I respectfully dissent.
I previously have expressed my view that generally worded constitutional and statutory provisions typically do not lend themselves to application through fixed, mechanical rules established by judicial decree.1 The United States Supreme Court has spoken in the present context, however, holding in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) 500 U.S. 44, 56-58 [114 L.Ed.2d 49, 63-64, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1670], that a state’s criminal statutory scheme does not comply with the Fourth Amendment unless it provides that a “person” (without differentiation between adults and juveniles), arrested and detained without a warrant, will be afforded a judicial determination of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest. That federal constitutional rule is now settled and, of course, binding upon this court.
Although, as the lead opinion recognizes, the procedures constitutionally mandated in juvenile proceedings need not mirror in all respects the procedures required in adult criminal proceedings, I agree with Justice Mosk’s conclusion that the People have not identified any state interest that would justify incarcerating a juvenile, detained solely because law enforcement authorities believe he or she has committed a crime, for a period of time (before according the juvenile an impartial judicial determination of probable cause) longer than the time the state could detain an adult under similar circumstances. Indeed, in this context, I believe the need for a very prompt judicial determination of probable cause may be a more crucial factor in assessing the “reasonableness” of the “seizure” of a juvenile than of an adult, because the consequences of even a relatively brief, wrongful incarceration are likely to be more detrimental and long-lasting to an innocent, vulnerable child than to an innocent adult. (See, e.g., In re William M. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 16, 31, fn. 25 [89 Cal.Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737].) In my view, the lead opinion’s conclusion to the contrary is not supported either by Schall v. Martin (1984) 467 U.S. 253 [81 L.Ed.2d 207, 104 S.Ct. 2403], or the very *1259recent decision in Reno v. Flores (1993) 507 U.S._[123 L.Ed.2d 1, 113 S.Ct. 1439], because neither case purported to address the propriety of an extended detention of a juvenile who could be released to the custody of his or her family but has been detained solely because he or she is suspected of committing a crime.
Petitioner’s application for review by the Supreme Court was denied March 18, 1994, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Mosk, J., Kennard, J., and George, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.
With reference to the statutory mandate that an adult suspect be taken before a magistrate for arraignment without unnecessary delay and within two days of arrest, see Youngblood v. Gates (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1302, 1343-1350 [246 Cal.Rptr. 775] (dis. opn. of George, J.).