with whom MATTHEWS, Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
I dissent from the court’s holding that the superior court erred in denying Brandon’s *94application for stay “because it faded to apply the proper test.”1 In the court’s view the superior court should have employed a “balance of hardships” approach and weighed the harm that Brandon would suffer if a stay were not granted against the harm that the correctional system would suffer by the granting of a stay. The court relies upon A.J. Industries, Inc. v. Alaska Public Service Commission, 470 P.2d 537, 540 (Alaska 1970), for its conclusion that the balance of hardships test is appropriate.
Since our decision in A. J. Industries we have expressed the balance of hardships approach as follows:
That standard [that the movant must show only that there are serious and substantial questions going to the merits of the case, and that the movant need not show probable success on the merits] applies only where the injury which will result from the temporary restraining order or the preliminary injunction can be indemnified by a bond or where it is relatively slight in comparison to the injury which the person seeking the injunction will suffer if the injunction is not granted. Where the injury which will result from the temporary restraining order or the preliminary injunction is not inconsiderable and may not be adequately indemnified by a bond, a showing of probable success on the merits is required before a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction can be issued.
State v. United Cook Inlet Drift Ass’n, 815 P.2d 378, 379 (Alaska 1991) (citations omitted); see also Olsen Logging Co. v. Lawson, 832 P.2d 174, 176 (Alaska 1992); Messerli v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources, 768 P.2d 1112, 1122 (Alaska 1989), overruled on other grounds by Olson v. State, Dep’t of Natural Resources, 799 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Alaska 1990).
The state and the public have important interests in effective prison discipline and effective management of correctional facilities. It is apparent that delayed imposition of prison discipline is generally not as effective a deterrent as reasonably immediate discipline. These considerations lead me to the conclusion that a showing of probable success on the merits should be required for court issued stays in matters of prison discipline.2
. I agree with the court's conclusion that 22 AAC 05.480(i) only requires the punishment to be stayed during the administrative appeal. This regulation refers only to administrative appeals to the superintendent of the facility and the Department of Corrections' regional director.
. In Evans v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 87 Or.App. 514, 743 P.2d 168 (1987), the court con-eluded that it should not become enmeshed in the day-to-day administration of inmate discipline. Id. 743 P.2d at 172. In my view this concern identifies an additional reason for requiring the movant to make a showing of probable success on the merits before obtaining a stay of any disciplinary measures imposed by correctional authorities.