ORDER DIRECTING ENLARGEMENT OF OPINION AND DENYING MOTION FOR REHEARING.
PER CURIAM.The defendant has moved for a rehearing, stating, inter alia, that our opinion, filed October 24, 1968, failed to dispose of certain matters raised in the briefs. We deny the motion and direct that our opinion be supplemented as follows: On page 2, following the first full paragraph and before the block heading “DID THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOW EVIDENCE,” " etc., insert the following:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SEPARATE TRIALS?
The defendant alleges that it was error to try him and his wife during the same trial because it deprived them of the anti-marital fact privilege, A.R.S. § 12-2232, citing State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533, 89 A.L.R.2d 461 (1960). This same question was raised on the first appeal in this case and was decided adversely to the defendant. It would ordinarily become the law of the case. We have noted, however, that the case upon which we relied in deciding this question in our former opinion, State v. Goodyear, 98 Ariz. 304, 404 P.2d 397 (1965), has recently been indirectly overruled by the United States Supreme Court. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). (Bruton is made applicable to the states by Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100 (June 10, 1968) ).
An examination of both Bruton and Turnbow reveal, however, that those decisions are based upon a showing of prejudice to the defendant. We find no such prejudice in this case. A thorough examination of the record has convinced us that no otherwise privileged communication between the husband-wife defendants in this case was introduced. The privilege only extends to communications and does not apply to acts. Posner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 56 Ariz. 202, 106 P.2d 488 (1940). We again find this contention to be without merit.
At page 7, following the first full paragraph and before block heading “DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ALLOWING TESTIMONY,” etc., add:
The defendant also contends that the following statement by the prose*523cutor, in summation to the jury, constituted reversible error:
“I have tried to bring evidence before you, all of the evidence I could. There are certain things that we can’t get in * * (Emphasis supplied)
The statement infers that the defendant was guilty of misconduct toward his child in other ways or instances in addition to those described at trial. We again agree with the defendant that such conduct is improper and we do not condone it. We agree with People v. Perez, 58 Cal.2d 229, 23 Cal.Rptr. 569, 373 P.2d 617, 3 A.L.R.3d 946 (1962), as to a prosecutor’s duty toward assurance of a fair trial. It is our duty, however, to determine whether or not a fair trial was had, not whether it was perfect. State v. Haffa, 246 Iowa 1275, 71 N.W.2d 35 (1955).
While it is true that argument before the jury as to evidence which has been excluded by the court, or withdrawn after objection, or simply not in evidence, may constitute reversible error, Canova v. State, 151 Tex.Cr.R. 252, 207 S.W.2d 404 (1947); Stapleton v. State, 107 Tex.Cr.R. 596, 298 S.W. 578 (1927); People v Perez, supra, We do not feel that the vague statement made by the prosecution in this case was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. The defendant cites no authority, and we are unable to find any, in which a similar statement has been held to be reversible error. See State v. Cutlip, 131 W.Va. 141, 46 S.E.2d 454 (1948); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910).