dissenting.
Code Ann. § 6-802 requires that the notice of appeal contain "a concise statement of the judgment, ruling or order entitling the appellant to take an appeal,” as does the form for notice of appeal set out in Code Ann. § 6-1202. Code Ann. § 6-809 (d) requires consideration "notwithstanding that the notice of appeal fails to specify definitely the judgment appealed from,” etc. However, in Ballew v. State, 225 Ga. 547 (170 SE2d 242) it was held that not specifying the judgment definitely was one thing, and failing to specify any judgment still required dismissal (although, as shown in the dissenting opinion, there was only one final judgment in the record). The same rule was followed in Head v. Gulf Oil Corp., 225 Ga. 21 (165 SE2d 658) and in Hicks v. State, 121 Ga. App. 52 (172 SE2d 453). In this case the plaintiffs merely recite that within 30 days of the court’s order arid judgment they "present their notice of appeal and pray that the same be certified in order that said case may be carried to the Court of Appeals of Georgia,” etc. Nor is any final judgment mentioned ijn the enumeration of errors, which directs itself only to tjhe grant of the motion for verdict. Neither the notice o)f appeal nor the enumeration of errors, therefore, specifies any final judgment. In this it differs from Housing Authority of City of Douglas v. *930Marbut Co., 229 Ga. 403 (191 SE2d 785), where it does at least appear in both the notice of appeal and the enumeration of errors that there was a final judgment for money damages. Neither the notice of appeal nor the enumeration of errors specifies an appealable judgment, as required by statute.
I would grant the motion to dismiss the appeal.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pannell and Judges Quillian and Evans join in this dissent.