dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the majority mistakenly relies on S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1720(B)(2) (Supp.2004) in overturning Sowell’s contempt citation. The majority correctly states that subsection (B)(2) outlines specific duties of governmental personnel involved in enforcing the criminal laws of the State. However, the majority ignores the fact that the trial court’s protective order directs that the parties to this action are also subject to the restrictions of S.C.Code Ann. *341§ 14-7-1700. The Code provides that a criminal defendant is entitled to a copy of the transcript of the grand jury hearing “[sjubject to the limitations of Section 14-7-1720(A) and (D) and Rule 5, South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure.” S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1700 (Supp.2004).
Accordingly, the language of § 14-7-1700 places the same secrecy restrictions upon the criminal defendant and his counsel that the state grand jurors are subject to via § 14-7-1720(A).3 This limitation dictates that “[s]tate grand jury proceedings are secret, and a state grand juror shall not disclose the nature or substance of the deliberations ... of the state grand jury.” S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1720(A). Therefore, any disclosure under section (A) must be done under the direction of the Court.4
The portion of the statute relied upon by the majority, § 14-7-1720(B)(2) governs those occasions when disclosure can be made without leave of the court. As correctly pointed out, this section is not even applicable to Sowell. Were it applicable, Sowell’s disclosure to Gore would be permissible because he could have done it without the court’s permission. However, because § 14-7-1720(A) requires the leave of the *342court to disclose grand jury information, Sowell was appropriately held in contempt pursuant to § 14-7-1720(D) for his disclosure to Gore.5
Therefore, I would uphold the trial court’s decision holding Sowell in contempt.
BURNETT, J., concurs.. Under the majority's rationale, the language contained in § 14-7-1700 stating that "subject to the limitations of [sjection 14-7-1720(A) and (D) ... a defendant has the right to review .... materials” is meaningless. S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1700 (emphasis added).
. The majority correctly points out that a criminal defense attorney must make clear to whom disclosure can be made by asking the court for permission to disclose under § 14-7-1720(A). This would include a defense attorney’s employees or office personnel. The grand jury proceedings are by their very nature secretive and designed to prevent the very thing that happened in the present case — i.e. disclosure to an unauthorized person who then takes that information and divulges it to a person under investigation by the grand jury. This result is not dictated by my position but rather by the very language contained in the statute. The majority’s position would insulate an authorized person from penalty under the statute by allowing the authorized person to simply inform their employee of the grand jury's investigation and then leave it to chance whether that employee informs whomever he or she would like. In my opinion, the integrity of the grand jury proceedings can be compromised by engaging a lawyer’s office in a game of "whisper down the line.” It is not overly burdensome to get the court’s permission for a specific disclosure, and obtaining such disclosure permission protects the lawyer from unauthorized down the line disclosure.
. To further exemplify the contemptuous nature of Sowell's actions, the record indicates that a person under investigation by the grand jury, Curtis, paid a legal fee to Sowell to keep another suspect from testifying against Curtis. While Curtis paying Sowell a fee might not be the reason for the trial court holding Sowell in contempt, this fact epitomizes Sowell’s total disregard for the much needed secrecy in the grand jury proceedings.