concurring specially.
Although I concur fully in Divisions 1 (b) and 2 and the judgment, I do not agree with Division 1 (a), because I do not believe the expert testimony regarding the battered person syndrome was admissible in this case under Georgia law, nor am I persuaded by the foreign authority relied upon by the majority.
I believe, as did the trial court, that this issue is on all fours with Graham v. State, 239 Ga. App. 429 (521 SE2d 249) (1999). There, as here, a mother accused of aggravated child molestation and child molestation against her children attempted to introduce evidence of the prior domestic violence against her by her husband/co-defendant in order to support her justification defense based on the battered person syndrome. As held there,
“In this state, the battered person syndrome is not a separate defense and (evidence supporting .this syndrome) is admissible only to assist the jury in evaluating a defendant’s claim of self-defense” under OCGA § 16-3-21. (Citations' omitted.) Chester v. State, 267 Ga. 9, 10 (471 SE2d 836) (1996), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196, 200, n. 5 (486 SE2d 819) (1997). See also Selman v. State, 267 Ga. 198 (475 SE2d 892) (1996); Chapman v. State, 259 Ga. 706, 707 (4) (386 SE2d 129) (1989), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, supra, 268 Ga. at [200], n. 5; Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 619 (277 SE2d 678) (1981); Pugh v. State, 191 Ga. App. 394 (382 SE2d 143) (1989). However, self-defense is not an issue in this trial, where the criminal acts were directed toward non-aggressor victims. Accordingly, the battered person defense was not available . . . and the trial court did not err in excluding evidence thereof. See Freeman v. State, 269 Ga. 337, 339 (1) (d) (496 SE2d 716) (1998).
(Emphasis supplied.) Graham v. State, supra at 431 (1). See also Gravitt v. State, 279 Ga. 33, 34 (2) (608 SE2d 202) (2005) (citing Graham, supra, for the proposition that self-defense and defense of others are not in issue when the defendant’s acts are directed toward a nonaggressor victim).
The majority acknowledges that Pickle did file a notice of the defense of battered person syndrome and coercion. That defense was not withdrawn prior to trial and it was only during arguments *835regarding the State’s motion in limine to exclude the expert testimony on battered person syndrome that the defense began to argue that the evidence was to explain Pickle’s conduct.
As succinctly noted by the trial court, evidence of the battered person syndrome would have been admissible “had she shot Mr. Pickle . . . , but she didn’t.”
To the extent that the reasoning of the majority is premised on a federal district court case and cases from appellate courts of sister states, such authority is not binding on this Court2 and I find it nonpersuasive, especially in light of Graham, supra.
I am authorized to state that Judge Bernes joins in this opinion.
See Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Nat. Treasury Employees Union, 265 Ga. 557, 558 (1) (458 SE2d 95) (1995); Tyson Foods v. Craig, 266 Ga. App. 443, 444 (597 SE2d 520) (2004).