(dissenting).
Respectfully, I dissent on the ground that the challenged ordinance neither comports with substantive nor procedural due process. Specifically, this criminal statute forbids an act in terms so vague that there is an absence of ascertainable standards of guilt, and thus encourages arbitrary and erratic enforcement. The effect of the statute is to grant unfettered discretion to the County Board of Health and its employees to determine what objects or structures are “unsightly.” Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance may be required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the employees of the County Board of Health.
. Where, as here, there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance, the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminating enforcement of the law. . . .1
*296Furthermore, the ordinance does not provide an opportunity for a hearing in contravention of minimum standards of procedural due process.
Plaintiff collects old automobiles and has acquired some 261 old vehicles, to which plaintiff assigned a value of $51,815. An automobile dealer, of long standing in Utah County, testifying for plaintiff, placed a value on said automobiles of $28,000. Some of these automobiles appeared to have more value than others, because of their age and type.
These automobiles are stored, in open view, on a 40-acre parcel of land, in proximity to plaintiff’s residence.
The subject ordinance, 1970-1, amended Title 3 of the Revised Ordinances of Utah County, Utah, 1956, relating to health and sanitation, by enacting a new chapter 13, entitled “Inspection and Cleaning of Real Property.” Pursuant to this ordinance the county, on March 6, 1973, dispatched a letter to plaintiff informing him, “There are numerous cars and other items located on your property that do not conform with the ordinances of Utah County, a copy of said ordinances are enclosed herewith for your reference.” The letter went on to say that plaintiff had until April 6, 1973, to correct the situation. After a meeting with the commission on April 26, 1973, the commission dispatched another letter dated May 8, 1973, informing plaintiff he had until June 25, 1973, to comply with the ordinance. A final letter of July 6, 1973, told plaintiff he had until July 11, 1973, to remove any personal articles from any of the vehicles located on his property, because the county was making preparation to “clean up the property, . . .” The delays, as stated by respondent, were given to allow plaintiff to accomplish spring planting and other farming operations, — not to afford him a hearing. Shortly thereafter plaintiff secured a preliminary injunction, which was later dissolved, and plaintiff’s complaint dismissed.
This ordinance, Section 3-13-2, deems it unlawful for any person owning or occupying any real property to fail to remove from such property “any unsightly or deleterious objects,” upon notice from Utah County. Another section, 3-13-3, deems it unlawful for any person to cause or permit vehicles to be in or upon any piece of property within the county, “whenever said items shall be unsightly and in public view.”
This court has long adhered to the precept that if a statute or ordinance be so designed that persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding, can tell what their conduct must be to conform to its requirements, and it is susceptible of uniform interpretation and application, by those charged with the responsibility of enforcing it, it is invulnerable to an attack for vagueness.2
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 374, 250 P.2d 561, 563 (1952), this court cited with approval the following:
. A statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law. . . .
Does this ordinance by its express terms define a standard whereby a person may determine whether he is violating a criminal law ? Where the violation of a law subjects one to criminal punishment, the restrictions upon conduct should be described with sufficient certainty, that persons of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law, may know how to govern themselves in conformity with it, and that no one should be compelled at the peril of life, liberty or property, to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.3 To be valid, when challenged upon the ground *297of vagueness or uncertainty, the statute must be tested accordingly:
It must be sufficiently definite (a) to inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding, what their conduct must be to conform to its requirements; (b) to advise a defendant accused of violating it just what constitutes the offense with which he is charged, and (c) to be susceptible of uniform interpretation and application by those charged with responsibility of applying and enforcing it.4
Plaintiff was given notice to remove certain unsightly objects or items in public view. It should be noted that this ordinance was an amendment to one relating to health and sanitation. Even by construing the term “unsightly” in conjunction with the objectives of the act, health and sanitation, it does not create an objective standard so as to fulfill the aforementioned requirements. “Unsightly” means, according to Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, not sightly, not comely. “Sightly” therein is defined as pleasing to the sight; comely; open to sight; as a sightly hill. “Comely” is said to mean, pleasing to the sight; fair to look upon. Could it be that the subject items being unsightly and therefore not open to sight, are not visible, and thus not in violation of the ordinance?
There is nothing in the language of the ordinance to indicate an intention to limit the term “unsightly” to a meaning less broad than in its ordinary sense. There is no basis to limit the meaning of the word beyond its general meaning so as to define the offense therein denounced. The word provides only a subjective standard at best. The ordinance is therefore void for vagueness and uncertainty under the Fourteenth Amendment.5
The ordinance uses the word “abandonment” extensively. From the findings of fact, it is impossible to ascertain whether the court deemed the vehicle abandoned. Within the findings, the court recited the provision, in the ordinance, that a vehicle shall be prima facie presumed abandoned, if it is not registered and inspected 30 days after the date on which such registration and inspection is required, by the laws of the State of Utah. Our statute, Section 41-1-19, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1973, provides that a motor vehicle, “when driven or moved upon a highway shall be subject to the registration and certificate of title provisions of this act.” Section 41-6-158, U.C.A.1953, as amended 1967, provides that every motor vehicle “registered in this state” is required to be inspected.
Since the vehicles in the instant action were located upon private property, and were not being driven or moved on the highway, they were not subject to the registration and inspection laws of this State. The provision of the ordinance concerning the abandonment of the vehicle was inapplicable. Furthermore, the assertion of dominion and control, of plaintiff, over these vehicles would rebut any presumption of abandonment. There is nothing in the record to overcome such rebuttal.
Plaintiff claims the ordinance does not provide a person an opportunity to be heard — and it does not. The determination of the trial court that- due process does not require judicial process does not meet the problem, nor resolve the issue.
This court, in Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 7, 163 P.2d 314 (1945), in addressing itself to the requirements of due process said:
Normally we think of “due process of law” as requiring judicial action, but “due process” is not necessarily judicial action. [Cases cited.] In proper cases the purposes of the law, especially as to property, may be effected by executive or administrative action, and still be valid if they meet the requirements of due process. . . . But all these methods and means provided for *298the protection and enforcement of human rights have the same basic requirements — that no party can be affected by such action, until his legal rights have been the subject of an inquiry by a person or body authorized by law to determine such rights, of which inquiry the party has due notice, and at which he had an opportunity to be heard and to give evidence as to his rights or defenses.
The main opinion says plaintiff attacks the ordinance "as an abstract proposition,” and may not do so “because it may unjustly affect someone else.” Confronted, as plaintiff was, with the destruction of his property without a hearing is hardly an abstraction. The only procedure available to him was his attack on the ordinance, but he is not required to furnish his own due process — legislation of this nature, to be constitutionally permissible, must provide it for him. The ordinance does provide notice, but that is only half the vehicle. If there were a provision for a hearing the main opinion would have quoted it.
In the City of Everett v. Slade, 83 Wash .2d 80, 515 P.2d 1295 (1973), a proceeding was brought by the City to forfeit the respondent’s interest in an automobile which was seized by the police at the time the respondent was arrested and charged with the sale of a controlled substance — an exercise of the police power, and for that reason interesting here. Addressing itself to the City’s contention that the “seizure” procedure did not violate Slade’s right to due process, because the procedure fell within the “extraordinary situations” exception recognized in various Federal due process cases, the court, in disagreeing, said:
Unlimited power of “seizure” is not authorized by the suggested exception. Even there, due process requires that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest except, “for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justified postponing the hearing until after the event.” Further, the “opportunity” for a hearing must be granted “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” . . . The hearing must be “appropriate to the nature of the case.” .
Recognizing that “extraordinary situations” may justify the postponement of notice and hearing, the United States Supreme Court recently stated that such situations must be “truly unusual” and that ordinary costs in time, effort, and expense incurred by providing a hearing cannot outweigh the constitutional right. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1999, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972).6
The ordinance before us, although providing for notice, does not provide for any hearing, and therefore, the concept that in an extraordinary situation, notice and an opportunity to be heard may be postponed, is not applicable. The thought that this could be an extraordinary situation, permitting outright seizure, without a prior opportunity to be heard, cannot be countenanced. Indeed, it is refuted by the provision for notice itself.
The subject ordinance is unconstitutional. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).
. Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957); Parker v. Hampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848 (1972).
. Id., 122 Utah at 375, 250 P.2d at 564.
. Id., 122 Utah at 376, 250 P.2d at 564.
. State v. Musser, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950).
. Id., 515 P.2d at 1297-1298.