This case involves a condemnation proceeding under the Special Masters Act (Code Ann. Ch. 36-6 A). The condemnee appeals on a certificate of immediate review, challenging the constitutionality of a portion of Code *282Ann. § 36-610a, the form of the special master’s report, the special master’s decision as to the necessity for the taking, and the trial court’s confirming order.
Georgia Power Company filed a petition in Forsyth Superior Court seeking condemnation under Code Ch. 36-6A of an easement for a transmission line across the property of the condemnee. The condemnee filed an answer and counterclaim including a prayer for an injunction. The court granted a temporary restraining order, ex parte. Later at the hearing on the injunction the condemnee argued that part of Code Ann. § 36-610a, which permits the special master to make conclusive findings on all matters material to the condemnation proceeding, unconstitutionally denies the condemnee the right to a jury trial and due process of law. The court dissolved the temporary restraining order and directed the special master to proceed with the hearing on the petition, answer and counterclaim.
After that hearing, the special master entered an award of $10,000 and dismissed the counterclaim and special defenses raised by the condemnee. The special master did not submit findings of fact. The condemnee made timely exceptions and appealed to the Forsyth Superior Court.
After a hearing, the court ordered "absolute title in and to said easement” to vest in Georgia Power Company. The order made no reference to the exceptions filed by the condemnee to the special master’s report. The condemnee appeals from this order.
1. The condemnee contends that the court erred in referring the entire proceeding to the special master rather than allowing a hearing before the court on the issues raised, other than the value of the property. Alternatively he argues that he should have the right of appeal to a jury from the special master’s rulings. He reasons that, since Code Ann. § 36-610a makes the award of the special master and the judgment of the court conclusive, sending the proceedings to the special master without first determining the nonvalue issues is a denial of his constitutional right to due process, equal protection and trial by jury.
A condemnation proceeding under the statutory *283provisions codified as Chapter 36-6A has just recently been upheld as constitutional against a due process attack. In Brown v. Ga. Power Co., 134 Ga. App. 784 (1) (216 SE2d 613), the Court of Appeals found that due process requirements are satisfied by Code Ch. 36-6A in that it gives the condemnee notice as well as an opportunity for a hearing. In Brown, the constitutional attack was directed at the procedure and order. Filed originally in this court, it was transferred to the Court of Appeals for decision, following which certiorari was denied. The constitutional attack in the case now before us is directed at the statute but we find Brown applicable and sound.
The constitutional guaranty of trial by jury does not extend to eminent domain proceedings. Oliver v. Union Point & W. P. R. Co., 83 Ga. 257, 261 (9 SE 1086); Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v.Postal-Tel. Cable Co., 112 Ga. 941, 943 (38 SE 353); Anthony v. State Hwy. Dept., 215 Ga. 853, 855 (113 SE2d 768). Code Ann. § 36-614a, however, does provide for an appeal from the award of the special master to a jury on the issue of the value of the property even though the Constitution may not require a jury trial.
Although there is no right to an appeal from a special master award to a jury on nonvalue issues, an appeal to the superior court is provided if exceptions have been timely filed. Leach v. Ga. Power Co., 228 Ga. 16 (4) (183 SE2d 755); Wiggins v. City of Macon, 120 Ga. App. 197 (1) (169 SE2d 667).
The condemnee has made no argument in his brief or at oral argument pointing out how his constitutional right to equal protection has been violated.
Code Ann. § 36-610a does not violate the condemnee’s constitutional rights for any reason urged.
2. The condemnee argues that the report of the special master should have contained findings of fact and conclusions of law as are required by the provisions of the Code concerning auditors, Chapter 10, specifically Code Ann. § 10-203, relating to the auditor’s report containing his findings and conclusions upon the law and the facts.1
*284Code Ann. § 36-606a provides for the appointment of a special master by the superior court. It lists his qualifications and then states that "His relation and accountability to the court shall be that of an auditor or master in the general practice existing in this State...” In Wiggins v. City of Macon, 120 Ga. App. 197, supra, p. 199, the court compared a special master with an auditor in order to explain that the rulings of neither are immediately final. Code Ann. § 36-606a obviously contemplates the possibility of exceptions and an appeal thereon to the superior court.
However, Leach v. Ga. Power Co., 228 Ga. 16 (4), supra, held that the procedural provisions of Chapter 10 applicable to auditors are not applicable to special masters appointed in condemnation proceedings. Although the relationship and accountability of a special master to the court is that of an auditor, a special master is not obligated by Code Ann. § 36-606a to render a report in the manner prescribed in Code Ann. § 10-203.
3. The condemnee argues that Georgia Power Company acted arbitrarily and capriciously and abused its discretion in selecting the direction the transmission line would follow on the condemnee’s property.
The Georgia law is well settled that much discretion is vested in the condemnor to determine the necessity for the taking and to select the particular property to be condemned. Miles v. Brown, 223 Ga. 557 (156 SE2d 898), and cits. This discretion will not be interfered with or controlled by the courts unless it is shown that the condemning authority acted in bad faith or beyond the powers conferred upon it by law. Miles v. Brown, supra.
At the hearing before the special master, Georgia Power Company presented sufficient evidence of the necessity for the transmission line and of the care exercised by Georgia Power Company in the selection of the property to be taken. We find, therefore, that there is no merit in this contention of the condemnee.
4. The condemnee cites as error the order of the trial court confirming the report of the special master because it failed to state that the exceptions were overruled and because the order vested "absolute title in and to said easement” in Georgia Power Company.
*285Argued July 8, 1975 Decided September 12, 1975 Rehearing denied September 30, 1975.Code Ann. § 36-613a authorizes the judge to enter order and judgment condemning the property when the award of the special master is entered (filed pursuant to Code Ann. § 36-612a) and presented to the court. Code Ann. § 36-614a grants 10 days from the filing of the award for the filing of an appeal to a jury as to the issue of the value of the property. Exceptions to the special master’s rulings on nonvalue issues must be made prior to the judgment authorized by Code Ann. § 36-613a. Ga. Power Co. v. Baggarley, 133 Ga. App. 399 (211 SE2d 23). This court has not squarely faced the question of whether exceptions to the special master’s nonvalue rulings, filed within 10 days of his award but after judgment of condemnation, are timely. Nor must we do so here under the facts of this case.
The special master report and award was filed December 20,1974. Exceptions to the report were timely filed by the condemnee. On February 3,1975, a hearing on the exceptions was held before the trial court. On February 25,1975, the court’s order affirming the special master’s report was entered. Although the order did not specifically refer to the exceptions, it was entered after the court had the benefit of the hearing of February 3 as well as the transcript of the special master’s hearing. The facts of this case distinguish it from City of Atlanta v. Turner Advertising Co., 234 Ga. 1 (214 SE2d 501). We find no error here.
It was proper for the order to vest "absolute title in and to said easement” in Georgia Power Company. An easement was sought by Georgia Power Company in the petition initiating the condemnation. The order is in conformity with the petition and the evidence at the hearings on the condemnation. Leach v. Ga. Power Co., supra, (6).
Condemnee’s remaining enumerations of error have been disposed of adversely to him by the rulings specified above.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Nichols, C. J., and Ingram, J., who dissent. Jordan, J., disqualified. *286Dillard, Dillard & Shearer, George P. Dillard,, for appellant. Boling, Neville & Shinall, Richard Neville, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, for appellee.Compare Code Ann. § 81A-152 (a) which is not in issue here.