(concurring). I join the majority’s opinion regarding Docket Nos. 191299 and 196797 *564without reservation. I concur in its decision in Docket No. 191733, but write separately to urge our Supreme Court to consider the applicability of Schultz v Consumers Power Co, 443 Mich 445; 506 NW2d 175 (1993), to cases involving prolonged exposure to low levels of stray voltage that cause avoidance behavior in dairy herds.
I agree that the trial court did not err in crafting jury instructions in reliance on Schultz. However, I join the trial court in questioning whether Schultz’ broad statement of the duty of care, which approaches strict liability, is appropriate where the electric current involved is not powerful and human beings face no threat of death or serious bodily harm. Schultz, supra at 451, appears to require an electric company employing energized power lines to inspect and repair those lines to reduce “potential” hazards “as far as practicable”; mere remedying of defective conditions after notice is not adequate. Id. at 454. Applying Schultz’ broad formulation renders a defendant utility company negligent for failing to inspect, even where the hazard is minimal. Because the risk to be foreseen from low levels of electric current is not of the highest order, the duty should not approach strict liability. I adopt the trial court’s statement regarding the problem:
I can’t conclude that the jury made a mistake, unless— unless they were improperly instructed as to the duty owed by Consumer Powers (sic) as set forth in the Schultz case that we discussed throughout this case.
Now, the Court considered this instruction and, though having some reservations about it when I applied it in the actual trial as it applied to stray voltage — if you recall, I was concerned as a judge — I didn’t quite understand the Supreme Court’s rationale in that case in finding the duty *565that they set forth. It seemed to me it was almost a[n] absolute liability. And I so said then and I still repeat it now, that it seems to me that this is too strong a duty to be imposed upon stray voltage cases. But I did say that I didn’t know of any other duty, I couldn’t find any other duty, and, under the rule of starre (sic) decisis and, of course, the Supreme Court ruling, I was bound by the ruling and the duty set forth in that case. And that’s what I did. I applied that to my review of the proposed instructions and I instructed the jury based upon this.
[TJhough I was concerned about the ruling under the Schultz case and I personally as a judge believed as the trier of this case that a less stringent rule should apply in the stray voltage cases, but I believed it was my duty and I was bound to follow the rule set forth by the Supreme Court, that I was not in a position to overrule and/or distinguish the Schultz case.
It’s my opinion — and I expressed my personal opinion and I don’t have any reason to change anything — but I think I agree with the — Mr. Clark that in the Schultz case you’re talking about the hazardous portion of the electrical current systems that Consumer Powers (sic) is selling to the customers. And there’s no question that it is hazardous and there’s no question that if you hit the high line and you get ahold of the hot line, you’re gonna get electrocuted and you can be killed [sic], and it also could cause fires and damage property. We all know that there are these cases where people have been electrocuted. The Schultz case, Detroit Edison case, many other cases. We also know that many houses have burned down because of the hot wire shortages in the houses. And that is true.
But as I understand all the testimony in this case and all of the experts, that the stray voltage is not hazardous. The only way that stray voltage could be hazardous on the neutral [line] that I can see in all the testimony I’ve reviewed is it would have to be the hot line falling onto or connecting *566to the neutral line and in effect changing the neutral to a hot line in order to be hazardous and dangerous. That’s why I think and I put this in the record — though I can’t make this decision that I put it on the record hoping the appeals court will review it in light of the fact that I do not believe stray voltage is hazardous such as to put the almost too strict of a duty upon Consumers Powers (sic) or any power company as to stray voltage.
In my view, Schultz’ articulation of a broad duty is not appropriate for all claims involving the delivery of electricity. The scope of the duty should vary with the nature of the risk.
Nonetheless, because I do not find error in the trial court’s instruction under Schultz, I join the majority’s result.