(concurring specially).
I respectfully concur specially.
Some of our colleagues hold the view that the maintenance award is not an abuse of discretion because made within the reasonable range of the evidence, and I do not mean to imply disagreement with that general principle. I am concerned that when a short or moderate-term marriage has been followed by a lengthy period of divorce, the maintenance awarded should, within the trial court’s sound discretion, be re-opened only for such exigent reasons as to compel that exercise. I believe the compelling facts of this case establish a need for a rather narrow exception.
Where, as here, the movant is totally disabled from working due to a medical condition resulting directly from the marriage (such as injury suffered in childbirth), even though the marriage be of moderate duration, the maintenance award must provide for the entire medical expense and support necessary to life at a minimum, decent level. Respondent appears financially capable of providing such support, and no reason appears, either by statute or in equity, why it should be less.
The state of the record seems to be unclear, however, as to the total of medical expenses and support necessary to maintain appellant at that minimum, decent level, and I would remand with directions that it be set accordingly. I would defer to the trial court’s area of discretion, however, except for the special conditions of health directly attributable to the marriage which are present here.