstitutional,” even if an accurate statement of the law, would have no application in this case because the prison policy in question, i.e., a ten-day ban on access to the law library, is not facially unconstitutional because it does not impinge on any constitutional right of the prisoner. There is no constitutional right of access to a law library, only a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, supra. In order for there to be a “facially unconstitutional” argument, the prison policy would have had to impose a ban on access to the courts, which is the constitutional right involved, not merely a ban on access to a library, for which there is no constitutional right.
. The majority opinion’s reference to "fundamental rights" misfocuses the issue in this case. We are dealing here with a specific constitutional right, i.e., the right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, supra. The prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court have stated that there are certain "fundamental rights" emanating specifically from the United States Con*907stitution. Some of those rights include the following: (1) the right to travel interstate, Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 101 S.Ct. 2434, 69 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981); (2) the freedom of association, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); (3) the right to participate in the electoral process, Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); and (4) the right to privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965). On the other hand, some claimed rights have been held by the Supreme Court to not be fundamental rights: (1) the right to an equal education is not a "fundamental right,” San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973), reh'g denied 411 U.S. 959, 93 S.Ct. 1919, 36 L.Ed.2d 418 (1973); (2) the right to government employment is not a "fundamental right,” Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); and (3) the right to a statute of limitations defense is not a "fundamental right,” Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., — U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 2218, 100 L.Ed.2d 896 (1988). The Supreme Court of the United States has never held that the right of access to a law library is a “fundamental right.” It has also not held that access to a law library is a constitutionally guaranteed right. It has, however, in Bounds v. Smith, supra, held that the right of access to the courts is a constitutionally protected right, and that is the right involved in this case.