dissenting.
Although I concur in Division 1, which rules that the evidence *143was sufficient to support the verdict beyond a reasonable doubt, I do not agree that the loss of concluding argument constituted reversible error.
The reason is two-fold. First, defendant did not object. When defendant first sought to use the document without tendering it, he responded to the State’s objection by merely stating that it was for impeachment purposes and offered no authority for allowing such use without the document being admitted as evidence. Instead, he acquiesced in the court’s ruling (“Okay”) and tendered the document, which was admitted without objection.2
Then, after defendant testified as his only witness and the State introduced no rebuttal evidence, and after the charge conference out of the jury’s presence, the court announced that “under the rules of procedure which govern a trial such as this one, the State has the opportunity to open and conclude closing arguments.” According to the Supreme Court of Georgia, “[t]he purpose in allowing an accused with no defense to have the opening and concluding argument is to allow his counsel every opportunity to persuade the jury that the State has failed to prove his guilt.”3 Defendant did not object to the trial court’s orchestration but instead proceeded to give his closing argument when the State waived the opening. No right to close was asserted after the State closed. Defendant did not complain of this in his motion for new trial either.
Failure to object on the ground that he was not required by law to admit the victim’s statement into evidence waived the error. The Supreme Court of Georgia ruled in Scott v. State, 243 Ga. 233, 234-235 (2) (253 SE2d 698) (1979): ‘When the court announced that the state would have opening and closing arguments, appellant made no objection, and enumerates the error for the first time on appeal. A party cannot during the trial ignore what he thinks to be an injustice, take his chances on a favorable verdict, and complain later. [Cit.] Out of this principle evolves the further premise that matters not objected to at trial cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. [Cit.]” This is precisely that situation.
Second, although the OCGA § 17-8-71 right to open and conclude, when defendant introduces no evidence other than his own testimony, is a valuable right, failure to afford this right does not require a new trial where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Scott, supra at 235; see Seyden v. State, 78 Ga. 105, 109 (4) (1886) *144(proof so strong it overcame presumption of harm); Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59 (230 SE2d 869) (1976) (highly probable that error did not contribute to verdict because evidence overwhelming); Matthews v. State, 268 Ga. 798, 803 (4) (493 SE2d 136) (1971) (“it is fundamental that harm as well as error must be shown for reversal”); Seavers v. State, 208 Ga. App. 711, 712 (3) (431 SE2d 717) (1993) (even if defendant should have had closing, overwhelming evidence of guilt made error harmless). That is the case here.
Decided April 9, 1998 Warren A. Sellers, for appellant. Rodney R. Whitehead, pro se. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Todd E. Naugle, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.The victim recognized the defendant during the robbery and named him immediately in her call to police, the police went to the apartment he shared with his mother but he was absent, the victim confirmed her identification by hearing him speak several hours later at the police station, and the sole defense was that the victim was mistaken and Whitehead was at home sleeping at the time of the robbery. The victim had worked together with defendant for about a month before she fired him three weeks before the robbery. Defendant knew the restaurant’s standard opening procedure which was begun by the victim on the morning of the robbery because he had worked that shift. During the robbery he used the same derogatory term as a substitute for “women” which the victim testified he had “always” used at work.
The fact that the defendant did not have the last word with the jury could not have affected the verdict to his detriment.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge McMurray join in this dissent.
Compare Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 404 (4) (480 SE2d 1) (1996) (defendant who presents evidence under guise of cross-examination loses right to open and close); Warnock v. State, 195 Ga. App. 537, 538 (2) (394 SE2d 382) (1990) (prior statement used on cross-examination to impeach, admitted in evidence, right to open and close waived).
Yeomans v. State, 229 Ga. 488, 492 (4) (192 SE2d 362) (1972).