On May 22, 1980 Mrs. Anderson filed suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to recover survivor’s benefits under the personal injury provisions of her husband’s automobile insurance policy. Mr. Anderson drowned on March 21, 1980 after he drove his car onto a flooded road, and, realizing he could not get through, left the car in an attempt to reach safety and was swept away by the water current. Mrs. Anderson died on September 9,1981, and the executors of her estate were substituted as parties plaintiff.
At the close of all the evidence at trial, State Farm’s motion for a directed verdict was denied. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of $50,000 in PIP benefits, $17,780 in pre-judgment interest, $100,000 in punitive damages and $15,000 in attorney fees. The trial court entered a judgment of $182,780 for plaintiffs, and State Farm appeals.
1. State Farm asserts that the trial court erred in overruling its *656motion for directed verdict because plaintiffs’ claim does not fall within the coverage of OCGA § 33-34-7 of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act since Mr. Anderson was not “occupying” his car at the time of injury. OCGA § 33-34-7 (a) (1) provides for the payment of benefits for economic loss resulting from “[accidental bodily injury sustained ... by the insured . . . while occupying any motor vehicle. ...” OCGA § 33-34-2 (8) defines “occupying” for purposes of this chapter as being “in or upon a motor vehicle or engaged in the immediate act of entering into or alighting from the motor vehicle.” As it is uncontested that Mr. Anderson was neither “upon” the auto nor “in the immediate act of entering” it, the determinative issues here are whether he was either “in” his car or “in the immediate act of . . . alighting from” it at the time of death.
It is undisputed that Mr. Anderson was occupying his car at the time he encountered the hazardous flood waters which swept his car from the roadway and partially onto the shoulder some twelve to eighteen inches below, leaving the car immobilized and tilted. From the shoulder of the road, the drop was approximately twelve to fifteen feet. This was filled with flood waters which rose to three or four feet above the road. Officer Commers testified that he was patrolling the area at the time of the accident. When he arrived at the scene, a truck was attempting to back out of the flood waters from the side opposite to that entered by Mr. Anderson. Officer Commers was notified that Mr. Anderson’s car had stopped in the water. Thinking that he could wade in halfway to meet Mr. Anderson, Officer Commers attempted to reach him but stopped due to the heavy current. He saw Mr. Anderson struggle against the waters to open the car door and then exit the vehicle. The force of the water pushed him against his car. When he reached the front of his car, he let go of it and began to walk through the flood waters toward Officer Commers. He made it three to six feet when he was swept away. He tried to stay afloat by using swimming movements, but he disappeared from sight approximately one hundred yards away. Mr. Anderson drowned and his body was recovered a few days later when the flood waters receded. Officer Commers also testified that because Mr. Anderson’s car was already partially off the roadway and onto the three-feet-wide shoulder, the force of the flowing water could have swept the vehicle away into deep water.
Although Mr. Anderson was not ejected from his car, we find the reasoning of the opinion in Partridge v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co., 172 Ga. App. 466 (323 SE2d 676) (1984), to be persuasive and applicable to these facts. The court in Partridge, supra at 467, recognized that “occupancy has been extended beyond physical presence in the vehicle in voluntary self-removal or alighting cases (see Annot., 42 ALR3d 501 (1972)). . . .” Thereafter, the court held that one “re*657mains an occupant of the car from which he is ejected until he is able to remove himself to a neutral zone or is removed to a neutral zone. . . .” Id. at 468. Further, the time interval between ejectment and such removal is not material. As in Partridge, Mr. Anderson encountered a perilous situation while driving and, thus, “occupying” his car. The ensuing emergency provided him a choice: staying “in” the car and being swept away, in which case he would certainly qualify as an “occupant,” or “alighting” from the car in an attempt to reach safety. While it is clear that Mr. Anderson did not remain “in” his car, we view his efforts to escape the peril at hand by alighting from the car and heading for safety — that “neutral zone” described in Partridge — as one unbroken chain of events constituting the immediate act of alighting from the car. That he was able to move to the end of the car and a small number of feet beyond is immaterial. As in Partridge, he remained an occupant of the car until he could reach a neutral zone or could be removed to one. Therefore, plaintiffs were not precluded from recovery of no-fault benefits and State Farm was not entitled to directed verdict as a matter of law.
2. We have carefully reviewed State Farm’s remaining enumerations of error and find them to be without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
Banke, C. J., Carley, Sognier, and Benham, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., and Birdsong, P. J., concur in part and dissent in part. Beasley, J., dissents. McMurray, P. J., disqualified.