dissenting.
A thorough reading of the majority opinion leaves me with grave concern that the majority has decided by way of mere speculation that the “year-and-a-day” rule was abolished by the enactment of the 1968 Criminal Code. Believing that it was not so abolished, I must dissent.
1. Although the year-and-a-day rule had its origin in common law (Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 760 (24 SE2d 145) (1943)), it has been recognized throughout the years in Georgia. The rule’s status was aptly described in Head v. State, supra at 761:
While . . . our courts have not passed directly on the question before us, our Supreme Court has indirectly dealt with the principle and seems to have recognized that the doctrine of the common law, that death must result within a year and a day from the infliction of the injury, prevails in Georgia.
A careful review of the case law dealing with the year-and-a-day rule shows that it has become ingrained in the criminal law of this and many other states. See 60 ALR3d 1323, §§ 1-4.
*848The majority holds that the year-and-a-day rule was abolished by the adoption of the 1968 Criminal Code, and in footnote 4 of its opinion cites a New York case, People v. Brengard, 265 NY 100 (191 NE 850) (1934), in support of its view that the legislature intended to abrogate the common law year-and-a-day rule. However, the majority opinion fails to point out that in Brengard, the New York court pointed to specific language in the 1864 notes of the commission formed to prepare a new Penal Code indicating that “each definition [of a statutory offense would be] independent and sufficient in itself.” Although the majority opinion in the present case directs our attention to some language employed by the drafters of Georgia’s 1968 Criminal Code expressing an intent to codify all criminal laws, that language is not specific enough to evidence a clear and unmistakable intent to abolish a fundamental tenet of criminal law and procedure. When a new criminal code is drafted and no mention is made of a fundamental rule of criminal law, we should consider the rule still in force unless there is evidence of a clear and unmistakable specific intent to abolish it.
The conclusion advanced by the majority, that the year-and-a-day rule was abolished in 1968 by the adoption of the Criminal Code, directly contradicts a decision of the Court of Appeals in Manning v. State, 123 Ga. App 844 (182 SE2d 690) (1971), where the continued vitality of the year-and-a-day rule was specifically acknowledged. Since the Manning decision in 1971, the criminal laws relating to homicide have been amended several times, but the legislature has taken no action to specifically disavow the year-and-a-day rule.
All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it; they are to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law; and their meaning and effect will be determined in connection with not only the common law and the Constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts. State v. Davis, 246 Ga. 761 (1) (272 SE2d 721) (1980). Applying those principles to the present case leads to the inescapable conclusion that the year-and-a-day rule is alive and well in Georgia.
2. Since the year-and-a-day rule was judicially created, it can be judicially abolished, but that must be done prospectively. Due to advances in the medical field since the time the rule was first recognized, it is obvious that the year-and-a-day rule is archaic and should be abolished, and I would gladly join the rest of this court in doing so. However, I would abolish the rule directly and deliberately and today, and would not speculate that the legislature abolished it sub silentio in 1968. I submit, therefore, that the proper resolution of this appeal would be to affirm the trial court’s judgment quashing count one of the indictment against appellant, and to inform the bench and bar *849that henceforth the year-and-a-day rule is abrogated and will not be applied. For that reason, I respectfully dissent to the judgment of the majority of this court.
Decided February 27, 1991. Thomas J. Charron, District Attorney, Debra H. Bernes, Nancy I. Jordan, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellant. Bert W. Cohen, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Smith joins in this dissent.