concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I concur with Part II’s holding that the trial court’s denial of the motion to continue was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). However, I see no reason to order an evidentiary hearing regarding the alleged *1084violation of Houston’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. Houston has never requested a hearing. Neither has the State. The trial court inquired into the matter, and it is already apparent that Houston’s claim lacks merit. I therefore dissent from Part III of the majority opinion.
I.
The Supreme Court has established that, absent a showing of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), habeas relief can be granted due to the violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel in either of two circumstances: First, relief is granted if defense counsel timely objected to concurrent representation of two or more defendants with conflicting interests and the trial court failed to take “adequate steps” to ascertain whether the risk of conflict was sufficient to require separate counsel. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978). Second, in any other case of multiple concurrent representation, relief is granted only if the defendant demonstrates that an “actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 174-76, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002). Houston is entitled to an eviden-tiary hearing if (1) he alleged facts that, if proven, would demonstrate a violation of his rights under Holloway or Sullivan, and (2) he did not receive a full and fair opportunity to develop those facts. Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir.2005). For the reasons described below, I would hold that Houston failed to allege facts that would entitle him to habeas relief under Holloway. I would also hold that Houston already received a full and fair opportunity to develop the facts regarding his Sullivan claim, and that those facts establish the absence of a Sixth Amendment violation.
A.
An evidentiary hearing regarding the adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry under Holloway clearly is not required. The record already contains a complete transcript of the December 2000 hearing during which the trial court inquired into Jor-genson’s alleged conflict of interest. Houston does not contend that additional fact-finding regarding the circumstances or substance of that hearing is necessary.
Moreover, it is apparent from the existing record that Houston is not entitled to habeas relief under Holloway. “Holloway ... creates an automatic reversal rule only where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over his timely objection.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 168, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (emphasis added). Because Jorgen-son was representing only one defendant— Houston was not a codefendant with Chadwick, it follows that Holloway does not apply.
Even if Holloway applied, I would hold that the trial court took “adequate steps” to ascertain the risks presented by the alleged conflict of interest. The court held a hearing on the matter in December 2000. During that hearing, the court gave Jor-genson an opportunity to explain at length the nature of any conflict and inquired about its anticipated impact on his ability to cross-examine Chadwick. The court also inquired about the extent of Jorgen-son’s relationship with Chadwick, Jorgen-son’s knowledge of the case in which the public defender’s office had represented Chadwick, and whether Jorgenson possessed any confidential information from the prior representation. The transcript of this discussion spans twenty pages. The inquiry thus went well beyond the *1085inquiry found constitutionally inadequate in Holloway. See 435 U.S. at 484 n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (explaining that the trial court “cut off any opportunity of defense counsel to do more than make conclusory representations”)- The majority’s assertion that the trial court “[n]ever inquired] into the impact the prior representation may have had on Houston or on Jorgenson’s performance,” Maj. Op. at 1081, is simply not consistent with the record.
The majority concludes that the state trial court’s inquiry was inadequate because it focused exclusively on whether Jorgenson’s representation of Houston would be adverse to Chadwick’s interests, rather than to Houston’s. Maj. Op. at 1081-82. The premise of that conclusion is incorrect. The trial court understood the issue to be whether Chadwick’s role as a government witness would render Jorgen-son unable “to defend [Houston] in a manner that would be otherwise his defense if another attorney was operating or deferred.” In line with this understanding, the court asked whether the public defender’s office’s prior representation of Chadwick would compromise Jorgenson’s ability to challenge Chadwick’s veracity as a government witness. The record thus shows that the trial court correctly understood the issue. Although the State Supreme Court seems to have misunderstood, Maj. Op. at 1081, it does not follow that the trial court’s inquiry was inadequate.
B.
I also disagree that an evidentiary hearing is required to ascertain whether Houston was deprived of effective assistance of counsel under the Sullivan test. To establish an “actual conflict of interest” — i.e., one that “adversely affected” his counsel’s performance, Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172, 122 S.Ct. 1237 — Houston would have to show that “some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but was not and that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney’s other loyalties or interests.” Foote v. Del Papa, 492 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (9th Cir.2007). Houston cannot meet this standard.
The trial court’s December 2000 hearing was not an evidentiary hearing, and only counsel were present, but it was nevertheless sufficient because the parties’ representations revealed that mixed personal loyalties could not possibly have affected Jorgenson’s performance. Those representations included the following: The public defender’s office for which Jorgen-son worked no longer represented Chadwick. Jorgenson never personally represented Chadwick, did not know him, and knew nothing about his prior case other than that Chadwick had failed a polygraph test. Until the day before the December 2000 hearing, Jorgenson did not even know that his office had represented Chadwick. Jorgenson also confirmed that he had no “inside information or what might be considered personal or secret information that has been imparted by Mr. Chadwick to his counsel,” and that he did not possess “any information concerning Mr. Chadwick that would not be available to any other defense attorney.” Houston does not dispute the accuracy of any of these statements. Considering them together, Jorgenson’s isolated assertion that he could not effectively represent Houston because his “heart [would] be with ... Chadwick” was, to put it mildly, incredible. We should not fault the state trial court for declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing that no one has requested, on an assertion of divided loyalty that cannot possibly be credited.
An evidentiary hearing is also unnecessary to determine whether the interest of the public defender who previously represented Chadwick can be imputed to Jor-genson in a manner that renders the rep-*1086reservation ineffective. The relevant facts are already apparent, and no court has held an actual conflict to exist for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment purely on the basis of such a relationship. As we have recognized, the Supreme Court has never extended Sullivan to circumstances involving either successive representation or imputed conflicts, much less to circumstances involving both. See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1184 (“Mickens ... specifically and explicitly concluded that Sullivan was limited to joint representation.”); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 986 (9th Cir.2004) (“[T]he Supreme Court has never applied the ethical imputed disqualification rule in Sixth Amendment analysis.”). By emphasizing the particularly high probability of prejudice in cases of multiple concurrent representation, Mickens suggests that, if anything, the Court is disinclined to extend Sullivan to circumstances such as those encountered by Houston. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-76, 122 S.Ct. 1237. At least two circuits, moreover, have held that one attorney’s representation of a defendant in a trial involving a government witness previously represented by another attorney from the same office does not on its own give rise to an actual conflict of interest. See United States v. Blount, 291 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1098-99 (10th Cir.1996). Other courts have similarly held that successive representation of defendants with adverse interests by different attorneys at a public defender’s office does not independently create an actual conflict. See United States v. Trevino, 992 F.2d 64, 65-66 (5th Cir.1993); Salam v. Lockhart, 874 F.2d 525, 527-28 (8th Cir.1989). Insofar as the majority is ordering an evidentiary hearing to enable Houston to explore a Sixth Amendment claim based solely on an imputed conflict of interest, our decision is at odds with this precedent and the Supreme Court’s instruction that the Sixth Amendment does not protect against a “mere theoretical division of loyalties.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237.
Finally, Houston has failed even to allege that, due to the conflict, some “plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but was not.” Foote, 492 F.3d at 1029-30 (emphasis added); see also Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc) (holding that the petitioner failed to show adverse effect because the trial tactics that counsel neglected to pursue would not have succeeded). The conflict of interest purportedly caused Jorgenson to refrain only from impeaching Chadwick with evidence that he had failed a polygraph, pled guilty to felony firearms charges in 1998, and spent time as a parolee thereafter. None of these tactics would have succeeded.
Polygraph results are admissible under Nevada law only when the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and defense counsel all stipulate in writing for the defendant’s submission to the test. Jackson v. State, 116 Nev. 334, 997 P.2d 121, 121-22 (2000). Houston does not contend that the required stipulations were made, and the prosecutor specifically explained at the December 2000 hearing that Chadwick’s polygraph results would not be admissible. Jorgenson therefore cannot be faulted for declining to cross-examine Chadwick on the matter. If he had, the prosecutor would have objected, and the trial court would have sustained the objection.
Houston also cannot claim adverse effect on the basis of Jorgenson’s cross-examination regarding Chadwick’s prior felony conviction. Evidence of such a conviction is generally admissible for the purpose of attacking witness credibility. Nev.Rev. Stat. § 50.095(1). However, “the details and circumstances of the prior crimes are ... not appropriate subjects of inquiry.” *1087Plunkett v. State, 84 Nev. 145, 437 P.2d 92, 93 (1968). Jorgenson asked Chadwick whether he had pled guilty in 1998 to a felony for “firing a gun into a house.” Chadwick responded that he had. Any further inquiry would have been precluded by Plunkett. This rule was also made apparent to Jorgenson at the pretrial hearing in December 2000.
Nor would Jorgenson have been permitted to cross-examine Chadwick about his parole status. Nevada Revised Statutes § 50.095(1) permits an opposing party to impeach a witness with evidence of a prior felony conviction, but it prohibits inquiry into the resulting sentence. Jacobs v. State, 91 Nev. 155, 532 P.2d 1034, 1036 (1975). Houston fails to articulate any theory on which the evidence of Chadwick’s parole status would have been relevant.
I do not find Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860 (9th Cir.2006), to be controlling. We remanded for an evidentiary hearing on a Sullivan claim in that case because, unlike here, the trial court never inquired into the possible adverse impact of the alleged conflict on the defendant’s representation. 458 F.3d at 871. The absence of such an inquiry was particularly problematic because there was ample reason to believe that the defense attorney had limited cross-examination of his own former client due to the conflict. The attorney objected to cross-examining the witness, and when the witness took the stand the attorney declined to impeach him on multiple material issues notwithstanding the apparent admissibility of the impeachment evidence. Id. at 868-69. The cross-examination itself took up only three pages of transcript. Id. at 869. By contrast, the cross-examination of Chadwick, which covered over thirty pages, closely questioned Chadwick’s recollection of the crime and pointed out internal inconsistencies in his testimony. Coupling this fact with the complete unfamiliarity between Jorgenson and Chadwick, and with the absence of even an allegation of a plausible alternative defense strategy, we have no reason to suspect the possibility of an actual conflict of interest.
II.
The majority’s approach will burden district courts with evidentiary hearings even on obviously unmeritorious Sixth Amendment claims. I would affirm the denial of the petition.