dissenting.
I concur with the majority that Georgia law applies as a matter *906of choice of law for public policy reasons. I join in the dissent by Presiding Judge McMurray and write to elaborate on his analysis.
Decided March 19, 1998 Reconsideration denied April 2, 1998 Downey & Cleveland, Russell B. Davis, Tara M. Waller, for appellants. Jack F. Witcher, David L. Smith, Joel R. Cope, for appellees.Tolbert v. Duckworth, 262 Ga. 622, 624 (1) (423 SE2d 229) (1992) abolished the legal defense in Georgia of “legal accident.” The Supreme Court held that “[t]he defense of inevitable accident ‘is nothing more than a denial by the defendant of negligence, or a contention that his negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the injury.’ [Cits.]” Id. at 623-624.
The Uniform Rules of the Road require that a driver maintain and control the vehicle within the lane and not run off the roadway. OCGA §§ 40-6-40; 40-6-41; 40-6-48; 40-6-272. Thus, to lose control of a vehicle and run a vehicle under the defendant’s control off the roadway at a curve and to strike a fixed object is negligence per se. See generally as to loss of control Meacham v. Barber, 183 Ga. App. 533, 537 (4) (359 SE2d 424) (1987); Durden v. Collins, 169 Ga. App. 347, 349 (4) (312 SE2d 842) (1983).
If the defendant ran a vehicle under her exclusive control off the road at a curve without the negligence of another, then such evidence gives rise to an inference of fact that a jury may draw of evidence of negligence per se on the part of the defendant, because drivers do not run off the road absent the negligence of someone, i.e., the driver, passenger, another driver, someone who spills a substance on the road, or the designer and maintainer of the road. See generally as to the doctrine DeVane v. Smith, 154 Ga. App. 442 444-445 (2) (268 SE2d 711) (1980); Wimpy v. Rogers, 58 Ga. App. 67 (4) (197 SE 656) (1938); Ga. Power Co. v. Stonecypher, 47 Ga. App. 386 (170 SE 530) (1933). This is res ipsa loquitur. OCGA § 24-4-9. Where the facts would permit a jury to infer the existence of evidence under res ipsa loquitur, it is error to grant a motion for summary judgment. Dawson v. American Heritage Life Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 266 (173 SE2d 424) (1970).
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this dissent.