concurring:
The circuit court granted the Town of Lyman summary judgment in this action brought by Appellant Vaughan in which she alleged the town negligently maintained a sidewalk located within the municipality’s boundaries. As explained below, I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and remand, but write separately to explain how I reach this conclusion.
“A plaintiff alleging negligence on the part of a governmental actor or entity may rely either upon a duty created by statute or one founded on the common law.” Arthurs v. Aiken County, 346 S.C. 97, 103, 551 S.E.2d 579, 582 (2001). As explained below, I would find only a common law duty.
In 1892 the General Assembly passed an act titled “An act providing for a right of action against a municipal corporation for damage sustained by reason of defects in the repair of streets, sidewalks and bridges within the limits of said municipal corporation.” 21 St. at Large 91 (1892 Act. No. 40). This act, effectively waived municipal sovereign immunity.3
Although the Court never undertook to specifically define the common law duty owed by a town to travelers on its sidewalks, it cited with approval to this statement:
The general rule in this country is that municipalities which have full and complete control over the streets and highways within their corporate limits are liable in damages for injuries sustained in consequence of their failure to use reasonable care to keep them in a reasonably safe condition for public travel. 13 R.C.L. 310.
*450Heath v. Town of Darlington, 175 S.C. 27, 29, 177 S.E. 894(1934).
The Heath Court was careful to note that, “of course, the statute law of each state controls the matter,” thereby emphasizing that municipal liability for sidewalk defects was governed by the waiver statute.
This waiver statute was recodified several times, last appearing as S.C.Code Ann. § 57-5-1810 (1976). Section 57-5-1810 was repealed by the 1986 Act4 which created the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10 et seq. (2005 and Supp. 2005). The Tort Claims Act (TCA) does not create liability but rather removes the bar of sovereign immunity to the extent permitted by the Act. Arthurs v. Aiken County, supra.
Heath acknowledged a municipal common law duty, breach of which gave rise to liability only by virtue of the waiver status. In my opinion, the enactment of the TCA and the concomitant repeal of the waiver statute effectively restored liability for a municipality’s breach of its duty to use reasonable care to keep streets and highways within its corporate limits, over which it has full and complete control, in a reasonably safe condition for public travel. I therefore agree with the majority to the extent it holds that summary judgment was improperly granted to Lyman on the common law duty theory as there are genuine issues of material fact whether Lyman exercised a sufficient degree of control over the Lawrence Street sidewalk to give rise to this common law duty. If such a duty is found, then the circuit court must consider Lyman’s TCA defenses.
In addition, the majority holds that summary judgment is inappropriate because there is some evidence that Lyman voluntarily undertook to repair and maintain streets and sidewalks within the town’s municipal boundaries, and was aware that the Lawrence Street sidewalk was in disrepair. I agree with the trial court that there is simply no evidence in this record that the town had ever undertaken any repairs or maintenance of the Lawrence Street sidewalk. There is, however, some evidence that town employees repaired a side*451walk on Groce Street using materials supplied by the Department of Transportation. Assuming the town volunteered to undertake repairs on Groce Street, this one time act did not impose upon Lyman an obligation to volunteer to fix other sidewalks and streets. Rather, the decision to volunteer merely obligated the town to use due care in performing the Groce Street repairs. Miller v. City of Camden, 329 S.C. 310, 494 S.E.2d 813 (1997); see also Bryant v. City of North Charleston, 304 S.C. 123, 403 S.E.2d 159 (Ct.App.1991)(“and the evidence that the City placed the barricade at the site of the accident, is evidence that the City assumed the duty to maintain the sidewalk in question”). I would therefore affirm the grant of summary judgment to Lyman on the voluntary undertaking theory.
I would reverse the circuit court order granting Lyman summary judgment because I would find that there is a material question of fact whether Lyman breached a common law duty to Vaughan. In light of this disposition, I find it unnecessary to address Vaughan’s contention that the appellate record was wrongly settled. Since this issue is raised by the appellant as a ground for reversal, and not by the respondent as an additional ground upon which the circuit court can be affirmed, I’On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 526 S.E.2d 716 (2000), is inapposite. Accordingly, while I agree with the majority’s conclusion that it is unnecessary to address this appellate issue, I base my decision on the general proposition that an appellate court need not address issues not necessary to its decision. E.g., Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999).
. See Reeves v. City of Easley, 167 S.C. 231, 166 S.E. 120 (1932); see also Jackson v. City of Columbia, 174 S.C. 208, 177 S.E. 158 (1934).
. 1986 Act No. 463.