Opinion
LUCAS, C. J.The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sponsors and regulates intercollegiate athletic competition throughout the United States. Under the NCAA’s drug testing program, randomly selected college student athletes competing in postseason championships and football bowl games are required to provide samples of their urine under closely monitored conditions. Urine samples are chemically analyzed for proscribed substances. Athletes testing “positive” are subject to disqualification.
*9Plaintiffs, who were student athletes attending Stanford University (Stanford) at the time of trial, sued the NCAA, contending its drug testing program violated their right to privacy secured by article I, section 1 of the California Constitution. Stanford intervened in the suit and adopted plaintiffs’ position. Finding the NCAA’s program to be an invasion of plaintiffs’ right to privacy, the superior court permanently enjoined its enforcement against plaintiffs and other Stanford athletes. The Court of Appeal upheld the injunction.
By its nature, sports competition demands highly disciplined physical activity conducted in accordance with a special set of social norms. Unlike the general population, student athletes undergo frequent physical examinations, reveal their bodily and medical conditions to coaches and trainers, and often dress and undress in same-sex locker rooms. In so doing, they normally and reasonably forgo a measure of their privacy in exchange for the personal and professional benefits of extracurricular athletics.
A student athlete’s already diminished expectation of privacy is outweighed by the NCAA’s legitimate regulatory objectives in conducting testing for proscribed drugs. As a sponsor and regulator of sporting events, the NCAA has self-evident interests in ensuring fair and vigorous competition, as well as protecting the health and safety of student athletes. These interests justify a set of drug testing rules reasonably calculated to achieve drug-free athletic competition. The NCAA’s rules contain elements designed to accomplish this purpose, including: (1) advance notice to athletes of testing procedures and written consent to testing; (2) random selection of athletes actually engaged in competition; (3) monitored collection of a sample of a selected athlete’s urine in order to avoid substitution or contamination; and (4) chain of custody, limited disclosure, and other procedures designed to safeguard the confidentiality of the testing process and its outcome. As formulated, the NCAA’s regulations do not offend the legitimate privacy interests of student athletes.
For these reasons, as more fully discussed below, the NCAA’s drug testing program does not violate plaintiffs’ state constitutional right to privacy. We will therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and direct entry of final judgment in favor of the NCAA.
Statement of Facts and Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs’ action for injunctive relief was tried to the court. We summarize the facts as revealed by the uncontradicted evidence in the record and the findings of the trial court.
*10The NCAA, a private association of more than 1,000 colleges and universities, was created to foster and regulate intercollegiate athletic competition. NCAA rules are made by member institutions, acting collectively and democratically at national conventions. Member institutions and college athletes are required to abide by NCAA rules as a condition to participation in NCAA-sponsored events.
1. Events Leading to the NCAA’s Adoption of Drug Testing
In 1973, the NCAA enacted a rule prohibiting student athlete drug use. Ten years later, at the Pan American Games in Caracas, Venezuela, several college student athletes tested positive for prohibited drugs. Others withdrew from competition when faced with the prospect of testing. In response to the incident, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) developed a drug testing program modeled after the program of the International Olympic Committee, which had been established in the early 1970’s. Following the lead of the USOC, the NCAA began to study drug use among student athletes.
The NCAA commissioned Michigan State University to conduct a nationwide survey of college athlete drug use. The results revealed substantial use of a variety of drugs—8 percent of the athletes surveyed reported using amphetamines, 36 percent marijuana or hashish, 17 percent cocaine, and 4 percent steroids. Nine percent of football players reported using steroids at some time; six percent reported using steroids within the preceding twelve months.
In January 1984, the members of the NCAA’s Pacific 10 Conference, including Stanford, introduced a resolution calling on the NCAA to adopt a mandatory drug testing program. The resolution recited that “the use of controlled substances and allegedly performance-enhancing drugs represents a danger to the health of students and a threat to the integrity of amateur sport.”
Acting on the Pacific 10 Conference resolution, the NCAA created a special committee to study drug use and testing. The committee recommended a comprehensive drug testing program based on the Olympic model, concluding in part: “The NCAA has a legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of intercollegiate athletics, including insuring fair competition and protecting the health and safety of all participating student athletes. The use of ‘performance-enhancing’ drugs by individual student-athletes is a violation of the ethic of fair competition, [and] poses a potential health and safety hazard to those utilizing such drugs and a potential safety hazard to those *11competing with such individuals. The most effective method of ensuring that student-athletes are not utilizing ‘performance enhancing’ drugs is through a consistent, national drug testing program.”
At the NCAA’s 1985 convention, the drug use and testing committee’s proposal was referred back for further study and refinement. At the 1986 convention, the committee’s revised proposal was adopted by an overwhelming vote of the member institutions. The NCAA’s drug testing program has continued, with certain amendments, through the time of this appeal.
2. The NCAA Drug Testing Program
The NCAA prohibits student athlete use of chemical substances in several categories, including: (1) psychomotor and nervous system stimulants; (2) anabolic steroids; (3) alcohol and beta blockers (in rifle events only); (4) diuretics; and (5) street drugs. At the time of trial, sympathomimetic amines (a class of substances included in many medications) were also included in the NCAA’s list of banned drugs. The NCAA has amended its rules to delete sympathomimetic amines from its list of proscribed substances.
Student athletes seeking to participate in NCAA-sponsored competition are required to sign a three-part statement and consent form. New forms must be executed at the beginning of each year of competition. The first part of the form affirms that the signator meets NCAA eligibility regulations and that he or she has duly reported any known violations of those regulations.
The second part of the form, entitled Buckley Amendment Consent, authorizes limited disclosure of the form, the results of NCAA drug tests, academic transcripts, financial aid records, and other information pertaining to NCAA eligibility, to authorized representatives of the athlete’s institution and conference, as well as to the NCAA. The items of information to be disclosed are identified in the statement as “education records” pursuant to the federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974. (20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).)
The final part of the form is a “Drug-Testing Consent” including the following provisions:
“By signing this part of the form, you certify that you agree to be tested for drugs.
“You agree to allow the NCAA, during this academic year, before, during or after you participate in any NCAA championship or in any postseason *12football game certified by the NCAA, to test you for the banned drugs listed in Executive Regulation l-7(b) in the NCAA Manual.
“You reviewed the procedures for NCAA drug testing that are described in the NCAA Drug-Testing Program brochure.
“You understand that if you test positive (the NCAA finds traces of any of the banned drugs in your body), you will be ineligible to participate in postseason competition for at least 90 days.
“If you test positive and lose eligibility for 90 days, and then test positive again after your eligibility is restored, you will lose postseason eligibility in all sports for the current and next academic year.
“You understand that this consent and the results of your drug tests, if any, will only be disclosed in accordance with the Buckley Amendment consent.”
The Drug Testing Consent contains dated signature spaces for the student athlete and, if the student athlete is a minor, a parent. Failure to sign the three-part form, including the Drug Testing Consent, renders the student athlete ineligible to participate in NCAA-sponsored competition.
Drug testing is conducted at NCAA athletic events by urinalysis. All student athletes in championship events or postseason bowl games are potentially subject to testing. Particular athletes are chosen for testing according to plans that may include random selection or other selection criteria such as playing time, team position, place of finish, or suspicion of drug use.
Upon written notice following his or her participation in an athletic event, the selected athlete must report promptly to a collection station. The athlete may choose to be accompanied by a witness-observer. At the collection station, the athlete picks a plastic-sealed beaker with a personal code number. In the presence of an NCAA official monitor of the same sex as the athlete, the athlete supplies a urine specimen of 100-200 milliliters. The specimen is identified, documented, and divided into two samples labeled A and B. Both samples are delivered to one of three certified testing laboratories. Chain of custody procedures provide for signed receipts and acknowledgments at each transfer point.
At the laboratory, a portion of sample A is tested by gas chromatography/ mass spectometry—the most scientifically accurate method of analysis available. Positive findings, signifying use of proscribed drugs, are confirmed by *13testing another portion of sample A, and then reviewed by the laboratory director and reported to the NCAA by code number. The NCAA decodes the reports and relays positive findings to the athletic director of the college or university involved by telephone and overnight letter marked “confidential.” The institution is required to notify the athlete of the positive finding. Within 24 hours of notice of a positive finding, sample B of the athlete’s urine is tested.A positive finding may be appealed to a designated NCAA committee.
A positive test finding results in loss of postseason eligibility. Refusal by a student athlete to follow NCAA-mandated drug testing procedures yields the same consequence—the offending athlete is barred from competition.1
3. Effects of the Drug Testing Program
In considering whether the NCAA’s drug testing program violated plaintiffs’ state constitutional right to privacy, the trial court and the Court of Appeal required the NCAA to demonstrate that its drug testing program advanced a “compelling state interest” by proving each of the following: (1) the program furthered its stated purposes, i.e., to safeguard the integrity of athletic competition and to protect the health and safety of student athletes; (2) the utility of the program manifestly outweighed any resulting impairment of the privacy right; and (3) there were no alternatives to drug testing less offensive to privacy interests.
Much of the trial was devoted to a debate among scientists, physicians, and sports professionals regarding the merits of the NCAA’s list of proscribed drugs and the general efficacy of its drug testing program. There were sharp differences in professional opinions on a wide range of subjects, including what substances should be banned, as well as the attitudes and behaviors of athletes and coaches toward certain drugs (e.g., steroids) that some may regard as enhancing athletic performance. The trial court’s findings, sustained by the Court of Appeal, heavily favored plaintiffs’ side of the professional debate.
The trial court found in part that the NCAA drug testing program invades the privacy interests of student athletes by requiring them: (1) to disclose *14medications they may be using and other information about their physical and medical conditions; (2) to urinate in the presence of a monitor; and (3) to provide a urine sample that reveals chemical and other substances in their bodies.
The court further found that college athletes do not use drugs any more frequently than college students as a general class. It observed that in 1986-1987, the first year of the NCAA’s drug testing program, 34 of the 3,511 athletes tested for drugs were declared ineligible because of proscribed drug use. Of the 34 athletes declared ineligible, 31 were engaged in football, 1 was in track and field, and 2 were in basketball. Of the football players, 25 had tested positive for use of steroids. The track and field athlete tested positive for steroids, the two basketball players for cocaine.
From its findings, the court concluded there was no “compelling need” for drug testing to protect the health of college athletes or the integrity of athletic competition. According to the court, the NCAA program was “over-broad” because it banned “useful” over-the-counter medications and prescription drugs “designed to improve the health of the athlete.” The court observed the NCAA had not been completely consistent in its professed concern for the health of athletes as shown by its failure to require measles vaccinations of athletes despite previous measles outbreaks at postseason competition or to provide counselling or rehabilitation services for drug-using athletes. The court added that Stanford “believes it is wrong to single out athletes for drug testing” and “favors drug education for its students.”
The trial court also found the NCAA had failed to produce evidence that certain banned substances, e.g., amphetamines, diuretics, marijuana, and heroin, actually enhance athletic performance. It did find, however, that marijuana clearly impairs athletic performance and that cocaine may do so. Addressing the alleged perception that use of certain drugs may enhance performance, the court found that drugs are generally not perceived by college athletes and coaches to enhance performance or to be “a major problem.” With respect to steroid use, the “perception,” according to the court, is that steroids “might only help certain types of positions in football.”
On the issue of public perception of drug use, the court offered its general view that ‘the NCAA drug testing program is probably doing more harm than good,” and further determined the NCAA had failed to show that drug education and testing based on reasonable suspicion were inadequate to the task of controlling drug use by athletes.
From its conclusions, the trial court determined that the NCAA’s drug testing program violated the state constitutional privacy rights of Stanford *15student athletes. It permanently enjoined any testing of those athletes wherever it might be conducted, whether inside or outside of California.2
On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s factual findings and sustained its legal determinations regarding the NCAA’s drug testing program, including its holding that the NCAA had failed to establish a “compelling state interest” in support of the program. The trial court’s judgment, including the permanent injunction, was affirmed. We granted review.
Discussion
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution provides: “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” (Italics added.)
The phrase “and privacy” was added to California Constitution, article I, section 1 by an initiative adopted by the voters on November 7, 1972 (the Privacy Initiative or Amendment).
To resolve the dispute between the parties, we address three questions of first impression in this court: (1) Does the Privacy Initiative govern the conduct of private, nongovernmental entities such as the NCAA; and (2) if it does, what legal standard is to be applied in assessing alleged invasions of privacy; and (3) under that standard, is the NCAA’s drug testing program a violation of the state constitutional privacy right?
1. Application of the California Constitutional Right to Privacy to Nongovernmental Entities
Neither plaintiffs nor Stanford assert that the NCAA is an agency or instrumentality of government or a vehicle for state action. Case law generally confirms the status of the NCAA as a private organization, comprised of American colleges and universities, and democratically governed by its own *16membership. (National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Tarkanian (1988) 488 U.S. 179, 197 [102 L.Ed.2d 469, 488, 109 S.Ct. 454] [NCAA is private actor that “enjoy[s] no governmental powers”]; Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (4th Cir. 1984) 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 [NCAA is “a voluntary association of public and private institutions”]; O’Halloran v. University of Washington (W.D.Wash. 1988) 679 F.Supp. 997, 1001, revd. on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 [NCAA is private entity].)
In its opening attack on the judgment, the NCAA asserts that its private status is dispositive of this action because the Privacy Initiative does not embody a right of action against nongovernmental entities. We disagree.
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution is an enumeration of the “inalienable rights” of all Californians. “Privacy” is declared to be among those rights. Typical of broad constitutional declarations of rights, the section does not define “privacy” or explain its relationship to other rights or interests. Nor does it specify how or against whom the right of privacy is to be safeguarded. Mere use of the word “privacy” is not definitive in this regard—at the time of the Privacy Initiative there were two distinct and well-established legal sources of privacy rights—the federal Constitution (applicable only to government action) and common law and statutory provisions (applicable as well against nongovernmental entities). (See discussion in pt. 2, post.)
The Privacy Initiative is to be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the probable intent of the body enacting it: the voters of the State of California. (Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 505 [286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 1309]; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].) When, as here, the language of an initiative measure does not point to a definitive resolution of a question of interpretation, “ ‘it is appropriate to consider indicia of the voters’ intent other than the language of the provision itself.’ . . . Such indicia include the analysis and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet.” (Legislature v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 504, quoting in part Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 250 [279 Cal.Rptr. 325, 806 P.2d 1360]; see also Amador Valley Joint High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245-246 [149 Cal.Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].)
The official ballot pamphlet section dealing with Proposition 11, the Privacy Initiative, contains arguments for and against the measure as well as rebuttals. The argument in favor of Proposition 11 is replete with references to information-amassing practices of both “government” and *17“business.” (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats, and Amends, to Cal. Const, with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1972) p. 26 [hereafter Ballot Argument].) The authors of the argument, then-Assemblyman Kenneth Cory and then-Senator George Moscone, emphasized the capacity of both governmental and nongovernmental agencies to gather, keep, and disseminate sensitive personal information without checking its accuracy or restricting its use to mutually agreed or otherwise legitimate purposes.
As the argument in favor of Proposition 11 observes: “At present there are no effective restraints on the information activities of government and business. This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian. H] The right of privacy . . . prevents government and business interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us. [f] . . . The proliferation of government and business records over which we have no control limits our ability to control our personal lives. . . . ffl Even more dangerous is the loss of control over the accuracy of government and business records on individuals. . . . Even if the existence of this information is known, few government agencies or private businesses permit individuals to review their files and correct errors. [1] . . . Each time we apply for a credit card or a life insurance policy, file a tax return, interview for a job[,] or get a drivers’ license, a dossier is opened and an informational profile is sketched.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at pp. 26-27, italics omitted and added.)
The rebuttal to the argument in favor of Proposition 11 and the argument against Proposition 11, both of which were written by then-Senator James Whetmore, do not contest the privacy measure’s potential impact on “business” as well as “government.” Rather, they challenge only the need for additional privacy safeguards, observing: “To say there are at present no effective restraints on the information activities of government and business is simply untrue.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27, italics added.) Opponents further argued that the receipt of personal information is essential to effectuate the private party relationships and transactions referred to by proponents of the measure, e.g., credit cards, life insurance policies, and employment interviews. (Ibid)
The repeated emphasis in the competing ballot arguments on private party relationships and transactions, as well as individual encounters with government, underscores the efforts of the Privacy Initiative’s framers to create enforceable privacy rights against both government agencies and private entities. As we have recognized: “[T]he overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by government and business interests” *18was one of the principal “ ‘mischiefs’ ” at which the Privacy Initiative was directed. (White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775 [120 Cal.Rptr. 94, 533 P.2d 222], italics added.)
Although none of our decisions has squarely addressed the question whether our state constitutional right to privacy may be enforced against private parties (we had no occasion to decide the issue in Schmidt v. Superior Court (1989) 48 Cal.3d 370, 389, fn. 14 [256 Cal.Rptr. 750, 769 P.2d 932]), the Courts of Appeal have consistently answered in the affirmative. (See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1040-1044 [264 Cal.Rptr. 194] [hereafter Wilkinson]; Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1489-1493 [232 Cal.Rptr. 668, 69 A.L.R.4th 1027]; Cutter v. Brownbridge (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 836, 841-843 [228 Cal.Rptr. 545]; Kinsey v. Macur (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 265 [165 Cal.Rptr. 608]; Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 829-830 [134 Cal.Rptr. 839] [hereafter Porten]; see also Chico Fem. Women’s Health Cr. v. Butte Glen Med. S. (E.D.Cal. 1983) 557 F.Supp. 1190, 1201-1203.)
In Porten, supra, 64 Cal.App.3d 825, a college student sought damages from the University of San Francisco, a private institution, alleging it had, without his permission or any good reason, disclosed his academic transcript from another school to a state government agency. The Court of Appeal held the student had stated a cause of action against the university for violation of his state constitutional right to privacy by alleging the unauthorized and improper use of personal and confidential academic information for a purpose not in keeping with its creation or retention. Relying on the references in the ballot argument we have quoted, the court noted that “business” as well as government was the focus of the Privacy Initiative and concluded: “The constitutional provision is self-executing; hence, it confers a judicial right of action on all Californians. [Citations.] Privacy is protected not merely against state action; it is considered an inalienable right which may not be violated by anyone.” (Id. at pp. 829-830.)
Similarly, in Wilkinson, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, the court reviewed prior cases in support of its holding that the California constitutional right to privacy afforded protection against a private employer that required drug testing as part of pre-employment physical examinations. Emphasizing that the concerns underlying the Privacy Initiative extended to the conduct of both governmental and nongovernmental entities, the court observed: “Common experience with the ever-increasing use of computers in contemporary society confirms that the [Privacy Initiative] was needed and intended to safeguard individual privacy from intrusion by both private and governmental action. That common experience makes it only too evident that personal *19privacy is threatened by the information-gathering capabilities and activities not just of government, but of private business as well. If the right of privacy is to exist as more than a memory or a dream, the power of both public and private institutions to collect and preserve data about individual citizens must be subject to constitutional control. Any expectations of privacy would indeed be illusory if only the government’s collection and retention of data were restricted.” (Id. at p. 1043.)
In its day-to-day operations, the NCAA is in a position to generate, retain, and use personal information about student athletes and others. In this respect, it is no different from a credit card purveyor, an insurance company, or a private employer (the private entity examples used in the ballot arguments) in its capacity to affect the privacy interests of those with whom it deals.3
The NCAA nonetheless urges us to impose a state action prerequisite to suits under the Privacy Initiative because it adds “privacy” to the declaration of rights portion of our state Constitution. The NCAA correctly observes that our decisions construing other provisions in the declaration of rights impose a state action requirement (e.g., People v. Zelinski (1979) 24 Cal.3d 357, 365 [155 Cal.Rptr. 575, 594 P.2d 1000] [search and seizure]; Garfinkle v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 268, 281-282 [146 Cal.Rptr. 208, 578 P.2d 925], app. dism. (1978) 439 U.S. 949 [58 L.Ed.2d 340, 99 S.Ct. 343] [due process]; Kruger v. Wells Fargo Bank (1974) 11 Cal.3d 352, 366 [113 Cal.Rptr. 449, 521 P.2d 441, 65 A.L.R.3d 1266] [same]). But those decisions were not premised on the mere location of the respective provisions in the constitutional text, but on their distinct language and histories. As we recognized in Kruger, supra, what the “drafters” of our Constitution’s due process clause “intended by that enactment” remains the pivotal factor in determining whose activity is subjected to regulation. (11 Cal.3d at p. 366.) Similarly, what the voters intended in enacting the Privacy Initiative must determine the propriety of any state action requirement in this case. As we have seen, the ballot arguments contain persuasive evidence of drafter and voter intent to recognize a right of action for invasion of privacy against private as well as government entities. (White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 773-776.)
Finally, the NCAA advocates a narrow reading of the history of the Privacy Initiative, calling the reference to “business” in the ballot arguments *20“nothing more than a general description of increasing strains on privacy in society generally.” To the contrary, the repeated ballot argument references to “business” as an equal source of invasions of privacy, when coupled with examples of specific “business” entities that regularly obtain and use personal information, reveal an attempt by the framers of the Privacy Initiative to make their case to voters based on the conduct and practices of entities in the private as well as the public sector. Reading this language, a reasonable voter would most likely have concluded he or she was casting a ballot to safeguard his or her personal privacy against private as well as government entities.4 After the case was so presented, the voters were persuaded. To remove by judicial construction a significant part of what the voters desired would amount to an electoral “bait and switch.”
In summary, the Privacy Initiative in article I, section 1 of the California Constitution creates a right of action against private as well as government entities. The legal concept of “privacy” as embodied in the initiative is susceptible of such an interpretation; the ballot arguments strongly support it. Our holding in this regard is necessarily confined to the Privacy Initiative. We intimate nothing about the existence of rights of action or permissible defendants in legal proceedings that may be brought either under other clauses in article I, section 1 or other parts of our state Constitution.
2. Standards for Determining Invasion of Privacy Under Article I, Section 1
In evaluating the NCAA’s drug testing program, the trial court and the Court of Appeal assumed that private entities were subject to the same legal standards as government agencies with respect to claims of invasion of privacy. Borrowing from a few of our cases involving the conduct of government in its dealings with individual citizens, the lower courts imposed on the NCAA the burden of proving both: (1) a “compelling state interest” in support of drug testing; and (2) the absence of any alternative means of accomplishing that interest. (See Long Beach City Emp. v. City of Long Beach (1986) 41 Cal.3d 937, 948 [227 Cal.Rptr. 90, 719 P.2d 660]; White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 775.) Because the NCAA failed to shoulder the purported burden, it was enjoined from carrying out its drug testing program.
The text of the Privacy Initiative does not define “privacy.” The Ballot Argument in favor includes broad references to a “right to be left alone,” *21calling it a “fundamental and compelling interest,” and purporting to include within its dimensions no less than “our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom to associate with the people we choose.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.) Regrettably, such vague and all-encompassing terms afford little guidance in developing a workable legal definition of the state constitutional right to privacy.
The principal focus of the Privacy Initiative is readily discernible. The Ballot Argument warns of unnecessary information gathering, use, and dissemination by public and private entities—images of “government snooping,” computer stored and generated “dossiers” and “ ‘cradle-to-grave’ profiles on every American” dominate the framers’ appeal to the voters. (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 26.) The evil addressed is government and business conduct in “collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information . . . and misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass . . . .” (Id. at p. 27.) “The [Privacy Initiative’s] primary purpose is to afford individuals some measure of protection against this most modern threat to personal privacy.” (White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 774.)
Although the argument in favor does contain a cryptic reference to a “compelling public need” for abridgement of privacy, the reference occurs in the context of informational privacy rights against government. The argument states in part: “The right of privacy is an important American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This right should be abridged only when there is compelling public need. Some information may remain as designated public records but only when the availability of such information is clearly in the public interest.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27, italics added.) Nothing in this passage compels the conclusion that the phrase “compelling public need” was intended to supply a single, all-encompassing legal test for privacy rights.
Even within the context of government information-gathering, the limited references in the ballot arguments to “compelling” necessity in the ballot arguments are not consistent. When pressed by the opponents of the Privacy Initiative, who maintained that the new right to privacy would place unwieldy burdens on government efforts to obtain information needed to police the welfare system, the framers equivocated, narrowing their description of the initiative’s effect. In a rebuttal to the argument against the Privacy Initiative, Assemblyman Cory stated in part: “The right to privacy will not destroy welfare nor undermine any important government program. It is *22limited by ‘compelling public necessity’ and the public’s need to know. [The Privacy Initiative] will not prevent the government from collecting any information it legitimately needs. It will only prevent misuse of this information for unauthorized purposes and preclude the collection of extraneous or frivolous information.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 28, italics added.)
The references to a public “need to know” and to information “legitimately need[ed]” by government serve to limit and narrow the prior reference to “compelling public interest.” A mere “legitimate need” for information may be less than overwhelming. Similarly, a type of information may not be “extraneous” or “frivolous” in pursuit of a government task, but the government’s claim of entitlement may not be “compelling.” For example, if a perceived “need” merely represents greater efficiency or effectiveness in the performance of some public function, but its fulfillment is by no means indispensable to government existence or operation, it might not be regarded as “compelling.” And yet, as the ballot arguments reveal, the framers of the Privacy Initiative preferred, at least in responding to the arguments of their opponents, a more flexible and pragmatic approach to the privacy right than the isolated term “compelling public interest” appears to demand.
As applied to private entities, a “compelling public interest” standard poses additional difficulties. Private entities pursue private ends and interests, not those of government. If every private organization had to establish a “compelling public interest” or “compelling state interest” to justify any activity that had an impact on individual privacy, it would fail to do so in most, if not all, conceivable cases. To use an example referred to in the ballot arguments, a private business extending credit or selling insurance may have a legitimate commercial need for obtaining personal information, but such a need is not thereby legally transformed into a “state interest,” let alone a “compelling” one.
The Ballot Argument on the Privacy Initiative is useful in identifying the general evils that concerned its authors, but it does not provide clear or unequivocal support for a universal “compelling public interest” standard for privacy rights, regardless of context or circumstances.5 Indeed, the argument offers little guidance in developing privacy standards. Rather, at bottom, it counsels careful evaluation in context of all asserted “legitimate” interests at stake in the resolution of privacy claims.
*23Although confined to the single word “privacy,” the language of the Privacy Initiative may be more helpful in developing a suitable legal standard. The term “privacy” was not coined by the authors of the Privacy Initiative. At the time the Privacy Initiative was considered and adopted by the voters, a right to privacy had been recognized and defined in several distinct branches of the law.
When an initiative contains terms that have been judicially construed, “' “ ‘the presumption is almost irresistible’ ” ’ ” that those terms have been used “ ‘ “ ‘in the precise and technical sense’ ” ’ ” in which they have been used by the courts. (In re Harris (1989) 49 Cal.3d 131, 136 [260 Cal.Rptr. 288, 775 P.2d 1057], quoting People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 845-846 [218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380]; see also In re Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 890, fn. 11 [“The adopting body is presumed to be aware of existing laws and judicial construction thereof.”]; People v. Weidert, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 844; In re Jeanice D. (1980) 28 Cal.3d 210, 216 [168 Cal.Rptr. 455, 617 P.2d 1087] [same effect].) Therefore, in order to discern the meaning of “privacy” as used in the Privacy Initiative, we must examine the various legal roots of the privacy concept.
a. Sources of the Right to Privacy
The pre-initiative judicial construction of the right to privacy developed along two distinct lines: (1) a common law right, supplemented in some instances by statutes, protecting a diverse set of individual interests from interference by nongovernmental entities; and (2) a federal constitutional right, derived from various provisions of the Bill of Rights, that took distinct shape in United States Supreme Court decisions in the 1960’s safeguarding the rights of individuals and private entities from government invasion.
(1) The common law right
The origin of the common law right to privacy is often traced to a seminal law review article written at the end of the last century. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis observed a trend in tort law extending protection beyond property rights to what they described as “inviolate personality”— “the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent [a person’s] thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.” (Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193, 205, 198.) Warren and Brandeis attempted to weave together various strands of tort law into a single thread—in Judge Thomas Cooley’s phrase, a “right ‘to be let alone.’ ” (Id. at p. 195.) Nearly 40 years later, Brandeis regarded the privacy right as broad-based and rooted in the federal Constitution. As he stated: “The *24makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” (Olmstead v. United States (1928) 277 U.S. 438, 478 [72 L.Ed. 944, 956, 48 S.Ct. 564, 66 A.L.R. 376]; (dis. opn. of Brandeis, D.)
The Privacy Initiative’s debt to the legal tradition begun by Warren and Brandéis is revealed in ballot arguments: “The right of privacy is the right to be left alone. ... It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion, and our freedom to associate with the people we choose.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27, italics added.)
Seventy years after Warren and Brandéis proposed a right to privacy, Dean William L. Prosser analyzed the case law development of the invasion of privacy tort, distilling four distinct kinds of activities violating the privacy protection and giving rise to tort liability: (1) intrusion into private matters; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity placing a person in a false light; and (4) misappropriation of a person’s name or likeness. (Prosser, Privacy (1960) 48 Cal.L.Rev. 381, 389.) Prosser’s classification was adopted by the Restatement Second of Torts in sections 652A-652E. California common law has generally followed Prosser’s classification of privacy interests as embodied in the Restatement. (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, §§ 580-594, pp. 674-693.)
The privacy tort seeks to vindicate multiple and different interests that range from freedom to act without observation in a home, hospital room, or other private place to the ability to control the commercial exploitation of a name or picture. (Rest.2d Torts, §§ 652B; 652C; see also Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d 1463 [television producer and camera crew entered home without permission to film unsuccessful efforts of paramedics to save the life of plaintiff’s husband who had suffered heart attack]; Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 654 [109 Cal.Rptr. 269, 73 A.L.R.3d 1164] [private investigator entered hospital room to interrogate patient]; Civil Code, § 3344 [right to recover damages for knowing use of a person’s name, photograph, likeness, voice, or signature for commercial exploitation; statutory right cumulative to the common law].)
Each of the four categories of common law invasion of privacy identifies a distinct interest associated with an individual’s control of the process or products of his or her personal life. To the extent there is a common denominator among them, it appears to be improper interference (usually by means of observation or communication) with aspects of life consigned to *25the realm of the “personal and confidential” by strong and widely shared social norms.
“The [common law invasion of privacy] tort safeguards the interests of individuals in the maintenance of rules of civility. ... [f] ... [In everyday life we experience privacy] as an inherently normative set of social practices that constitute a way of life, our way of life. ... In the tort, ‘privacy’ is simply a label we use to identify one aspect of the many forms of respect by which we maintain a community. It is less important that the purity of the label be maintained, than that the forms of community life of which it is a part be preserved.” (Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy (1989) 77 Cal.L.Rev. 957, 1008.)
Privacy rights also have psychological foundations emanating from personal needs to establish and maintain identity and self-esteem by controlling self-disclosure: “In a society in which multiple, often conflicting role performances are demanded of each individual, the original etymological meaning of the word ‘person’—mask—has taken on new meaning. [People] fear exposure not only to those closest to them; much of the outrage underlying the asserted right to privacy is a reaction to exposure to persons known only through business or other secondary relationships. The claim is not so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define one’s circle of intimacy—to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask. Loss of control over which ‘face’ one puts on may result in literal loss of self-identity [citations], and is humiliating beneath the gaze of those whose curiosity treats a human being as an object.” (Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529, 534 [93 Cal.Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34, 57 A.L.R.3d 1], fn. omitted.)
The legally amorphous character of a tort based on social custom and psychological well-being did not escape either common law judges or American Law Institute commentators. The common law right of privacy contains several important limiting principles that have prevented its becoming an all-encompassing and always litigable assertion of individual right. Initially, not every kind of conduct that strays from social custom or implicates personal feelings gives rise to a common law cause of action for invasion of privacy. The various branches of the privacy tort refer generally to conduct that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” thereby emphasizing the importance of the objective context of the alleged invasion, including: (1) the likelihood of serious harm, particularly to the emotional sensibilities of the victim; and (2) the presence or absence of countervailing interests based on competing social norms which may render the defendant’s *26conduct inoffensive; e.g., a legitimate public interest in exposing and prosecuting serious crime that might justify publication of otherwise private information or behavior.6
Moreover, the plaintiff in an invasion of privacy case must have conducted himself or herself in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy, i.e., he or she must not have manifested by his or her conduct a voluntary consent to the invasive actions of defendant. If voluntary consent is present, a defendant’s conduct will rarely be deemed “highly offensive to a reasonable person” so as to justify tort liability. (Rest.2d Torts, § 652B, com. c [no liability for public observation of plaintiff “since he is not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public eye”]; Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 224, 230 [253 P.2d 441] [plaintiffs waived any right to privacy by a “pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place”]; Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co. (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 146,162 [269 Cal.Rptr. 379] [“One factor relevant to whether an intrusion is ‘highly offensive to a reasonable person’ is the extent to which the person whose privacy is at issue voluntarily entered into the public sphere.”]; Melvin v. Reid (1931) 112 Cal.App. 285, 290 [297 P. 91] [no right to privacy in matters publicized with consent: “There can be no privacy in that which is already public.”]; see also Kapellas v. Kofman (1969) 1 Cal.3d 20, 36-37 [81 Cal.Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912].) The maxim of the law “volenti non fit injuria” (no wrong is done to one who consents) applies as well to the invasion of privacy tort. (Rest.2d Torts, § 892A, com. a; see also Civ. Code, § 3515.)
In determining the “ ‘offensiveness’ ” of an invasion of a privacy interest, common law courts consider, among other things, “the degree of the intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose privacy is invaded.” (Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1483-1484.)
Thus, the common law right of privacy is neither absolute nor globally vague, but is carefully confined to specific sets of interests that must inevitably be weighed in the balance against competing interests before the right is judicially recognized. A plaintiffs expectation of privacy in a specific context must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances, *27especially in light of the competing social interests involved. As one commentator has summarized: “Through a careful balancing of interests, the courts developed specific [common law] causes of action which protected somewhat well-defined aspects of personal privacy. Although privacy was clearly identified as an interest worthy of some legal protection, courts generally did not give privacy a privileged place or undue weight in the balancing process.” (Kelso, California’s Constitutional Right to Privacy (1992) 19 Pepperdine L.Rev. 327, 376 [hereafter Kelso].)
Our reference to the common law as background to the California constitutional right to privacy is not intended to suggest that the constitutional right is circumscribed by the common law tort. The ballot arguments do not reveal any such limitation. To the contrary, common law invasion of privacy by public disclosure of private facts requires that the actionable disclosure be widely published and not confined to a few persons or limited circumstances. (Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. a.) In contrast, the ballot arguments describe a privacy right that “prevents government and business interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and or misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.) Obviously, sensitive personal information may be misused even if its disclosure is limited.7
By referring to the common law, we seek merely to draw upon the one hundred years of legal experience surrounding the term “privacy” in identifying legally protected privacy interests and in describing the process by which such interests are compared and weighed against other values. That experience suggests that the common law’s insistence on objectively reasonable expectations of privacy based on widely shared social norms, serious violations of those expectations, and thorough consideration of competing interests, is an invaluable guide in constitutional privacy litigation.
*28(2) The federal constitutional right
The ballot arguments refer to the right to privacy as “an important American heritage and essential to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution,” thereby invoking the federal constitutional right to privacy as recognized in decisions of the United States Supreme Court. (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.)
The Privacy Initiative was placed before the voters following a two-thirds vote of each house of the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. XVIII, § 1.) Testimony before the Assembly Constitution Committee, together with staff reports and analyses prepared for that committee and the Senate Constitution Committee, makes explicit reference to the federal constitutional right to privacy, particularly as it developed beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479 [14 L.Ed.2d 510, 85 S.Ct. 1678]. (Kelso, supra, 19 Pepperdine L.Rev. at pp. 468, 473, 475, 477 [reproducing legislative history of Privacy Initiative].)
In Griswold, the Supreme Court invalidated a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice regarding their use. Although the federal Constitution contains no explicit reference to a “privacy” right, the court found implicit in the Bill of Rights provisions cited in the ballot argument—the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments— “zones of privacy” emanating from what it called the “penumbras" of the specific constitutional guarantees. The court located within those “zones of privacy” personal decisions made by married persons regarding the use of birth control devices. (Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 484 [14 L.Ed.2d at pp. 514-515].)
Concurring justices in Griswold sought to place the interest in marital privacy violated by the anticontraception law on other, less “penumbral”, constitutional grounds. (381 U.S. 479: “ ‘tradition and [collective] conscience of our people’ ” regarding fundamental rights manifested in Due Process Clause and Ninth Amendment (id., at p. 493 [14 L.Ed.2d at p. 520]) (conc. opn. of Goldberg, J.); “basic values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ ” in Fourteenth Amendment (id., at p. 500 [14 L.Ed.2d at pp. 524-525]) (conc. opn. of Harlan, J.); due process denied because no “end” of government could support state law at issue (id., at p. 507 [14 L.Ed.2d at pp. 528-529]) (conc. opn. of White, J.).) The concurring justices’ approach has been preferred to the more amorphous “penumbral” privacy analysis in at least one recent case. (Cruzan v. Missouri (1990) 497 U.S. 261, 279, fn. 7 [111 L.Ed.2d 224, 242, 110 S.Ct. 2841] [right to refuse medical treatment *29analyzed as Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest rather than part of right to privacy].)
The Supreme Court has included within the post-Griswold implicit right to privacy “certain rights of freedom of choice in marital, sexual, and reproductive matters,” but has not recognized a general right to engage in sexual activities done in private. (3 Rotunda & Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1992) § 18.26, p. 298; cf., e.g., Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113 [35 L.Ed.2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705] and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) 505 U.S__[120 L.Ed.2d 674, 112 S.Ct. 2791] [abortion laws struck down in part and upheld in part]; Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) 492 U.S. 490 [106 L.Ed.2d 410, 109 S.Ct. 3040] [same] with Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) 478 U.S. 186 [92 L.Ed.2d 140, 106 S.Ct. 2841] [consensual homosexual sodomy law upheld].)8
The Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause is sometimes referred to as a “privacy” provision. (See, e.g., Treasury Employees v. Von Raab (1989) 489 U.S. 656, 672 [103 L.Ed.2d 685, 706, 109 S.Ct. 1384].) The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 619 [103 L.Ed.2d 639, 661, 109 S.Ct. 1402].) Under the Fourth Amendment and the parallel search and seizure clause of the California Constitution (art. I, § 13), the reasonableness of particular searches and seizures is determined by a general balancing test “weighing the gravity of the governmental interest or public concern served and the degree to which the [challenged government conduct] advances that concern against the intrusiveness of the interference with individual liberty.” *30(Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1321, 1338 [241 Cal.Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299].)9
Collectively, the federal cases “sometimes characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” (Whalen v. Roe (1977) 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 [51 L.Ed.2d 64, 73, 97 S.Ct. 869] [hereafter Whalen], fns. omitted.) The former interest is informational or data-based; the latter involves issues of personal freedom of action and autonomy in individual encounters with government. The distinction between the two interests is not sharply drawn—disclosure of information, e.g., information about one’s financial affairs, may have an impact on personal decisions and relationships between individuals and government. (Plante v. Gonzalez (5th Cir. 1978) 575 F.2d 1119, 1130, cert. den. (1979) 439 U.S. 1129 [59 L.Ed.2d 90, 99 S.Ct. 1047].)
The diversity of federal constitutional “privacy” interests has left the federal right to privacy, especially in its comprehensive “penumbral” sense, without any coherent legal definition or standard. In privacy cases involving informational interests, the federal courts have generally applied balancing tests that avoid rigid “compelling interest” or “strict scrutiny” formulations. (See, e.g., Whalen, supra, 429 U.S. 589 [upholding state statute requiring drug prescriptions to be reported to a state government agency]; Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (1977) 433 U.S. 425, 457-458 [53 L.Ed.2d 867, 899-901, 97 S.Ct. 2777] [sustaining archivists’ right of access to presidential papers against individual president’s privacy claim]; see also Doe v. Attorney General (9th Cir. 1991) 941 F.2d 780, 796 [in informational privacy cases, “courts balance the government’s interest in having or using the information against the individual’s interest in denying access”]; Plante v. Gonzalez, supra, 575 F.2d at p. 1134 [public official financial disclosure law case; court applies balancing test, confining strict scrutiny to serious intrusions of specific autonomy rights such as marriage, family, and contraception].)
When it is applied, strict scrutiny generally functions as a judicial “trump card,” invalidating any attempt at state regulation because the state’s interest is rarely sufficiently compelling to justify abridgement of the right. (See, *31e.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (1978) 435 U.S. 765, 786 [55 L.Ed.2d 707, 724, 98 S.Ct. 1407]; Loving v. Virginia (1967) 388 U.S. 1,11 [18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1017-1018, 87 S.Ct. 1817]; Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term (1972) 86 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 8 [strict scrutiny is “ ‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”].) But the Supreme Court has not endorsed strict scrutiny for all privacy-based interests at all conceivable levels of intrusion. Even in specific fields of federal privacy protection, such as abortion rights, the high court has experienced difficulty articulating a consistent standard of review. (Compare, e.g., Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 155-156 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 178-179] [reference to “compelling state interest”] with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, supra, 505 U.S. at p._[120 L.Ed.2d at pp. 713-715, 742-743, 748-749, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 2820, 2842, 2847] [court unable to arrive at majority position regarding legal standard to measure burdens on abortion rights: three justices favor “undue burden” standard, one justice “strict scrutiny,” five justices various other rules and standards].)
In summary, outside the separate context of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures, the “penumbral” federal constitutional right to privacy has been applied to intrusions by the government into a narrow and defined class of personal autonomy interests in contraceptive and reproductive decisions. There is at least some prospect that what have been regarded as “privacy” interests may henceforth be viewed as Fourteenth Amendment “liberty” interests in federal constitutional analysis. (See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri, supra, 497 U.S. 261.) But whatever predictions one might hazard, the murky character of federal constitutional privacy analysis at this stage teaches that privacy interests and accompanying legal standards are best viewed flexibly and in context.10
*32b. Elements of a Cause of Action for Invasion of the State Constitutional Right of Privacy
Our cases do not contain a clear statement of the elements of a cause of action for invasion of the state constitutional right to privacy. Plaintiffs and Stanford succeeded in convincing the lower courts that the NCAA was required to justify any conceivable impact on plaintiffs’ privacy interests by a “compelling interest” and to establish that its drug testing program was the “least restrictive” alternative furthering the NCAA’s interests. The NCAA assails the “compelling interest/least restrictive alternative” test; plaintiffs and Stanford naturally come to its defense. We consider the positions of the parties in light of the history of the Privacy Initiative.
Our Privacy Initiative jurisprudence emanates from White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d 757. In White, we upheld against a general demurrer a taxpayer’s complaint seeking to enjoin expenditures of public funds for a police department’s covert surveillance of university classes at the University of California at Los Angeles. (Id. at p. 773.) The complaint alleged a level of “extensive, routine, covert police surveillance of university classes and organization meetings” that was “unprecedented in our nation’s history.” (Id. at p. 776.) According to plaintiffs ¿negations, police informants and undercover agents disguised themselves as students, attended university functions, and compiled dossiers of statements made by others in attendance, despite the absence of any illegal activity.
Because White arose on the pleadings, we necessarily assumed the truth of plaintiffs allegations and intimated no view regarding the ultimate question, i.e., whether plaintiffs state and federal constitutional rights had been violated by the challenged conduct of law enforcement authorities. (White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 776.) Focusing on plaintiffs’ rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression, we held the facts as alleged revealed government conduct “likely to pose a substantial restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights” and observed that “the challenged surveillance activities can only be sustained if defendant can demonstrate a ‘compelling’ state interest which justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendment rights and which cannot be served by alternative means less intrusive on fundamental rights.” (Id. at p. 772.)
Commenting on the state constitutional right to privacy, we characterized the law enforcement conduct alleged in the complaint as inherently “intrusive,” noting defendant would have the opportunity to “contest any of the allegations of the complaint as well as to designate the compelling governmental interests upon which they rely . . . .” (White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 776.)
*33Properly analyzed, our decision in White did not establish a blanket “compelling interest” test for all state constitutional dght-to-privacy cases. According to the White plaintiffs’ allegations, the government was spending taxpayer dollars to gather information and construct dossiers containing the surreptitious observations of academic speech by government agents. There was no legitimate government interest in this activity; its continuation threatened to harass and embarrass citizens in the exercise of their rights to free expression and association. Plaintiffs charge in White thus pertains to government invasion of one distinct set of privacy interests—those which overlap the First Amendment and relate to “our expressions,” “our freedom of communion,” and “our freedom to associate with the people we choose.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.)
This view of White is supported by an examination of the authority cited by the court. The White court refers without discussion to three cases in support of its “compelling governmental interests” language. None of the cases involves our state constitutional right of privacy.
Two of the three cases cited in White deal with freedom of expression and the concomitant right to hold public office. In City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, supra, 2 Cal.3d 259, plaintiffs attacked a sweeping conflict-of-interest law requiring “every public officer” and “each candidate” for state or local public office to file a statement disclosing all investments in excess of $10,000 owned by the officer, a spouse, or a minor child. (Id. at p. 262.) Drawing on state and federal cases recognizing a First Amendment right to participate in political activity, we emphasized that laws restraining political expression must be justified by a government showing of “compelling state purpose” as well as an absence of any “alternatives” that are “ ‘less offensive’ ” or “ ‘less subversive of constitutional rights.’ ” (Id. at pp. 264-265.) Finding the conflict-of-interest statute overbroad and not subject to a reasonable limiting construction, we held it unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 272.)
In County of Nevada v. MacMillen (1974) 11 Cal.3d 662, 670-672 [114 Cal.Rptr. 345, 522 P.2d 1345], we upheld a revision of the conflict-of-interest law designed to satisfy the demands of City of Carmel-by-the-Sea. Both of the conflict of interest cases make reference to a right to privacy, but in the context of the federal “penumbral” right. (City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 266-268; County of Nevada v. MacMillen, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 672.)
The third case cited in White—the Supreme Court’s Griswold decision— involves the federal “penumbral” right to privacy as applied to a married couple’s right to use contraceptives. White refers to Justice Goldberg’s *34concurring opinion, which discusses a “compelling” state interest standard for a “significant encroachment on personal liberty.” (White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 776, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. at p. 497 [14 L.Ed.2d at pp. 522-523] (conc. opn. of Goldberg, J.).) The standard is borrowed from Bates v. City of Little Rock (1959) 361 U.S. 516 [4 L.Ed.2d 480, 80 S.Ct. 412], a National Association for the Advancement of Colored People membership-list disclosure case involving “privacy” as an aspect of freedom of association protected by the First Amendment. Justice Goldberg’s concurrence represented the views of three justices. The majority opinion, written by Justice Douglas, does not adopt a “compelling interest” standard. (Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S. at pp. 480-486 [14 L.Ed.2d at pp. 512-516].)
As we have observed in part 2(a)(2), ante, there is no clear or uniform “compelling interest” standard emanating from the federal penumbral “privacy” decisions. Based on its language and the authority it cites, our decision in White signifies only that some aspects of the state constitutional right to privacy—those implicating obvious government action impacting freedom of expression and association—are accompanied by a “compelling state interest” standard.
Some of our decisions following White use “compelling interest” language; others appear to rely on balancing tests giving less intense scrutiny to nonprivacy interests. The particular context, i.e., the specific kind of privacy interest involved and the nature and seriousness of the invasion and any countervailing interests, remains the critical factor in the analysis. Where the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue consensual familial relationships, a “compelling interest” must be present to overcome the vital privacy interest. If, in contrast, the privacy interest is less central, or in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are employed.11
For the reasons stated above, we decline to hold that every assertion of a privacy interest under article I, section 1 must be overcome by a “compelling *35interest." Neither the language nor history of the Privacy Initiative unambiguously supports such a standard. In view of the far-reaching and multifaceted character of the right to privacy, such a standard imports an impermissible inflexibility into the process of constitutional adjudication.
There remains, however, the question of the correct legal standard to be applied in assessing plaintiffs’ claims for invasion of privacy. Based on our review of the history of the Privacy Initiative, we will describe in the remainder of this part the elements of the cause of action for violation of the state constitutional right to privacy and the defenses that might be asserted against such a cause of action.
(1) A legally protected privacy interest
The first essential element of a state constitutional cause of action for invasion of privacy is the identification of a specific, legally protected privacy interest. Whatever their common denominator, privacy interests are best assessed separately and in context. Just as the right to privacy is not absolute, privacy interests do not encompass all conceivable assertions of individual rights. Legally recognized privacy interests are generally of two classes: (1) interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information (“informational privacy”); and (2) interests in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference (“autonomy privacy”).
Informational privacy is the core value furthered by the Privacy Initiative. (White v. Davis, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 774.) A particular class of information is private when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity. Such norms create a threshold reasonable expectation of privacy in the data at issue. As the ballot argument observes, the *36California constitutional right of privacy “prevents government and business interests from [1] collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from [2] misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.)
Autonomy privacy is also a concern of the Privacy Initiative. The ballot arguments refer to the federal constitutional tradition of safeguarding certain intimate and personal decisions from government interference in the form of penal and regulatory laws. (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.) But they do not purport to create any unbridled right of personal freedom of action that may be vindicated in lawsuits against either government agencies or private persons or entities.
Whether established social norms safeguard a particular type of information or protect a specific personal decision from public or private intervention is to be determined from the usual sources of positive law governing the right to privacy—common law development, constitutional development, statutory enactment, and the ballot arguments accompanying the Privacy Initiative.
(2) Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The second essential element of a state constitutional cause of action for invasion of privacy is a reasonable expectation of privacy on plaintiffs part.
“The extent of [a privacy] interest is not independent of the circumstances.” (Plante v. Gonzalez, supra, 575 F.2d at p. 1135.) Even when a legally cognizable privacy interest is present, other factors may affect a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. For example, advance notice of an impending action may serve to “ ‘limit [an] intrusion upon personal dignity and security’ ” that would otherwise be regarded as serious. (Ingersoll v. Palmer, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1346 [upholding the use of sobriety checkpoints].)
In addition, customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities may create or inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy. (See, e.g., Whalen, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 602 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 75] [reporting of drug prescriptions to government was supported by established law and “not meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care”]; Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. City of Philadelphia (3d Cir. 1987) 812 F.2d 105, 114 [no invasion of privacy in requirement that applicants for promotion to special police unit disclose medical and financial information in part *37because of applicant awareness that such disclosure “has historically been required by those in similar positions”].)
A “reasonable” expectation of privacy is an objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms. (See, e.g., Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 652D, com. c [“The protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens.”]
Finally, the presence or absence of opportunities to consent voluntarily to activities impacting privacy interests obviously affects the expectations of the participant. (See pt. 2(a)(1), ante.)
(3) Serious invasion of privacy interest
No community could function if every intrusion into the realm of private action, no matter how slight or trivial, gave rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy. “Complete privacy does not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part.” (Rest.2d Torts, supra, § 652D, com. c.) Actionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right. Thus, the extent and gravity of the invasion is an indispensable consideration in assessing an alleged invasion of privacy.
c. Defenses to a State Constitutional Privacy Cause of Action
Privacy concerns are not absolute; they must be balanced against other important interests. (Doyle v. State Bar, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 20; Wilkinson, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1046.) “[N]ot every act which has some impact on personal privacy invokes the protections of [our Constitution] .... [A] court should not play the trump card of unconstitutionality to protect absolutely every assertion of individual privacy.” (215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1046.)
The diverse and somewhat amorphous character of the privacy right necessarily requires that privacy interests be specifically identified and carefully compared with competing or countervailing privacy and nonprivacy interests in a “balancing test.” The comparison and balancing of diverse interests is central to the privacy jurisprudence of both common and constitutional law.
*38Invasion of a privacy interest is not a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy if the invasion is justified by a competing interest. Legitimate interests derive from the legally authorized and socially beneficial activities of government and private entities. Their relative importance is determined by their proximity to the central functions of a particular public or private enterprise. Conduct alleged to be an invasion of privacy is to be evaluated based on the extent to which it furthers legitimate and important competing interests. (See pt. 2(a), ante; Ballot Argument, supra, at pp. 26-27.)
Confronted with a defense based on countervailing interests, the plaintiff may undertake the burden of demonstrating the availability and use of protective measures, safeguards, and alternatives to the defendant’s conduct that would minimize the intrusion on privacy interests. (Whalen, supra, 429 U.S. at pp. 600-602 [106 L.Ed.2d at pp. 498-500]; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., supra, 489 U.S. at p. 626, fn. 7 [103 L.Ed.2d at pp. 665-666].) For example, if intrusion is limited and confidential information is carefully shielded from disclosure except to those who have a legitimate need to know, privacy concerns are assuaged. On the other hand, if sensitive information is gathered and feasible safeguards are slipshod or nonexistent, or if defendant’s legitimate objectives can be readily accomplished by alternative means having little or no impact on privacy interests, the prospect of actionable invasion of privacy is enhanced.
The NCAA is a private organization, not a government agency. Judicial assessment of the relative strength and importance of privacy norms and countervailing interests may differ in cases of private, as opposed to government, action.
First, the pervasive presence of coercive government power in basic areas of human life typically poses greater dangers to the freedoms of the citizenry than actions by private persons. “The government not only has the ability to affect more than a limited sector of the populace through its actions, it has both economic power, in the form of taxes, grants, and control over social welfare programs, and physical power, through law enforcement agencies, which are capable of coercion far beyond that of the most powerful private actors.” (Sundby, Is Abandoning State Action Asking Too Much of the Constitution? (1989) 17 Hastings Const.L.Q. 139, 142-143 [hereafter Sundby].)
Second, “an individual generally has greater choice and alternatives in dealing with private actors than when dealing with the government.” (Sundby, supra, 17 Hastings Const.L.Q. at p. 143.) Initially, individuals usually have a range of choice among landlords, employers, vendors and others with *39whom they deal. To be sure, varying degrees of competition in the marketplace may broaden or narrow the range. But even in cases of limited or no competition, individuals and groups may turn to the Legislature to seek a statutory remedy against a specific business practice regarded as undesirable. State and federal governments routinely engage in extensive regulation of all aspects of business. Neither our Legislature nor Congress has been unresponsive to concerns based on activities of nongovernment entities that are perceived to affect the right of privacy. (See, e.g., Lab. Code, § 432.2, subd. (a) [“No employer shall demand or require any applicant for employment or prospective employment or any employee to submit to or take a polygraph, lie detector or similar test or examination as a condition of employment or continued employment”]; 29 U.S.C. § 2001 [regulating private employer use of polygraph examination].)
Third, private conduct, particularly the activities of voluntary associations of persons, carries its own mantle of constitutional protection in the form of freedom of association. Private citizens have a right, not secured to government, to communicate and associate with one another on mutually negotiated terms and conditions. The ballot argument recognizes that state constitutional privacy protects in part “our freedom of communion and our freedom to associate with the people we choose.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.) Freedom of association is also protected by the First Amendment and extends to all legitimate organizations, whether popular or unpopular. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 854 [143 Cal.Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766]; see also Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) § 18-2, p. 1691 [noting rationale of federal constitutional requirement of state action protects “the freedom to make certain choices, such as choices of the persons with whom [one associates]” which is “basic under any conception of liberty”].)
These generalized differences between public and private action may affect privacy rights differently in different contexts. If, for example, a plaintiff claiming a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy was able to choose freely among competing public or private entities in obtaining access to some opportunity, commodity, or service, his or her privacy interest may weigh less in the balance. In contrast, if a public or private entity controls access to a vitally necessary item, it may have a correspondingly greater impact on the privacy rights of those with whom it deals.
Summary of Elements and Defenses
Based on our review of the Privacy Initiative, we hold that a plaintiff alleging an invasion of privacy in violation of the state constitutional right to privacy must establish each of the following: (1) a legally *40protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.
Whether a legally recognized privacy interest is present in a given case is a question of law to be decided by the court. (Cf. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., supra, 40 Cal.2d at p. 229; Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 880, 892 [118 Cal.Rptr. 370] [common law cases].) Whether plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and whether defendant’s conduct constitutes a serious invasion of privacy are mixed questions of law and fact. If the undisputed material facts show no reasonable expectation of privacy or an insubstantial impact on privacy interests, the question of invasion may be adjudicated as a matter of law.
A defendant may prevail in a state constitutional privacy case by negating any of the three elements just discussed or by pleading and proving, as an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests. The plaintiff, in turn, may rebut a defendant’s assertion of countervailing interests by showing there are feasible and effective alternatives to defendant’s conduct which have a lesser impact on privacy interests. Of course, a defendant may also plead and prove other available defenses, e.g., consent, unclean hands, etc., that may be appropriate in view of the nature of the claim and the relief requested.
The existence of a sufficient countervailing interest or an alternative course of conduct present threshold questions of law for the court. The relative strength of countervailing interests and the feasibility of alternatives present mixed questions of law and fact. Again, in cases where material facts are undisputed, adjudication as a matter of law may be appropriate.
3. Application of the Elements of Invasion of Privacy to This Case
The NCAA challenges the decision of the Court of Appeal upholding a permanent injunction against its drug testing program as a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy. We will therefore review the record, including the findings made by the trial court, in light of the elements of a cause of action for invasion of privacy as we have just discussed them.
Plaintiffs correctly assert that the NCAA’s drug testing program impacts legally protected privacy interests. First, by monitoring an athlete’s urination, the NCAA’s program intrudes on a human bodily function that by law *41and social custom is generally performed in private and without observers. (Cf. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., supra, 489 U.S. 602, 617 [103 L.Ed.2d 639, 659-660]; Pen. Code, § 653n [installation or maintenance of two-way mirror permitting observation of restroom is misdemeanor].) Second, by collecting and testing an athlete’s urine and inquiring about his or her ingestion of medications and other substances, the NCAA obtains information about the internal medical state of an athlete’s body that is regarded as personal and confidential. (Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 669, 678 [156 Cal.Rptr. 55] [“A person’s medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and protected.”]; see also Wilkinson, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1048.)
Observation of urination and disclosure of medical information may cause embarrassment to individual athletes. The first implicates autonomy privacy—an interest in freedom from observation in performing a function recognized by social norms as private. The second implicates informational privacy—an interest in limiting disclosure of confidential information about bodily condition. But, as we have noted, the identification of these privacy interests is the beginning, not the end, of the analysis.
a. Freedom From Observation During Urination
(1) Reasonable expectations of privacy
The observation of urination—a human excretory function—obviously implicates privacy interests.12 But the reasonable expectations of privacy of plaintiffs (and other student athletes) in private urination must be viewed within the context of intercollegiate athletic activity and the normal conditions under which it is undertaken.
By its nature, participation in intercollegiate athletics, particularly in highly competitive postseason championship events, involves close regulation and scrutiny of the physical fitness and bodily condition of student athletes. Required physical examinations (including urinalysis), and special regulation of sleep habits, diet, fitness, and other activities that intrude significantly on privacy interests are routine aspects of a college athlete’s life not shared by other students or the population at large. Athletes frequently disrobe in the presence of one another and their athletic mentors and *42assistants in locker room settings where private bodily parts are readily observable by others of the same sex. They also exchange information about their physical condition and medical treatment with coaches, trainers, and others who have a “need to know.”
As a result of its unique set of demands, athletic participation carries with it social norms that effectively diminish the athlete’s reasonable expectation of personal privacy in his or her bodily condition, both internal and external. In recognition of this practical reality, drug testing programs involving athletic competition have routinely survived Fourth Amendment “privacy” challenges.13 Drug testing has become a highly visible, pervasive, and well-accepted part of athletic competition, particularly on intercollegiate and professional levels. (Schaill, supra, 864 F.2d at p. 1319.) It is a reasonably expected part of the life of an athlete, especially one engaged in advanced levels of competition, where the stakes and corresponding temptations are high.
The student athlete’s reasonable expectation of privacy is further diminished by two elements of the NCAA’s drug testing program—advance notice and the opportunity to consent to testing. A drug test does not come as a unwelcome surprise at the end of a postseason match. Full disclosure of the NCAA’s banned substances rules and testing procedures is made at the beginning of the athletic season, long before the postseason competition during which drug testing may take place. Following disclosure, the informed written consent of each student athlete is obtained. Thus, athletes have complete information regarding the NCAA’s drug testing program and are afforded the opportunity to consent or refuse before they may be selected for testing.
To be sure, an athlete who refuses consent to drug testing is disqualified from NCAA competition. But this consequence does not render the athlete’s consent to testing involuntary in any meaningful legal sense. Athletic participation is not a government benefit or an economic necessity that society has decreed must be open to all. One aspect of the state constitutional right *43to privacy is “our freedom to associate with the people we choose.” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.) Participation in any organized activity carried on by a private, nongovernment organization necessarily entails a willingness to forgo assertion of individual rights one might otherwise have in order to receive the benefits of communal association.
Plaintiffs and Stanford have no legal right to participate in intercollegiate athletic competition. (Cf. Steffes v. California Interscholastic Federation (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 739 [222 Cal.Rptr. 355].) Their ability to do so necessarily depends upon their willingness to arrive at and adhere to common understandings with their competitors regarding their mutual sporting endeavor. The NCAA is democratically governed by its member institutions, including Stanford.14 Acting collectively, those institutions, including Stanford, make the rules, including those regarding drug use and testing. If, knowing the rules, plaintiffs and Stanford choose to play the game, they have, by social convention and legal act, fully and voluntarily acquiesced in the application of those rules. To view the matter otherwise would impair the privacy and associational rights of all NCAA institutions and athletes.
(2) Seriousness of invasion
Although diminished by the athletic setting and the exercise of informed consent, plaintiffs’ privacy interests are not thereby rendered de minimis. Direct observation of urination by a monitor, an intrusive act, appears to be unique to the NCAA’s program. Other decided cases, including those involving athlete drug testing, have involved less invasive testing methods, typically unobserved urination in a restroom stall. (See, e.g., Dimeo v. Griffin, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 682 [urine specimen given in “(relative) privacy” of toilet stall with representative standing by but not observing urination]; Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp., supra, 864 F.2d at p. 1311 [no direct visual observation of urination; monitor stands outside stall to listen for normal sounds of urination and to check temperature of sample by hand].) The NCAA’s use of a particularly intrusive monitored urination procedure justifies further inquiry, even under conditions of decreased expectations of privacy.
(3) Competing interests
To justify its intrusion on student athletes’ diminished expectations of privacy, the NCAA asserts two countervailing interests: (1) safeguarding the *44integrity of intercollegiate athletic competition; and (2) protecting the health and safety of student athletes. The central purpose of the NCAA is to promote competitive athletic events conducted pursuant to “rules of the game” enacted by its own membership. In this way, the NCAA creates and preserves the “level playing field” necessary to promote vigorous, high-level, and nationwide competition in intercollegiate sports.
Plaintiffs and Stanford do not contend that the purpose or objectives of the NCAA are contrary to law or public policy. Nor do they attribute bad faith motives to the NCAA or challenge its important role as “the guardian of [the] important American tradition” of intercollegiate athletic competition. (NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., supra, 468 U.S. at p. 101, fn. 23 [82 L.Ed.2d at p. 84].) The NCAA is, without doubt, a highly visible and powerful institution, holding, as it does, a virtual monopoly on high-level intercollegiate athletic competition in the United States. Although the NCAA, like other private businesses and organizations, is subject to numerous regulations, neither Congress nor our Legislature has seen fit to interfere with its general rulemaking functions, whether in the area of drug testing or in other fields. Therefore, we regard the NCAA’s stated motives and objectives, not with hostility or intense skepticism, but with a “respectful presumption of validity.” (Ibid.)
Considered in light of its history, the NCAA’s decision to enforce a ban on the use of drugs by means of a drug testing program is reasonably calculated to further its legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of intercollegiate athletic competition. As one author observed: “[Athletic] competition should be decided on the basis of who has done the best job of perfecting and utilizing his or her natural abilities, not on the basis of who has the best pharmacist." (Zemper, Drug Testing in Athletics, in Drug Testing: Issues and Options (Coombs & West, edits., 1991) p. 120.)
The NCAA began to study drug testing in response to a specific incident of probable drug ingestion by athletes at the Pan American Games. It followed other established and respected amateur sporting organizations— principally the USOC and the International Olympic Committee—in promulgating and enforcing its drug testing program. And, although the NCAA followed the lead of others, it did not do so blindly. Before beginning its testing program, the NCAA commissioned its own study—one that showed significant and widespread use of drugs by student athletes. Other studies included in the record, as well as testimony from physicians, trainers, and others, confirm substantial, if not extensive, drug use by student athletes. Despite advance notice and warnings to student athletes before the testing *45program began, approximately 1 percent of the athletes tested in the first two years of operation were declared ineligible because of drug use.15
But whatever the provable incidence of drug use, perception may be more potent than reality. If particular substances are perceived to enhance athletic performance, student athletes may feel pressure (whether internal or external, subtle or overt) to use them. A drug testing program serves to minimize that pressure by providing at least some assurance that drug use will be detected and the user disqualified. As a result, it provides significant and direct benefits to the student athletes themselves, allowing them to concentrate on the merits of their athletic task without undue concern about loss of a competitive edge. These benefits offset the limited impact on privacy imposed by the prospect of testing.
There was ample evidence in the record that certain kinds of drugs—such as anabolic steroids and amphetamines—are perceived by some athletes to enhance athletic performance. Among other findings, the Michigan State University study showed that 69 percent of the student athletes who reported taking steroids and 37 percent of those taking amphetamines admitted doing so “to improve athletic performance.” Plaintiffs’ own expert, Dr. David Lowenthal, wrote in 1985: “In spite of physicians’ efforts to provide rational and individual therapy for patients and despite warnings to healthy participants in sports, the consumption of caffeine, salicylates, nonsteroidal antiinflammatory drugs . . . alcohol, anabolic steroids, and amphetamines to improve athletic performance is rampant.”
As to anabolic steroids, Dr. Lowenthal commented: “The use of these drugs by athletes has now reached alarming proportions. . . . In the United States, anabolic steroid use has spread from professional athletes to college and high school athletes. ... It would be extremely difficult to determine the number of athletes who use anabolic steroids in different sports. Much of the information in this area comes from former users [and] from informal surveys. It has been suggested that between 80 and 100 per cent of male bodybuilders and weight lifters at the national and international level use these agents during training. Use among shotputters and discus, hammer and *46javelin throwers is probably comparable. The use of anabolic steroids has spread rapidly to include football players, swimmers and other competitive athletes, as well as noncompetitive athletes.”
Dr. Lowenthal confirmed his written findings and opinions in testimony given at trial. Although other experts expressed different views, the testimony, considered in light of the entire record, supplies uncontradicted evidence of a substantial, though perhaps not universal, perception that the use of certain drugs may enhance athletic performance.
Finally, the practical realities of NCAA-sponsored athletic competition cannot be ignored. Intercollegiate sports is, at least in part, a business founded upon offering for public entertainment athletic contests conducted under a rule of fair and rigorous competition. Scandals involving drug use, like those involving improper financial incentives or other forms of corruption, impair the NCAA’s reputation in the eyes of the sports-viewing public. A well announced and vigorously pursued drug testing program serves to: (1) provide a significant deterrent to would-be violators, thereby reducing tile probability of damaging public disclosure of athlete drug use; and (2) assure student athletes, their schools, and the public that fair competition remains the overriding principle in athletic events. Of course, these outcomes also serve the NCAA’s overall interest in safeguarding the integrity of intercollegiate athletic competition. (Cf. Dimeo v. Griffin, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 685 [state’s financial interest in horse racing revenues provides partial justification for drug testing of participants to preserve appearance and reality of fair competition]; Shoemaker v. Handel, supra, 795 F.2d at p. 1142 [“It is the public’s perception, not the known suspicion, that triggers the state’s strong interest in conducting warrantless [drug] testing [in the horse racing industry].”)
The NCAA also has an interest in protecting the health and safety of student athletes who are involved in NCAA-regulated competition. Contrary to plaintiffs’ characterization, this interest is more than a mere “naked assertion of paternalism.” The NCAA sponsors and regulates intercollegiate athletic events, which by their nature may involve risks of physical injury to athletes, spectators, and others. In this way, the NCAA effectively creates occasions for potential injury resulting from the use of drugs. As a result, it may concern itself with the task of protecting the safety of those involved in intercollegiate athletic competition. This NCAA interest exists for the benefit of all persons involved in sporting events (including not only drug-ingesting athletes but also innocent athletes or others who might be injured by a drug user), as well as the sport itself.
Plaintiffs and Stanford attempt to undermine the strength of the NCAA’s interests with a series of factual arguments based on the trial court’s findings. However, as we have noted, those findings were premised on the legal *47assumption that the NCAA bears the burden of establishing a “compelling interest” in its drug testing program that cannot be addressed by any alternative with a lesser impact on privacy interests. No such showing is required. Because the trial court’s findings were premised on an erroneous view of the applicable legal standard, they cannot save the judgment. (Lewis Food Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 515, 524 [24 Cal.Rptr. 557]; Smith v. Fetterhoff (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 471, 473 [295 P.2d 474]; cf. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 500, 501 [80 L.Ed.2d 502, 516-517, 104 S.Ct. 1949] [“ ‘clearly erroneous’ ” standard of review does not apply to a “finding of fact that is predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law”].) Although we could remand this case for reconsideration in light of the applicable rules of law, there is no reason to do so. Uncontradicted evidence in the record demonstrates as a matter of law the constitutional validity of the NCAA’s program.
Without reviewing all of the arguments advanced by plaintiffs and Stanford, it is sufficient to note that most, if not all, are based on matters that are immaterial in light of the elements of invasion of privacy described above. For example, plaintiffs seek to dismiss college athlete drug use as legally insignificant, pointing to a finding that “athletes do not use drugs any more than college students generally” and another that they “actually use drugs less during the athletic season than their peers.” The purported comparison between student athletes and other college students is beside the point. Student athletes have set themselves apart from their nonathlete peers; as we have noted, they have different and diminished expectations of privacy in the athletic context. If student athletes’ drug use is, or, in the absence of drug testing could be, substantial and detrimental to competition or to the health of student athletes, the NCAA has a significant interest in conducting a testing program.
Plaintiffs also point to trial court findings that none of the NCAA’s banned drugs were “scientifically proven” to enhance athletic performance, noting some controversy among experts respecting certain substances. Plaintiffs cite no authority imposing a “scientific” burden of proof on a defendant in an invasion of privacy case; we have located none. Scientific proof of this nature would require actual drug use under competitive conditions. This kind of human experimentation would pose risks to life and limb of far greater magnitude than plaintiffs’ asserted privacy interest in this case. Moreover, the existence of continuing scientific controversy about particular drugs or practices on perceptions in athletic settings can reasonably be viewed as dictating caution and prohibition, rather than total deregulation.
Finally, as we have noted, perception may well overpower reality in this area. Although the trial court found that coaches and athletes in general do *48not perceive drugs as performance-enhancing or as a “major problem,” there is clear evidence of a significant perception to the contrary on the part of some coaches and athletes. Plaintiffs’ own expert confirmed the perception and opined that it was growing. Rules are often made and enforced to control the behavior of relatively small numbers of individuals whose conduct, if it became more widespread, would undermine a community goal or objective. If athletic drug use became widespread because of a growing perception that drug users thereby obtained a “competitive edge,” the integrity and reputation of NCAA athletic competition could be seriously threatened. The NCAA is not required by state constitutional privacy principles to stay its hand until a “minor” problem becomes a “major” one. (Cf. Dimeo v. Griffin, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 684 [“[G]ovemment is not limited to addressing public safety problems after serious accidents reveal its want of foresight.”].)
Plaintiffs also challenge the NCAA’s list of proscribed drugs, maintaining that it is overbroad because, as the trial court found, it “includes substances which do not enhance performance.” Accepting the factual premise of plaintiffs’ argument, it is not fatal to the NCAA’s drug testing program. Initially, the NCAA’s interests are not limited to banning so-called performance-enhancing drugs. It also prohibits street drugs—such as marijuana and cocaine—which are illegal to possess and which probably retard athletic performance. The NCAA’s interests in maintaining the integrity of competitive conditions and protecting the health and safety of student athletes certainly extends to prohibiting the use of illegal and dangerous substances, as well as others that might potentially affect athletic performance, whether positively or negatively.
Moreover, the Privacy Initiative does not empower us to make an item-by-item review of the desirability of retaining each item in the NCAA’s prohibited substance list. The privacy interests asserted by plaintiffs are impacted by the manner in which drug testing is carried out; assuming the list contains at least some substances that may potentially injure competitors or competition and thereby justify testing, the impact of monitored urine testing on plaintiffs’ privacy interests does not wax or wane depending upon the number of such substances.
The ballot arguments in support of the Privacy Initiative impliedly caution against the kind of wholesale review of the rules and regulations of a private, voluntary organization advocated by plaintiffs and Stanford. The Privacy Initiative recognizes a specific privacy-related interest in “our freedom to associate with the people we choose” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27). To undertake, under the guise of protecting a diminished privacy interest, a review of the merits of rules enacted by the democratic process of a private *49organization would impair the associational freedom of organization members in a manner contrary to the purpose of the Privacy Initiative itself.
In accordance with the trial court’s findings, plaintiffs also argue that the NCAA did not carry “its burden of proving that there are no less intrusive means available to further its asserted goals of assuring fair competition and protecting the health of student athletes.” Plaintiffs submit that drug education and testing based on reasonable suspicion are feasible alternatives to random drug testing.
Initially, the trial court erred in imposing on the NCAA the burden of establishing that there were no less intrusive means of accomplishing its legitimate objectives. Like the “compelling interest” standard, the argument that such a “least restrictive alternative” burden must invariably be imposed on defendants in privacy cases derives from decisions that: (1) involve clear invasions of central, autonomy-based privacy rights, particularly in the areas of free expression and association, procreation, or government-provided benefits in areas of basic human need; or (2) are directed against the invasive conduct of government agencies rather than private, voluntary organizations.16
*50We have been directed to no case imposing on a private organization, acting in a situation involving decreased expectations of privacy, the burden of justifying its conduct as the “least offensive alternative” possible under the circumstances. Nothing in the language of history of the Privacy Initiative justifies the imposition of such a burden; we decline to impose it.
Moreover, the alternatives posited by plaintiffs—educational programs and suspicion-based drug testing—are different in kind and character from random drug testing. Education may have little effect on persons who are inclined not to listen; competitive pressures or addictive tendencies are likely to prevail over benign attempts at persuasion. Suspicion-based testing assumes reliable visible evidence of drug use and the availability of sufficient resources to make the necessary observations, neither of which finds substantial evidentiary support in the record. It also depends at least in part on the reporting of suspected athletes by their competitors, a situation fraught with conflicts of interest and other difficulties. In light of these factors, the NCAA was not constitutionally compelled to adopt educational or suspicion-based programs to further its interests in the integrity of athletic competition and the health and safety of student athletes.
The closest question presented by this case concerns the method used by the NCAA to monitor athletes as they provide urine samples. A tested athlete’s urination is directly observed by an NCAA official of the same sex as the athlete who stands some five to seven feet away. Even the diminished expectations of privacy in a locker room setting do not necessarily include direct and intentional observation of excretory functions. Plaintiffs had a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances; their privacy interest was impacted by the NCAA’s conduct. The NCAA was therefore required to justify its use of direct monitoring of urination.
In support of direct monitoring, the NCAA introduced substantial evidence that urine samples can be altered or substituted in order to avoid positive findings and that athletes had actually attempted to do so. The NCAA’s interest in preserving the integrity of intercollegiate athletic competition requires not just testing, but effective and accurate testing of unaltered and uncontaminated samples. If direct monitoring is necessary to accomplish accurate testing, the NCAA is entitled to use it.
*51The trial court rejected the NCAA’s evidence, finding cryptically as follows: “Direct monitoring of an athlete urinating is not necessary to ensure a valid sample.” No reasons were offered to support this conclusion. Plaintiffs point only to scant expert opinion—also unaccompanied by any credible line of reasoning—on the issue. More critically, plaintiffs did not offer any evidence (whether from experts or other sources) demonstrating that any alternative to direct monitoring with a significantly lesser impact on plaintiffs privacy interests would accomplish the NCAA’s objective of ensuring a valid sample.
Trial court findings must be supported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole. Substantial evidence is not any evidence—it must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (Kroopf v. Guffey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1356 [228 Cal.Rptr. 807]; Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873 [197 Cal.Rptr. 925].) Because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate with substantial evidence the presence of fully viable alternatives to monitoring, they stopped short of proving their case.17
Notwithstanding plaintiffs’ failure of proof in this case, direct monitoring remains a significant privacy issue in athletic and nonathletic drug testing cases. Social norms validate the distinction between the mere presence of another person in or around an area where urination takes place (such as a bathroom or locker room) and the direct and purposeful observation of urination act by someone specially commissioned to witness it. (See Capua v. City of Plainfield (D.N.J. 1986) 643 F.Supp. 1507, 1514 [urine test under close surveillance “embarrassing and humiliating”]; Decresce & Lifshitz, Drug Testing in the Workplace (1989) p. 143.)
*52Perhaps because of its greater impact on privacy interests, direct monitoring is not used in all drug testing programs. With two exceptions, no decided case has upheld direct monitoring, even in the diminished privacy context of athletic competition. The first exception—also in an NCAA drug testing context—is a later-vacated federal trial court decision containing virtually no analysis of the serious privacy issues. (O’Halloran v. University of Washington, supra, 479 F.Supp. at p. 1005.) The second involves testing of a probationary police officer after notice and consent. (O’Connor v. Police Com’r of Boston (1990) 408 Mass. 324 [557 N.E.2d 1146, 1149].) Neither case considers the possibility of less intrusive alternatives to direct monitoring.
There may indeed be less intrusive alternatives to direct monitoring that could nonetheless fully satisfy the tester’s objective of insuring a valid sample. (See, e.g., Dixon v. Department of Transp. F.A.A. (Fed.Cir. 1993) 8 F.3d 798, 803-804 [describing color and temperature tests designed to verify integrity of urine sample]; see also Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 661 [103 L.Ed.2d at p. 669]; Decresce & Lifshitz, supra, Drug Testing in the Workplace, p. 144; Fay, Drug Testing (1991) pp. 227-230 [outlining similar procedures to safeguard privacy while insuring accuracy of testing].) Because we are limited to the record before us, we necessarily leave any further consideration of less intrusive alternatives to direct monitoring initially to the judgment and discretion of the NCAA, and then to future litigation, if any.
b. Interest in the Privacy of Medical Treatment and Information
(1) Reasonable expectation
As discussed above, plaintiffs’ interest in the privacy of medical treatment and medical information is also a protectable interest under the Privacy Initiative. However, the student athlete’s reasonable expectation of privacy is similarly diminished because of the nature of competitive athletic activity and the norms under which it is conducted. Organized and supervised athletic competition presupposes a continuing exchange of otherwise confidential information about the physical (and medical) condition of athletes. Coaches, trainers, and team physicians necessarily learn intimate details of student athletes’ bodily condition, including illnesses, medical problems, and medications prescribed or taken. Plaintiffs do not demonstrate that sharing similar information with the NCAA, in its capacity as a *53regulator of athletic competition in which plaintiffs have voluntarily elected to participate, presents any greater risk to privacy.18
(2) Seriousness of invasion
Directed and specific inquiries about personal medications (including questions about birth control pills) in the potentially stressful circumstances of a random drug test are undoubtedly significant from a privacy standpoint Without a correspondingly important “reason to know,” the NCAA would have no right to demand answers to these kinds of questions. Again, however, the extent of the intrusion on plaintiffs’ privacy presented by the question must be considered in light of both the diminished expectations of privacy of athletes in such questions, which are routinely asked and answered in the athletic context.
(3) Competing interests
Drug testing for multiple substances is a complex process. Although both parties acknowledge the NCAA has used and continues to use the best available methods of laboratory analysis, mistakes are possible and “false positives” can occur. The NCAA’s inquiries to athletes about medications and drugs are designed to ensure accuracy in testing. The NCAA maintains that complete and accurate disclosure of these matters by athletes will, in certain instances and with respect to specified substances, serve to explain findings and prevent the embarrassment and distress occasioned by further proceedings. The record supports the NCAA’s contentions. These kinds of disclosures are reasonably necessary to further the threshold purpose of the drug testing program—to protect the integrity of competition through the medium of accurate testing of athletes engaged in competition. The NCAA’s interests in this regard adequately justify its inquiries about medications and other substances ingested by tested athletes.
The NCAA follows extensive procedures designed to safeguard test results, including: the numbering of urine specimens, chain of custody procedures, and control of disclosures regarding disqualified athletes. Plaintiffs *54and Stanford offer no serious criticism of the manner in which the NCAA protects the privacy interests of student athletes in the results or the process of drug testing. They point to no instances in which medical data or drug test results were disclosed to persons other than NCAA officials and the athlete’s own college or university.
Although plaintiffs plausibly observe that media interest in positive test results is inevitable, the NCAA cannot be held responsible for public curiosity. Under established NCAA procedures, positive drug testing results are disclosed only to the athlete’s school, which, in turn, informs the athlete. Only those with a “need to know” learn of positive findings. Plaintiffs fail to identify any other feasible precaution or safeguard. The uncontradicted evidence in the record thus points to a single conclusion: the NCAA carefully safeguards the confidentiality of athlete medical information and drug test data, using the same only to determine eligibility for NCAA athletic competition in accordance with its demonstrated interests. There is no invasion of privacy in the NCAA’s procedure. (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., supra, 489 U.S. at p. 626, fn. 7 [103 L.Ed.2d at pp. 665-666].)
In sum, plaintiffs and Stanford did not prove that the NCAA is “collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about [student athletes] [or] misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass [student athletes].” (Ballot Argument, supra, at p. 27.) The NCAA’s information-gathering procedure (i.e., drug testing through urinalysis) is a method reasonably calculated to further its interests in enforcing a ban on the ingestion of specified substances in order to secure fair competition and the health and safety of athletes participating in its programs.
In generally upholding the NCAA’s drug testing program against plaintiffs’ privacy challenge, we intimate no views about the legality of blanket or random drug testing conducted by employers, whether of current employees or applicants for employment, or by other kinds of entities. Employment settings are diverse, complex, and very different from intercollegiate athletic competition. Reasonable expectations of privacy in those settings are generally not diminished by the emphasis on bodily condition, physical training, and extracurricular competition inherent in athletics.
In the government employment context, for example, the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures has generally been interpreted to require more than an employer interest in employee job performance or a “drug-free workplace” to justify drug testing without reasonable suspicion. Drug testing has been upheld when particular kinds of *55employment settings—including prison guarding, train operations, or customs inspection—present extraordinary risks to employer or public interests from employee drug use.19 As one federal court commented: “No one would want to live in an Orwellian world in which the government assured a drug-free America by randomly testing the urine of all its citizens.” (American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Roberts (9th Cir. 1993) 9 F.3d 1464.)
What requirements are imposed on private employers by the California constitutional right to privacy will depend upon the application of the elements and considerations we have discussed to the employer’s special interests and the employee’s reasonable expectations prevailing in a particular employment setting. We are not called upon to decide any such issues here.20
*56(4) Response to concurring and dissenting opinions
The three separate opinions filed by our colleagues reflect the diversity of views possible in a case of this magnitude and difficulty. In her concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard expresses agreement with our interpretation of the Privacy Initiative and the legal standard we articulate, but would remand this case for further proceedings rather than direct judgment for the NCAA. As a result, five justices of this court concur in the basic test defining the scope of our state constitutional right to privacy.
In contrast, both Justices George and Mosk would place on the NCAA the burden of showing a “compelling interest” to justify its drug testing program. But their radically different applications of the same preferred “compelling interest” test illustrate its inherently elusive character. Justice George finds the threshold imposed sufficiently low to allow the NCAA’s drug testing program to pass through unimpeded, even as a matter of law. In essence, he finds the “compelling interest” test to require an interest of “some importance,” but one that may be something less than vital or absolutely essential to an enterprise. Justice Mosk, on the other hand, believes the “compelling interest” step is such a high one that the NCAA is tripped up at the outset.
We prefer to avoid the continuing uncertainty and confusion inherent in the rigid application of a “compelling interest” test to a multi-faceted right to privacy. The NCAA lost this case in the lower courts because it could not, in the views of two superior court judges and three Court of Appeal justices, show a sufficiently “compelling” reason for its drug testing program. At least one other appellate court in our state has erroneously concluded in an employment drug testing case that a compelling interest test “places a heavier burden on [the defendant] than would a Fourth Amendment privacy analysis, in which the permissibility of a particular practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.” (Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., supra, 218 Cal.App.3d 1, 20.) We will not *57perpetuate this kind of error by continuing to say “compelling” when we mean merely “legitimate” or “important.” There is enough confusion in the law. We should say what we mean and mean what we say.
Even at the risk of losing some degree of flexibility in decisionmaking, a constitutional standard that carefully weighs the pertinent interests at stake in an ordered fashion is preferable to one dominated by the vague and ambiguous adjective “compelling.” Because, unlike Justices George and Mosk, we discern confusion rather than clarity in the language and history of the Privacy Initiative on this issue, we have restated the standard in a manner consistent with the voters’ intent and amenable to application in constitutional adjudication. Our lower courts, as well as the individuals and institutions in our society, are entitled to some comprehensible guidance from this Court, even in areas as abstract as “the right to be let alone.”
Justice Mosk’s dissent assails our views on both the law and the facts. The reasons for our interpretations of the Privacy Initiative and the case law are fully discussed elsewhere in this opinion. Our differences regarding the record in this case are also explored in the preceding sections. The dissent studiously ignores student athletes’ markedly diminished expectations of privacy and the NCAA’s self-evident interests in protecting athletes and athletic competition from the nefarious influence of chemical substances. Despite the broad, elaborate, and plaintiff-prepared findings of the trial court, these were not matters of legitimate factual dispute in this case—they arise from uncontradicted evidence presented at trial. Drugs have no place in intercollegiate athletics, where human physical performance is at stake and small fractions of time or distance can spell the difference between victory and defeat. As a sponsor of athletic competition, the NCAA was well within its legal rights in adopting a drug testing program designed to eliminate the actual or potential influence of drugs in competitive sports. The dissent’s view that the voters of the State of California somehow used the word “privacy” to prevent a private voluntary organization from regulating college sports in the interest of fair competition finds no support in logic, reason, or social reality, let alone in the language or history of the Privacy Initiative.
Disposition
The NCAA’s drug testing program does not violate the state constitutional right to privacy. Therefore, the NCAA is entitled to judgment in its favor. As a result of our disposition, we do not decide whether the recognition of a state constitutional right to privacy in these circumstances would violate the commerce clause of the federal Constitution.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal affirming the permanent injunction against the NCAA’s drug testing program is reversed. This case is remanded *58with instructions to direct entry of a final judgment in favor of the NCAA. The NCAA shall recover its costs.
Panelli, J., Arabian, J., and Baxter, J., concurred.
Since the trial in this case, the NCAA has expanded its drug testing program and made more serious the consequences of a positive finding. At its 1990 convention, the NCAA approved a mandatory, year-round testing program, although the program was restricted to the testing of NCAA Division I football players through August 1992. Under the new program, first-time offenders lose an entire year’s eligibility. Those testing positive a second time for “street drugs” lose another year of eligibility. And those caught using steroids twice are banned from intercollegiate athletics for life. (Note, Drug Testing and the Student Athlete: Meeting the Constitutional Challenge (1990) 76 Iowa L.Rev. 107, 116-117.)
The injunction provides as follows: “[I]t is hereby ordered that the National Collegiate Athletic Association is permanently enjoined from enforcing its requirement that Stanford [University] obtain signed drug testing consent forms from its athlet[es] or requiring Stanford athletes to sign such forms as a condition for participating in NCAA activities. NCAA may not declare any athlete ineligible or take punitive action against such athlete for failure to comply with or participate in the NCAA drug testing program or in any way discriminate against Stanford or its athletes by virtue of their refusal of this order.”
The NCAA does not assert that its nonprofit status or any other aspect of its organization or operations entitles it to any immunity from laws or regulations generally applicable to businesses. We have been directed to no authority that would support such an assertion. (Contra, see NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (1984) 468 U.S. 85 [82 L.Ed.2d 70, 104 S.Ct. 2948] [NCAA subject to antitrust laws].)
See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. (Alaska 1989) 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 [79 A.L.R.4th 75] [“history surrounding the 1972 adoption of the privacy amendment by the voters of California evinces a clear intent that the clause applies to private as well as governmental action”].
Ballot arguments often embody the sound-bite rhetoric of competing political interests vying for popular support. However useful they may be in identifying the general evils sought to be remedied by an initiative measure, they are principally designed to win votes, not to present a thoughtful or precise explication of legal tests or standards. The ballot arguments here are no different—their diverse references to “public” and “business” entities reflect perceived abuses of information-gathering power by both, but do not yield a useful legal standard with which to gauge the scope or limits of the right to privacy.
See, e.g., Restatement Second of Torts, sections 652B, comment d (intrusion into private affairs must be of a kind highly offensive to reasonable person), 652C, comment d (appropriation of commercial or other value of name or likeness is essential—mere incidental use not actionable), 652D, comment c (publicity given to private life must be highly offensive to reasonable person), 652E, comment c (false light publicity must be highly offensive to reasonable person).
Particularly when professional or fiduciary relationships premised on confidentiality are at issue (such as doctor and patient or psychotherapist and client), the state constitutional right to privacy may be invaded by a less-than-public dissemination of information. (See, e.g., Urbaniak v. Newton (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1138 [277 Cal.Rptr. 354] [complaint stated cause of action against physicians for nonpublic disclosure of positive status for human immunodeficiency virus.].)
Moreover, the common law right of privacy “may not be violated by word of mouth only” and can be infringed only by “ ‘printings, writings, pictures or other permanent publications ....”’ (Grimes v. Carter (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 694, 698, 699 [50 Cal.Rptr. 808, 19 A.L.R.3d 1310]; see also Gautier v. General Tel. Co. (1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 302, 309 [44 Cal.Rptr. 404]; Melvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal.App. at p. 290.) Although the Privacy Initiative reveals no voter intent to extend the common law to create a cause of action for mere gossip, in an age of oral mass media (e.g., radio), widespread oral disclosure may tread upon our state constitutional right to privacy as readily as written dissemination. (H & M Associates v. El Centro (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 399, 412 [167 Cal.Rptr. 392].)
Like other rights contained in or derived from provisions of the Bill of Rights, the federal constitutional right to privacy applies only against state action. (Pittsley v. Warish (1st Cir. 1991) 927 F.2d 3 [violation of right to familial associational privacy requires state action directly aimed at parent-child relationship]; Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ferre (S.D.Fla. 1985) 636 F.Supp. 970, 975-976 [right to privacy secured only against state action]; Houghton v. New Jersey Mfgrs. Ins. Co. (E.D.Pa. 1985) 615 F.Supp. 299, 306 [same]; see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. (1982) 457 U.S. 922, 936-937 [73 L.Ed.2d 482, 495-496, 102 S.Ct. 2744] [Fourteenth Amendment generally imports state action element]; Nowak et al., Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1983) p. 497 [“The safeguards against deprivations of individual rights which are contained in the text of the Constitution specifically apply only to the activities of either the state or federal governments. Similarly, the Bill of Rights by its terms and necessary implications has been viewed only to limit the freedom of the government when dealing with individuals. Finally, the amendments to the Constitution which protect individual liberties [with the exception of the Thirteenth] specifically address themselves to actions taken by the United States or a state.”].)
The “privacy” protected by the Privacy Initiative is no broader in the area of search and seizure than the “privacy” protected by the Fourth Amendment or by article I, section 13 of the California Constitution. (People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623, 629 [190 Cal.Rptr. 165, 660 P.2d 389].)
“While at least two of our cases decided before the Privacy Initiative referred in part to a constitutional right of privacy, a closer examination of those cases reveals a grounding in statutory or constitutional provisions not creating a “privacy” right. (In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415 [85 Cal.Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, 44 A.L.R.3d 1] [no broad federal constitutional right of privacy in disclosures to psychotherapist under Griswold; court interprets psychotherapist-patient privilege as inapplicable to communications at issue]; City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 263, 267 [85 Cal.Rptr. 1, 466 P.2d 225, 37 A.L.R.3d 1313] [First Amendment right to participate in political activity infringed by financial disclosure law; cryptic reference to Griswold without mention of a distinct “right to privacy” in state Constitution].) Thus, appellate decisions inferring the creation of a “penumbral” Griswoldtype state constitutional privacy right from our pre-Privacy Initiative cases represent an overbroad reading of the pertinent holdings. (See, e.g., Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1, 17 [267 Cal.Rptr. 618] citing Central Valley Chap. 7th Step Foundation v. Younger (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 212, 234-235 [157 Cal.Rptr. 117] & People v. Porras (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 874, 879 [160 Cal.Rptr. 627].)
See, e.g., Schmidt v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pages 389-390 (right to familial privacy not violated by mobilehome park rule excluding persons under 25; no reference to “compelling interest;” court appears to balance privacy interest against competing interests); Long Beach City Employees Assn. v. City of Long Beach, supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 948, footnote 12 (polygraph testing of government employees by city; case decided on state equal protection grounds; “compelling governmental interest” reference in footnote dictum on constitutional right to privacy); Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 20 [184 Cal.Rptr. 720, 648 P.2d 942] (State Bar subpoena for trust account records; clients’ privacy interest “is not absolute but must be balanced against the need for disclosure”); Conservatorship of Valerie N. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 143, 164 [219 Cal.Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760] (right to elect sterilization as method of contraception; restriction on exercise of fundamental constitutional right must be justified by “compelling interest that is within the police power of the state in regulating the *35subject”); People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 505, 511 [194 Cal.Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738] (patient’s privacy interest in psychotherapy must yield to compelling state interests; detection and prevention of child abuse constitutes such an interest); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 252 [172 Cal.Rptr. 866, 625 P.2d 779, 20 A.L.R.4th 1118] (invalidating restrictions on state funding of abortions; applying standard employed in Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 499, 505-507 [55 Cal.Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409], a political speech case, to rights of privacy and equal protection); City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 123 [164 Cal.Rptr. 539, 610 P.2d 436, 12 A.L.R.4th 219] (right to live in an alternative family with persons not related by blood, marriage, or adoption; abridgement must be justified by compelling public need); Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 864 [132 Cal.Rptr. 464, 553 P.2d 624] (no privacy right to expungement of arrest record; reference to common law interest in public reporting of crime; reference to “compelling interest”); Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 656-657 [125 Cal.Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977] (bank customer has reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records referring to customer’s financial affairs; right of privacy must be balanced against civil litigant’s right to discover facts).
In our culture, urination is generally regarded as private, but perhaps not absolutely private in all conceivable settings. “Men urinate side by side in public restrooms without embarrassment even though there is very little, and often no, attempt to partition the urinals. In hospitals and physicians’ offices, urine samples of both men and women are generally taken by female nurses or technicians under conditions of privacy similar to those prescribed by [athletic drug testing rules].” (Dimeo v. Griffin (7th Cir. 1990) 943 F.2d 679, 682.)
For example, in the leading case of Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County School Corp. (7th Cir. 1988) 864 F.2d 1309, the federal court of appeals upheld a program consisting in part of random drug testing of high school athletes, noting the “element of ‘communal undress’ inherent in athletic participation” and central role of physical examinations in athletic training and evaluation. (Id. at p. 1318.) (See also Dimeo v. Griffin, supra, 943 F.2d at p. 682 [upholding drug testing of horse racing participants, noting generally reduced privacy expectations of athletes in general]; Shoemaker v. Handel (3d Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 1136, 1141-1143 [86 A.L.R.Fed. 405] [same]; O’Halloran v. University of Washington, supra, 679 F.Supp. 997, 1005, revd. on other grounds (9th Cir. 1988) 856 F.2d 1375 [upholding the NCAA’s drug testing program, noting “communal undress” and routine physical examinations].)
The NCAA’s drug testing program was adopted by, and has been continued with the overwhelming support of, the NCAA’s member institutions, both public and private. Although Stanford has chosen to join plaintiffs in challenging the NCAA’s drug testing program in court, the record does not reveal any Stanford-initiated opposition to the program through established NCAA channels, either at the NCAA’s annual conventions or in any other NCAA setting.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ argument, we do not regard the results of dmg testing after the NCAA announced and began its program as the only persuasive evidence of actual drug use by student athletes. Plaintiffs ignore the self-evident deterrent effect of the program itself, particularly in the context of highly competitive sports activity. Once a program of drug testing is formally announced and in effect, athletes who wish to avoid the disastrous effects of disqualification have a strong incentive to refrain from ingesting prohibited substances. Indeed, one possible yardstick of a dmg testing program accompanied by advance consent and publicity is a percentage of positive dmg test findings that starts low and continues either at the same level or downward. When so measured, the NCAA’s program is successful.
See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, supra, 29 Cal.3d at page 270 (applying Bagley test, including its “no less offensive alternatives” element, to government discrimination against medical care benefits for abortions); City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pages 268-269 (“less drastic means” analysis derived from federal freedom of speech and association cases applied to financial disclosure by political candidates; no reference to burden of proof; need for balancing acknowledged); Robbins v. Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 199, 213-214 [211 Cal.Rptr. 398, 695 P.2d 695] (in-kind welfare benefits to recipients of general assistance); see also City of Long Beach Employees Assn., supra, 41 Cal.3d at page 948, footnote 12 (“less intrusive means” element referred to; issue not reached).
Both Bagley v. Washington Towship, supra, 65 Cal.2d at pages 506-507, and City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pages 268-269, rely principally on Shelton v. Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 488 [5 L.Ed.2d 231, 237-238, 81 S.Ct. 247], and similar First Amendment freedom of association and expression cases. In Shelton, public school teachers were required by law to disclose every organization they had joined or contributed money to—social, political, religious, professional, or other—over a five-year period. Recognizing the state’s interest in occupational competence and fitness of teachers, the high court nonetheless struck down the law, observing that its scope far exceeded any legitimate state concern. (Id. at pp. 488-490 [5 L.Ed.2d at pp. 237-238].) It stated in part: “The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” (Id., at p. 488 [5 L.Ed.2d at p. 237].) It was careful, however, to observe that a “less drastic means” analysis might not be applicable in other constitutional contexts: “In other areas, involving different constitutional issues, more administrative leeway has been thought allowable in the interest of increased efficiency in accomplishing a clearly constitutional central purpose. [Citations.].” (Id. at p. 488, fn. 8 [5 L.Ed.2d at p. 237].)
Thus, at the roots of the “least restrictive alternative” burden lie cases of government infringement of fundamental freedoms of expression and association. Unlike this one, those *50cases do not involve: (1) broad-based assertions of autonomy privacy interests (i.e., freedom of action as opposed to freedom of expression and association), (2) in circumstances of diminished expectations of privacy on the part of participants in a voluntary extracurricular activity conducted by a private entity. Consistent with Shelton, and because the NCAA’s stated purposes are legally valid and central to its function, the NCAA should be accorded the kind of “administrative leeway” necessary to accomplish those purposes with “increased efficiency.” (Shelton v. Tucker, supra, 364 U.S. at p. 488, fn. 8 [5 L.Ed.2d at p. 237].)
Justice Mosk’s dissent charges us with disregarding the substantial evidence rule with respect to the trial court’s finding that direct monitoring of athlete urination is unnecessary to ensure a valid sample. We plead not guilty. As Justice Mosk acknowledges, plaintiffs themselves offered no expert or other evidence offering or analyzing any viable alternative to direct monitoring. Rather, the testimony of the NCAA’s own expert, Ronald Heitzinger, is the sole evidence on which the court purported to base its finding. Heitzinger testified unequivocally as follows: “I have not only heard of but seen where the athletes have tried to screw up their drug tests so they will not be caught. So we really recommend that there should be observed testing.” (Italics added.) While he acknowledged performing testing without direct observation at the request of some of his clients, Heitzinger was not questioned regarding the feasibility of any specific alternatives or their impact on the accuracy of the testing process. In our view, Heitzinger’s testimony, when read in context, acknowledges obliquely the mere possibility of testing without direct monitoring, while upholding at all times the vital importance of monitoring to ensure accuracy in the testing process. It does not satisfy plaintiff’s burden of showing a practical, effective, and viable alternative. It is patently insufficient to permit a court to strike the balance in favor of the privacy right. The Privacy Initiative does not require the NCAA to settle for something less than a fully effective testing program.
The trial court also found that the NCAA’s drug testing program “interferes with the athletes’ right to treat themselves with appropriate over-the-counter medications as other students do.” In view of the trial court’s failure to weigh or consider the diminished expectations of privacy of student athletes when compared with “other students," this finding lacks significance. Moreover, following trial in this case, the NCAA eliminated from its list of banned substances the sympathiometic amines—the drugs contained in over-the-counter medications. Much of the issue regarding over-the-counter medications thus appears to be moot at this stage. Finally, our review of the portions of the record cited by the parties discloses no evidence that the NCAA has applied either its drug testing policy or its ban on the use of specified substances so as to preclude any athlete from obtaining medically necessary treatment for disease or injury. Plaintiffs have failed to establish an invasion of privacy in the form of interference with medical treatment.
Compare National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, supra, 489 U.S. at page 679 [103 L.Ed.2d at page 710-711] (customs workers whose performance “might endanger the integrity or our Nation’s borders or the life of the citizenry”; drug testing upheld); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., supra, 489 U.S. at page 628 [103 L.Ed.2d at pages 667] (railroad employees involved in accidents who “discharge duties fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous consequences”; drag testing upheld); and Railway Labor Executives’ Assn. v. Skinner (9th Cir. 1991) 934 F.2d 1096, 1099-1100 (“safety-sensitive” railroad workers; urinalysis drug testing upheld); with Taylor v. O’Grady (7th Cir. 1989) 888 F.2d 1189 (urinalysis drug testing permissible for prison guards but impermissible for other prison employees with no access to firearms and no opportunity to smuggle drugs); National Federation of Federal Employees v. Cheney (D.C. Cir. 1989) 884 F.2d 603, 610-614 [280 App.D.C. 248] (urinalysis drug testing permissible for aviation workers, police guards, and drug counselors but impermissible for lab workers); Harmon v. Thornburgh (D.C. Cir. 1989) 878 F.2d 484, 490 [278 App.D.C. 382] (urinalysis drug testing permissible for Justice Department employees with top security clearance but impermissible for general employees).
Three employment-related cases involving drug testing have arisen in our Courts of Appeal. In Wilkinson, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d 1034, the court held, consistent with the views we express here, that the state constitutional right to privacy applies to the conduct of nongovernmental entities. It applied a general “reasonableness” balancing test to uphold a urinalysis drug testing condition imposed on all applicants for employment at a publishing company. Applicants were given advance notice of the condition; testing was conducted as part of a pre-employment physical examination. (Id. at pp. 1044-1052.) In Semore v. Pool (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1087 [266 Cal.Rptr. 280], the court upheld against demurrer a complaint for wrongful discharge based on termination of an employee for refusal to submit to a pupillary reaction eye test designed to measure drug influence. Holding the employee’s state constitutional right of privacy was a sufficient public policy to serve as the basis of a wrongful discharge suit, the court observed in part that: “The resolution of the dispute depends upon balancing an employee’s expectations of privacy against the employer’s needs to regulate the conduct of its employees at work.” (Id. at p. 1097.) Noting the absence of any allegations in the complaint relating to the employee’s duties, the testing procedure, or the employer’s interest, the court declined to strike the required balance on the meager record before it. Finally, in Luck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1 [267 Cal.Rptr. 618], the court upheld a verdict for wrongful discharge in favor of a nonsafety *56employee of a railroad (a computer installer and technician) after she refused to submit to a urinalysis drug test. It determined in part that generalized, nonsafety interests in employee efficiency and competence and in a drug free work environment were not sufficiently “compelling” to justify drug testing. (Id. at pp. 23-24.) In light of our general discussion of the elements of invasion of privacy (which differs from the approaches taken in these cases) and the fact-specific character of this drug testing case (which involves extracurricular sports activity rather than employment), we offer no analysis of the continuing vitality of these cases. Like other claims for invasion of the state constitutional right to privacy, future claims arising in the employment context will be subject to the elements and standards we announce here, which require careful consideration of reasonable expectations of privacy and employer, employee, and public interests arising in particular circumstances.