dissenting.
The evidence in this case does not, under any legal theory, mandate a judgment for appellant as a matter of law. The record clearly indicates the presence of disputed issues of material fact which require presentation at trial and submission to a jury. Moreover, the jury, after proper instruction in applicable law, will need to assess the evidence as it pertains to the parties’ claims of, on the one hand, an alleged accord and satisfaction and allegedly unambiguous contractual language favoring the draftsman-appellant and, on the other hand, alleged fraud and lack of mutuality as they bear upon the validity vel non of the contract as it was drafted by appellant and understood by both parties. See Venable v. Block, 138 Ga. App. 215, 217 (225 SE2d 755) (1976); Mutual Benefit Health &c. Assn. v. LeMaster, 89 Ga. App. 870 (81 SE2d 484) (1954); cf. Newport Timber Corp. v. Floyd, 247 Ga. 535, 540 (277 SE2d 646) (1981). The status of the counterclaim likewise requires examination by a jury.
The case at bar is clearly not one for which summary adjudica*348tion is appropriate. For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully dissent.
Decided May 22, 1985 Rehearing denied July 9, 1985 George B. Haley, Deborrah Sutter Heller, for appellant. James D. Stokes, for appellees.I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Banke, Judge Pope, and Judge Benham join in this dissent.