(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur with part n(B) of the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that the questioning of Officer Stark regarding an affidavit from an unrelated case was properly excluded by the trial court. I dissent, however, from part n(A), which holds that the trial court properly excluded testimony regarding Stark’s reputation for truthfulness. In my view, the trial court did not engage in the appropriate inquiry mandated by MRE 403, and its decision to exclude *466Costello’s testimony was made in iminformative and conclusory terms. I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for a new trial.
i
Although acknowledging that Costello’s testimony regarding Stark’s reputation for truthfulness and his opinion with respect to Stark’s veracity were relevant under MRE 608(a), the majority justifies exclusion under MRE 403. In my view, the majority overstates the discretion granted by MRE 403. The test of MRE 403 is strongly biased toward admissibility, and the language of the rule imposes upon the party seeking exclusion a difficult burden to satisfy: Unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by one or more of the enumerated dangers, the evidence will be admitted. Because the principle underlying MRE 403 is the promotion of accurate and fair fact finding, see, e.g., Wischmeyer v Schanz, 449 Mich 469, 481; 536 NW2d 760 (1995), the trial court has the responsibility to apply the balancing test set forth in the rule, with the appropriate inquiry directed at considering whether the evidence in question advances or detracts from accurate factfinding.1 In the present case, when measured in terms of the context within *467which the evidence was offered, Costello’s testimony regarding Stark’s credibility would assist the primary goal of MRE 403.
n
The majority concedes (but then apparently finds unworthy of further examination), that the basis of the trial judge’s exclusion of the evidence is ambiguous: The trial judge initially incorrectly stated that only reputation evidence, not opinion testimony, could be used to attack Stark’s credibility. However, the trial court’s ruling also suggested that an inadequate foundation had been laid for the reputation evidence. Later, in response to a defense motion for a mistrial, the judge remarked that the matters about which Costello would testify would be “collateral,” although in context that may have been referring to testimony by Costello on a separate record about his disagreement with some of Stark’s investigative and interrogation techniques. By the time the judge ruled on the defendant’s motion for a new trial, the basis for excluding the evidence had evolved to a theory that it would have confused the jury to introduce such material by leading the trial into tangential matters regarding the operation of the police department.2
*468The majority excuses these lapses on the grounds that MRE 403 grants trial courts discretion, ignoring the fact that the rule bestows discretion to exclude only after the court makes a serious search for prejudice and an honest attempt to balance. In light of the ambiguous basis of the trial court’s decision, and the sparse remarks contained therein, I cannot share the majority’s view that the trial court’s decision was premised on that court’s recognition of “numerous harmful consequences.” Ante at 461. Indeed, the trial transcript indicates that the purported “harmful consequences” ascribed to the trial court by the majority is reduced to the following solitary statement made by the trial judge:
Now, I don’t want to get into any personal vendettas within the factory. We have that all the time. We have it in the court system, you know, the one secretary says the other has too many pencils and we get into an argument, you know.
Whether any such “personal vendetta” actually existed within the Three Rivers Police Department is not, standing alone, a proper basis for exclusion under MRE 403. Rather, the pertinent inquiry is whether the probative value of the evidence would inflict unfair prejudice, and then, whether the danger of unfair prejudice “substantially outweighs” probative value. Only then does MRE 403 confer discretion on the trial court to exclude the evidence. In the pres*469ent case, the trial court gives no hint (other than a vague reference to not wanting to generate “personal vendettas”) regarding how or why the particular balance, if any, was struck.3
I agree with the Court of Appeals majority that the importance of Stark’s credibility made exclusion of this evidence requiring reversal error. Moreover, the Court of Appeals conclusion that Stark’s conduct was “at issue here” because he was “instrumental” in obtaining statements from witnesses whose veracity was “hotly contested” at trial was correct.4 The testimony of Deanna and Scott Turner was the critical evidence linking the defendant to the crime, and it was Stark’s interrogation that led to the statements and subsequent testimony incriminating defendant.5 Finally, the trial court could have controlled any potential confusion emanating from the testimony by not admitting excessive material on the credibility issue. Accordingly, any fears about a parade of wit*470nesses had Costello been allowed to testify are unfounded.
m
Because it was error for the trial court to exclude Costello’s testimony regarding Stark’s reputation for truthfulness, and because the error was not harmless in this case, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for a new trial.6
Cavanagh and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Brickley, J.As one commentator has explained:
[EJvidence is unfairly prejudicial when it detracts from the accuracy of factfinding by inducing the jury to commit an inferential error. Inferential errors occur when the jury perceives evidence to be logically probative of a fact when it is not, perceives the evidence to be more probative of fact than it logically is, or bases its decision on improper bias. [Gold, Limiting discretion, to exclude prejudicial evidence, 18 U C Davis L R 59, 73 (1984).]
While it may be true, as a general proposition, that the trial court’s familiarity with the tone and scope of the evidence presented to the jury puts it in an advantageous position to gauge the relative importance of potential prejudice and probative value, trial court decisions under MRE 403 should never be treated as unreviewable. See, e.g., Leonard, Appellate review of evidentiary rulings, 70 NC L R 1155 (1992). Moreover, the balance required is not pro forma: A sensitive analysis of the need for the evidence as proof on a contested factual issue, and the prejudice, if any, which may eventuate from admission, is required before passing on such *468an objection. Finally, the substantiality of the consideration given to those competing interests can best be guaranteed by an explicit articulation of the trial court’s reasoning. The transcript in the instant case persuades me that the trial court conducted its inquiry on an ad hóc and standardless basis.
The majority reviews by hindsight when it observes that the trial court was concerned that Costello’s pending litigation against the police department would somehow inject itself into the present case, thereby “creating confusion of the issues for the jury.” Ante at 462. I find no support for that proposition in the record; moreover, the trial court could, if necessary, limit the scope of such evidence at the time of Costello’s testimony.
226 Mich App 291, 298; 670 NW2d 672 (1997).
Scott Turner testified that during Stark’s interrogation, Stark displayed animosity toward defendant, calling him a “worthless son of a bitch.” Turner also testified that Stark told him that he (Turner) was not “going anywhere” until he told police what Raymond Turner told him regarding the arson. "Finally, Turner admitted that because of his cooperation, Stark let him stay out of jail for three or four days and did not arrest him on an outstanding fugitive warrant. Thus, when Stark denied, on cross-examination, any improper conduct, and specifically denied Turner’s admissions during his cross-examination regarding Stark’s animosity toward defendant and his motivation to put defendant “behind bars,” a serious credibility issue existed between Turner and Stark, and a jury should have been permitted to evaluate that issue.
At a núnimum, the Court should remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of defendant’s other claims of error, which were not passed on by that panel in light of the reversal based on the exclusion of Costello’s testimony.