I concur in the judgment, but I am unable to agree fully with either of the opinions of my colleagues.
On the one hand the majority hold the highway patrol officer had no duty to assist a citizen who was injured and whose motor vehicle was damaged on a highway. The Chief Justice, on the other hand, adopts what is rather extravagantly referred to as “the expanding nature of the special relationship doctrine”; here this doctrine is deemed to require a public law enforcement officer “to marshal information for the purposes of [private] civil litigation.”
The case need not be decided on the basis of either extreme: there is ample authority for a moderate position which recognizes the duty that does exist but *29gives effect to the legislative intent that a public employee and his employer have immunity from civil liability for discretionary acts. (Gov. Code, § 820.2; see also id., §§ 815.2, subd. (b), 818.2, 821) Indeed, in a somewhat different context we adopted that principle in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d. 425 [131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166]; curiously the dissent embraces that case but overlooks the immunity granted the peace officers therein (id. at p. 449).
Unlike the majority, I find it difficult to equate a highway patrol officer who has prescribed duties on public highways with a Good Samaritan who volunteers to assist a stranger. McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 70 Cal.2d 252 [74 Cal.Rptr. 389, 449 P.2d 453], Clemente v. State of California (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 374 [161 Cal.Rptr. 799], and Mann v. State of California (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 773 [139 Cal.Rptr. 82], are instructive on the duty owed to a vehicle operator by a peace officer, although their interpretation of statutory immunity is debatable.
State highway patrol officers have all the powers of peace officers as to offenses committed on any highway. (Pen. Code, § 830.2, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 2409.) They “shall enforce all laws regulating the operation of vehicles and the use of the highways” and “shall have full responsibility and primary jurisdiction for the administration and enforcement of such provisions and laws, and for the investigation of traffic accidents, on all state highways” (id., § 2400). They are to patrol the highways “at all times” (id., § 2401). Highway patrol vehicles may be equipped with stretcher and first aid equipment for use in transporting injured persons (id., § 2406). The highway patrol gathers, tabulates and analyzes accident reports, and may conduct research into the cause and control of accidents (id., §§ 2407, 2408). Patrolmen may direct traffic as conditions warrant (id., § 2410). All members of the highway patrol may investigate accidents resulting in personal injuries and gather evidence for the purpose of prosecuting persons guilty of any violations of the law contributing to the accident (id., § 2412). It is unlawful to fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order, signal or direction of any traffic officer (id., § 2800); “traffic officer” includes highway patrolmen (id., § 625). The highway patrol shall provide proper and adequate policing of all vehicular crossings to insure enforcement of laws (id., § 23251). A public employee is not liable for civil damages for injuries caused by his vehicle while in pursuit of a suspected violator of the law (id., § 17004). Highway patrol officers who provide emergency medical services at the scene of an emergency shall be liable in civil damages only for gross negligence or acts not in good faith (Health & Saf. Code, § 1769.5).
The foregoing, read together and with reasonable inferences therefrom, indicate that the highway patrol officer in the case at bar, concerned as he was with highway safety, vehicle code provisions, and aid to injured persons on *30public highways, had a duty to this plaintiff who was injured in a motor vehicle on a public highway.
Having determined that the highway patrol officer had a duty to this plaintiff, I reach the problem of the manner in which that duty was to be exercised. Confronted with a seriously injured passenger, a damaged motor vehicle, two other damaged vehicles, potential witnesses at the site, and a fugitive truck that caused the injury and damages, the patrolman was faced with a dilemma. Should he attend to the injuries, should he remove the vehicles from the highway on which they might become a hazard to other motorists, should he seek and identify witnesses before they leave the scene, or should he pursue the truck that initially created the problem? Therein lies the imperative to exercise discretion. No matter which of the several alternatives he selected, someone could persuasively argue that another deserved priority. This scenario lends itself to typical Monday-morning quarterbacking.
It is for just such a circumstance that the Legislature provided immunity when discretion of a public employee is involved. (Gov. Code, § 820.2.) If discretion was exercised in a reasonable and nonnegligent manner, the conduct cannot result in liability even though another person, acting equally reasonably, might have handled the situation differently.
In my opinion, the officer cannot be faulted for failing to give the potential civil suit of this plaintiff his priority attention. The alleged negligence here merely refers to the officer choosing one course of action over another; thus the statutory immunity for exercising discretion applies.