dissenting:
The majority, in affirming this award, has concluded that the administrative law judge’s findings that the workers’ death and injuries were not compensable because of the “going and coming” rule is supported by the law and by the record. I strongly disagree. Petitioners have posited several exceptions to the “going and coming” rule which the majority has designated as (1) the travel time exception, (2) the substantial benefits exception, and (3) the special hazards exception. In my opinion, both the law and the record support the “substantial benefits” exception to the going and coming rule. I would set aside the award.
The majority has selected the term “substantial” as it relates to “benefits.” The parties in their written briefs before this court have used the terms “special” and “significant”, rather than “substantial”, in reference to “benefits.” I shall follow the term selected by the majority with the understanding that in this case there is no substantive difference between these terms.
The administrative law judge found that the $6.001 per diem paid to each worker *153represented reimbursement for the expenses of traveling and not payment for travel time. I have no quarrel with this finding and believe that it was supported by substantial evidence. The majority states that since we are concerned with “travel expense reimbursement” rather than “travel time”, any further analysis shifts “... from a conclusive inference of employer liability to one of examining the ‘total employment picture’ in this case.” I agree.
The majority also recognizes that “[cjlaimed exceptions to ‘going and coming’ rule cases must be reviewed on a case-by-case determination of each particular fact situation.” Again, I agree. It is with the ensuing analysis and conclusion that I disagree. In my opinion, an examination of the “total employment picture”, together with applicable law, clearly demonstrates that the substantial benefits exception applies to the case presently before us.
The petitioners contend that the employer specially benefited in several respects from the worker travel time. Originally the employer had refused to make any sort of travel payment to the workers, but was forced to reach a compromise and pay $6 per day for travel allowance in order to induce qualified, skilled workers from the various crafts to travel the long distances from their homes to the job site. It was also established that many workers quit or complained because of the long distances required to travel to the power plant construction site, and that many workers computed their “work day” including time consumed in travel to and from the construction site to be 12 to 14 hours a day, only 8 of which constituted actual work hours at the power plant.
It is also undisputed that Bechtel benefited from the travel because it did not have to provide housing at or near the construction site. In my opinion, these “benefits” are substantial and legally sufficient to satisfy the second element of the subject exception to the going and coming rule. As stated in 1 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 16.30, at 4-159 to 4-172:
[I]n the majority of cases involving a deliberate and substantial payment for the expense of travel, or the provision of an automobile under the employee’s control, the journey is held to be in the course of employment. This result is usually correct, because when the subject of transportation is singled out for special consideration it is normally because the transportation involves a considerable distance, and therefore qualifies under the rule herein suggested: that employment should be deemed to include travel when the travel itself is a substantial part of the service performed.
The sheer size of the journey is frequently the principal fact supporting this conclusion, as in the successful cases involving trips of eight miles, 20 miles, 22 miles, 30 miles, 50 miles, 54 miles, 60 miles, 120 miles, and 130 miles.
The record shows that the construction site for the power plant is located 50 miles west of downtown Phoenix. It is uncontested that the workers commonly faced a round-trip travel each day of approximately 100 miles or more. It is also clear from the record that the travel allowance was an inducement to the union-represented workers to reach an agreement with Bechtel. Indeed, it appears that there would have been no agreement absent the provision on travel allowance.
In my opinion, the Arizona decisions also support petitioners’ position. In J.D. Dutton, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 120 Ariz. 199, 584 P.2d 1190 (Ct.App.1978), the injured worker was employed by the employer at a construction project approximately 45 miles from the worker’s home. The worker had, on all but a few occasions, been given a ride both to and from the work site by the project supervisor who lived in the same town. The court stated:
The time spent by Nelson and Dyer going to and from work also benefited Dutton. The nature of Dutton’s construction business necessarily required considerable travel by supervisory personnel. The trip to and from the construction site was long and ardous. Nelson *154agreed that having Dyer as a passenger “made it a little bit easier [for him] to get home at night,” and that Dyer occasionally drove the truck when Nelson did not feel able to do so. When Dutton authorized Nelson to furnish company transportation for other employees, Dutton implicitly recognized that transportation was a part of its overall concerns on this remote job.
120 Ariz. at 201, 584 P.2d at 1192. The court went on to hold that the hearing officer had properly determined that the injuries were sustained in the course and scope of employment and came within an exception to the going and coming rule.2
Although Serrano v. Industrial Commission, 75 Ariz. 326, 256 P.2d 709 (1953), is not controlling authority since, strictly speaking, it involved payment for “travel time”, it nevertheless contains some indication as to when travel becomes part of the job. In Serrano, the worker was employed at the Davis Dam construction project in northwest Arizona. The closest living accommodations were in Kingman, Arizona, and the workers had to travel from 32 to 35 miles a day going to and from the job. The court stated:
There having been no housing, board or lodging accommodations provided for employees at or near the Dam where the work was being done it was necessary that these employees reside where such accommodations could be obtained. Kingman was the closest point to the job where such accommodations were available. As stated by the witness Wallace that was the primary reason for allowing the travel pay. Therefore in order for petitioner to perform his work on the job he had to travel to and from Kingman which was certainly incidental to the work done on the job. His travel between Kingman and the Dam did not only fall within the category of what he may reasonably do but it was as much a part of his employment as the actual work on the job. It was within the time, the place and the circumstances of his employment, and the cause producing the accident had its source within the employment and in a risk inherent therein, to wit, the hazard of traveling to and from his job to the only available living accommodations.
75 Ariz. at 330-31, 256 P.2d at 711.
In the present case, it is clear from the record that the employer provided no housing or other living accommodations at or near the nuclear plant construction site. It also appears that there was no existing housing available to the employees near the construction site, thereby necessitating that all employees drive a considerable distance to and from work, á distance which we note was considerably further than that present in Serrano, supra.
I also note that other jurisdictions have found a substantial benefit to the employer from worker travel sufficient to justify compensability in similar situations. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Department of Labor and Industries, 25 Wash.App. 103, 604 P.2d 1334 (1980); Gordon v. H.C. Smith Construction Co., 612 P.2d 668 (Mont.1980); McMillen v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 165 Mont. 462, 166 Mont. 400, 533 P.2d 1095 (Mont.1975); Jensen v. Manning & Brown, Inc., 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (Wyo.1947).
In Westinghouse, the worker stayed at or near the job site at Grand Coulee Dam throughout the week, but returned to his home on the weekends. The distance between the job site and the home was approximately 100 miles. Under the negotiated union contract, the worker was paid $15 per day travel allowance. The Washington court stated:
The fact that Allyn stayed in Coulee City during the week and drove home only on *155weekends does not change the nature of the contract nor the fact that the travel was an integral part of his employment. ... The travel allowance was an inducement for the worker to travel to a distant jobsite which was a mutual benefit to both employer and employee....
25 Wash.App. at 107, 604 P.2d at 1337.
In examining the “total employment picture”, it is also my opinion that the workers’ travel here is different from that of other commuters. First, the distance involved here is much greater than the average commuting trip. Second, the workers here involved were induced, and would not have agreed, to work at the plant unless some arrangement for travel expenses was made by the employer. Third, there was no housing provided at the project construction site by the employer, nor was there any available nearby. The nature of the nuclear plant made it necessary that the plant be constructed in a remote area, and this meant that all of the construction workers at the plant were required to travel a great distance to and from work every day.
A further matter which gives me some concern in viewing the “total employment picture” is the absence of any provision in the Stabilization Agreement avoiding worker’s compensation coverage for the travel. Indeed, it appears from the record that the negotiators for both labor and the corporation did not discuss or consider the effect of the travel allowance provision upon worker’s compensation coverage for the travel to and from the plant. In my opinion, the petitioners need not show an intention to extend workmen’s compensation. coverage to the travel; rather, it is the respondents who must show an express agreement avoiding coverage for the travel. This an employer can do. Ebasco Services v. Bajbek, 79 Ariz. 89, 284 P.2d 459 (1955); see also Fisher Contracting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 27 Ariz.App. 397, 555 P.2d 366 (1976).
I have examined the “total employment picture” in this case. I have also examined pertinent Arizona decisions bearing on the questions presented. I have also examined similar cases from other jurisdictions. Based upon this examination, together with the omnipresent consideration that the purpose of workmen’s compensation is remedial and that the provisions should be construed liberally so as to effectuate the purposes of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Van Nelson v. Industrial Commission, 134 Ariz. 369, 656 P.2d 1230 (1982), I conclude that the substantial benefits exception to the general going and coming rule applies to the case presently before us. I would set aside the award which denied compensability.
. The amount of payment was subject to review. It was subsequently increased to $11.00 and is subject to future review.
. See also Fisher Contracting Co. v. Industrial Commission, 27 Ariz.App. 397, 555 P.2d 366 (1976), wherein the court held that the total employment picture supported the hearing officer’s finding that the travel was within the course of the deceased’s employment. The court relied upon the facts that considerable travel was required by the job of the construction employees and that all permanent salaried employees were furnished with pickups and required to use the pickups in their travel.