dissenting.
I concur with the majority except as to Division 1. I dissent to that Division because I believe the trial court abused its discretion in overruling appellant’s motion for a mistrial on the basis of the prosecutor’s repeated violations of the trial court’s ruling on appellant’s motion in limine.
Prior to the trial of the case, the court granted appellant’s motion to exclude all references to the area where appellant was arrested as a *675“known drug area” and stated: “Well, the court would sustain your motion in limine and direct the district attorney to inform his witnesses that not to use the expression this strip shopping area was a known drug area or I knew it to be a drug area. The officer, if its correct and true and is asked to testify he was or whatever the facts are on a detail connected with the goal of arresting persons charged, arresting persons dealing in drugs, the community in this area, he was working this area and leave out the word known, I was there because it was a known drug area. Leave out those words, known drug area.” (Indention omitted.) In spite of this very clear and specific evidentiary ruling, the prosecutor continuously referred to the area where appellant was arrested as a “known drug area,” including several times during his opening statement and closing argument. The majority is of the opinion that the fact that the shopping plaza was known by the officers to be an area where drugs were sold was relevant to explain the officer’s conduct in placing the area under surveillance. However, the prosecutor’s remarks were not confined to explaining the officer’s conduct and gave the impression that appellant knew the area was a “known drug area.” That was exactly the prejudicial effect sought to be avoided through the motion in limine. Although the trial court after each violation gave curative instructions to the jury, I cannot conclude as the majority did that these improper references were not prejudicial to appellant. A motion in limine allows the court to exclude reference to certain matters deemed prejudicial prior to their utterance in front of a jury. See Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Daniel, 149 Ga. App. 120 (1) (253 SE2d 783) (1979). The trial court deemed references to “known drug area” to be too irrelevant to outweigh the prejudicial effect it could have on appellant’s case. “The trial court has an absolute right to refuse to decide the admissibility of evidence, allegedly violative of some ordinary rule of evidence, prior to trial. [Cits.] If, however, the trial court decides to rule on the admissibility of evidence prior to trial, the court’s determination of admissibility is similar ‘to a preliminary ruling on evidence at a pretrial conference’ and it ‘ “controls the subsequent course of action, unless modified at trial to prevent manifest injustice.” ’ [Cit.]” State v. Johnston, 249 Ga. 413 (3) (291 SE2d 543) (1982). The trial court’s ruling prior to trial was tantamount to the court’s declaration that the matters were too prejudicial and irrelevant to be uttered in front of a jury. The cumulative effect of allowing the prosecutor to repeatedly violate the ruling during the course of trial with nothing more than curative instructions did little to give effect to the preliminary ruling and, in my opinion made it “highly probable” that the error contributed to the conviction. Compare Jones v. State, 159 Ga. App. 704 (2) (285 SE2d 45) (1981).
Under OCGA § 17-8-75 the trial court, in its discretion, may *676grant a mistrial if prejudicial remarks are made by the prosecutor in the presence of the jury. While recognizing that the trial judge is vested with broad discretion in passing upon a motion for mistrial, it is my belief that excusing the prosecutor for his repeated violations of the trial court’s ruling, instead of declaring a mistrial because of the cumulative prejudicial effect those violations had on appellant, constituted a manifest abuse of discretion; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Decided September 4, 1990. Fredric W. Tokars, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, William L. Hawthorne III, Carl P. Greenberg, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.