concurring in the result:
In this case, the majority affirms the decision of the court of appeals allowing identification testimony based on DNA testing. The majority determines that, at the time of trial, the DNA test results and statistical analysis of such results were generally accepted by the scientific community and thereby admissible under the test of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). Because I would affirm under CRE 702 and reject Frye, I concur in the result only.
The defendant, Jeffrey Fishback, was convicted in 1989 of first degree sexual assault, second degree burglary, and mandatory sentence violent crime. Part of the evidence used in the trial against Fishback consisted of the testing and statistical analysis of his blood DNA compared with DNA derived from semen samples which were taken from the victim.1 These tests indicated that the alleles found in the defendant’s DNA matched those found in the samples. The statistical significance of that match was expressed in terms of the *896probability that the match occurred by chance, that is, the likelihood that someone other than the defendant would match the DNA found in the samples. According to the testimony, that probability or likelihood was 1 in 830,000,000. The defendant moved to suppress this evidence, and the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing as to its admissibility.
At the hearing, two expert witnesses were offered by the prosecution. One was Dr. William Setzer, the director of the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center DNA Diagnostic Laboratory, who was qualified as an expert in molecular biology, DNA testing and the field of genetics. He testified as to the laboratory procedures used to match the defendant’s blood DNA to that of the semen samples. The other was Dr. Lisa Forman of Cellmark Laboratories, the facility which conducted the tests, who was qualified as an expert in population genetics and population biology. Her testimony related primarily to the data base used for the statistical analysis. The testimony of both witnesses was essentially undisputed by the defendant, who did not put on any witnesses of his own. The court found these witnesses to be credible, and allowed the prosecution to enter the DNA test results and statistical analysis into evidence under both the Frye test and CRE 702.
The trial court’s reliance on both tests was due to confusion as to which test should apply to DNA evidence. It is apparent that the time has come for this court to set forth clearly the standard by which novel scientific evidence should be assessed. In the interests of logic and practicality, I believe CRE 702 is the more viable and persuasive test. In order to explain why I reach this conclusion, it is necessary to first examine Frye and its ramifications in the present case.
In Frye, a federal district court contemplating the new procedure of a systolic blood pressure deception test (i.e., a lie detector test) set forth certain precepts of analysis. These precepts since have become established as the primary standard by which to assess the admissibility of novel scientific principles. The court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Thus a novel scientific principle is held to be inadmissible unless it enjoys general acceptance among the scientific community. This view has been followed in the past by a majority of the jurisdictions, which notes that Frye addresses certain concerns such as the reliability of the proffered scientific data, the availability of experts, and the uniformity of decision concerning the admissibility of certain types of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C.Cir.1974); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240 (1976).
Now seventy years later, however, we should acknowledge that Frye, although it may have served this area of inquiry arguably well in the past, does not deal adequately with the issue of the admissibility of novel scientific principles as such evidence comes before trial courts today. Frye is premised on the assumption that once a scientific principle or discovery becomes “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific field, it forever remains accepted. Hence, once a particular form of evidence has passed the Frye test, it need not be tested again. This case shows that the Frye premise is not necessarily true and application of Frye does not achieve the stability of decision-making that it is meant to accomplish. According to the majority, “considerable debate has emerged in the three years since the trial in this case concerning the acceptability of the statistical frequencies which accompany a declared match of DNA profiles.” Maj. op. at 894. The opinion leaves to future cases the de*897termination of whether DNA statistical evidence “remains generally accepted.” Maj. op. at 895. Frye no longer provides certainty or ease of decision-making.
There are other serious problems involved in the application of Frye such as courts’ inconsistencies in characterizing evidence as “scientific,” difficulty in identifying the relevant scientific field, and ambiguity as to what constitutes “general acceptance.” See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence — A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 261, 264-265 (1981); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 1197 (1980). My primary dissatisfaction with Frye, however, is its unduly restrictive treatment of hovel scientific evidence, excluding testimony that may have strong support within the community but not be “generally accepted,” as in the situation here. And as Justice Potter Stewart stated, “any rule that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law impedes as well the doing of justice.” Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 81, 79 S.Ct. 136, 140, 3 L.Ed.2d 125 (1958) (concurring).
To my mind, the treatment of novel scientific principles is not only better addressed but pre-empted by the relevancy determination mandated by CRE 702, which is identical to the analogous federal rule of evidence. Enacted in Colorado in 1979, this rule reads as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
As stated by Professors Weinstein and Berger in reference to the federal rule, “Rule 702’s failure to incorporate a general scientific acceptance standard, and the Advisory Committee Note’s failure to even mention the Frye case must be considered significant.” 3 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 702[03] (1992). It has also been stated that the Frye standard “seems at odds with Rule 702” since “[ejvidence which is not yet accepted in the scientific community may still be helpful, and continued refusal to accept the testimony of a qualified expert for this reason alone cannot be supported by any other provision in the Rules.” 3 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 382 at 644 (1979). Although there are some voices to the contrary, I likewise believe that Frye has lost its viability since the implementation of CRE 702, which directly refers to scientific evidence and thus pre-empts any previous standards by which scientific testimony was weighed.2
Furthermore, I do not believe that the Frye rule has become established in our state to the extent that all scientific testimony must be examined under its standard. It is true that we applied the Frye test in People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 (Colo.1981). This case is distinguishable, however, on the grounds that the issue it addressed was the admissibility of polygraph test results into evidence — the identical issue that was addressed in Frye. It has been noted that the Frye standard “was applied consistently only in cases in which the admissibility of polygraph results was at issue.” Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L.Rev. 879, 884 (1982) (cited in 1 John W. Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 203 at 869 n. 6 (1992)). In our decision, we discussed Frye solely in the context of polygraph *898evidence, and we never referred to it in terms of scientific evidence as a whole. At least one other jurisdiction has adopted Frye only as to polygraph evidence, but has chosen to utilize the Rules of Evidence as to all other scientific evidence. State v. Walstad, 119 Wis.2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).
Critics of the Frye test, of whom there are many and who are increasing in number, have found a relevancy determination to be far more appropriate and efficient, addressing the concerns of Frye without its problems in application. Professor Charles McCormick has said of the Frye standard that:
“General scientific acceptance” is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion ... If the courts used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement of “general acceptance” not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific advances.
1 Strong, ed., McCormick on Evidence § 203 at 874-75. Other commentators have agreed with this position. See, e.g., 1 David W. Louisell & Christopher B. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 105 at 818 (1977); see also M. McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 Iowa L.Rev. at 916 (“Procedures that operate within the framework of general relevancy and expert testimony rules offer a more meaningful and effective alternative [to Frye ].”); E.J. Imwink-elried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence — A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. at 263-64 (“[W]e are now entering a new stage in the evolution of scientific evidence — a stage that will be dominated by questions of the weight of scientific evidence rather than admissibility.”); John W. Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U.Ill.L.Forum 1, 22 (1970) (“[I]t is suggested that the decision ultimately to admit scientific evidence, like other evidence, requires the striking of a balance between the probative worth of the evidence and its capacity to confuse or prejudice the jury.”).
Many federal courts have agreed with this position, rejecting the Frye rule in favor of a relevancy test balancing proba-tiveness against prejudice in cases involving scientific tests and principles other than those concerning DNA. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1025, 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979) (court applied balancing test); United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (probity of government’s expert evidence as attacked by defense is typical question for jury); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3rd Cir.1985) (Frye standard neither a necessary nor sufficient question for admissibility; general acceptance is single factor in broader reliability inquiry); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 456, 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975) (court found, in light of balancing test, dangers of new scientific evidence adequately guarded against); United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994, 91 S.Ct. 1232, 28 L.Ed.2d 531 (1971) (it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence and allow its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation); United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir.1989) (new technology required flexibility within legal system); United States v. Sample, 378 F.Supp. 44 (E.D.Pa.1974) (Frye test precluded too much relevant evidence).
State courts also have demonstrated disenchantment with Frye. See, e.g., Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346 (Del.1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910, 102 S.Ct. 1258, 71 L.Ed.2d 449 (1982) (general acceptance not indispensible criterion for admissibility); Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68 (Fla.App.1969), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla.1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927, 90 S.Ct. 2242, 26 L.Ed.2d 794 (1970) (appellate court deferred to trial court’s wide discretion in admissibility determination); State *899v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927, 101 S.Ct. 1384, 67 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (court rejected Frye); State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981) (despite lack of general acceptance, court found testimony sufficiently reliable for admission); State v. Catanese, 368 So.2d 975 (La.1979) (the criteria used for determining admissibility of scientific evidence should not rise to level necessary for judicial notice); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me.1978) (Frye should be limited to its original context — lie detector tests); State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St.3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983) (court rejected Frye and used “a more flexible standard derived from this state’s Rules of Evidence”); State v. Brown, 297 Or. 404, 687 P.2d 751 (1984) (court adopted relevancy test); Phillips ex rel. Utah St. Dept. of Social Serv. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (trier of fact should not be deprived of scientific data simply because of controversy); Walstad, 351 N.W.2d 469 (court found Frye adopted only as to polygraph evidence; all other evidence held to relevancy test of Rules of Evidence).
In addition, it should be noted that we conducted a balancing test of sorts in Anderson, the case in which we applied Frye strictly to polygraph evidence. We determined that, in addition to the inadmissibility of the polygraph evidence under Frye, such evidence is also inadmissible “because of the serious interference with and potential prejudice to a jury’s evaluation of the demeanor and credibility of witnesses and their testimony.” Anderson, 637 P.2d at 361. This is a balancing test weighing CRE 401 relevancy against CRE 403 prejudice — the same test I believe to be viable under CRE 702 and to be applicable to the present situation.
A balancing test under the rules of evidence was also applied in People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo.1987), a case that the majority cites as support for its discussion of the Frye test. Maj. op. at 889-891. Frye was not applied in Hampton and a plain reading of that case reveals a strong criticism of the Frye test. In that case, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of rape trauma syndrome. We acknowledged the use of Frye by other jurisdictions with regard to such evidence, but then declined to apply Frye and held that the evidence should be assessed under CRE 702. Although we noted that “the Frye test is applied to novel scientific devices and processes involving the manipulation of physical evidence ...” Hampton, 746 P.2d at 950, we also remarked upon the fact that Frye had been applied only in one case— Anderson — and that we had declined to apply it to another involving post-hypnotic testimony. People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003 (Colo.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 990, 108 S.Ct. 1296, 99 L.Ed.2d 506 (1988).
Subsequent to our decision in Hampton, we also declined to apply Frye in another case concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification, since it did not involve scientific testimony per se. Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo.1991). As before, we did not state whether Frye was the law of our state or not. In light of these cases and contrary to the majority’s position, it is my belief that we have not adopted Frye as being applicable to any scientific testimony other than the lie detector test. Thus, we are free to adopt other tests which would prove to be more efficient in assisting our search for the truth — namely CRE 702.
Other courts share my view as to the applicability of the Rules of Evidence to DNA evidence in determining that such evidence is admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629 (S.D.Ohio 1990); United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F.Supp. 250 (D.Vt.1990), judgment aff'd, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.1992); Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla.App. 5 Dist.1988); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989).
In applying CRE 702, the presiding judge must weigh the helpfulness of the evidence against the possibility that the jury may be misled or prejudiced by the admission of such evidence. One such factor to be utilized in the assessment would be the acceptance of the new technique within the scientific community, but it would not be the determinative factor as under Frye. As long as the proffered evidence is reliable and has support, although there may be controversy in the scientific field, such evidence would be admissible.
*900As did the trial court, I find, on the facts in the record before this court, that the scientific testimony as to both the testing procedures and statistical analysis is helpful and non-prejudicial. The trial court stated the following reasons for its admission of the DNA testimony into evidence. First, it determined that the same procedures are used in diagnosis of genetic diseases as well as paternity determinations, rendering the techniques not novel. In addition, there is a great deal of literature concerning the topic. The procedures are subject to peer review. Furthermore, the expert witnesses were well-qualified and shared the views of other witnesses around the country.
I find the testimony of the expert witnesses to be particularly persuasive. Dr. Setzer, from his perspective as a member of a national committee in the process of implementing standards as to testing procedures, testified that he thought such standards were met in this situation. Dr. Forman defended the validity of the data base used to determine the probabilities at issue in this case. The data base to which the defendant’s DNA was compared was compiled of members of the African-American community in Detroit. The defendant attacked the data base as not being a truly random population. Dr. Forman stated that Detroit was chosen for the very reason that its African-American population was in a constant state of flux, as stated by other population geneticists, sociologists and data base experts. Furthermore, she testified that the laboratory used a conservative approach to declaring matches as to the tested alleles, rendering the frequencies of matching much higher than the actualities.
Given Dr. Forman s expert testimony as to the statistical significance of the DNA match, I find the 1 in 830,000,000 probability to be a reliable number.3 The methods used to calculate that number have support within the scientific field. See, e.g., Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic Work, 254 Science 1735 (Dec. 20, 1991); B. Devlin, Neil Risch & Kathryn Roeder, No Excess of Homozygosity at Loci Used for DNA Fingerprinting, 249 Science 1416 (Sept. 21, 1990). Because Dr. Forman’s calculation was reliable and relevant, it was properly admitted into evidence under CRE 702 and 401.
The testimony of the prosecution experts is convincing, and it was not called into serious question by the defendant. As with other types of expert testimony, the burden is on the defendant to disprove such testimony or to demonstrate substantial prejudice, whether through the use of cross-examination or rebuttal expert witnesses. That burden was not met by the defendant in this case, and exclusion under CRE 403 is not mandated.
I thus concur in the majority’s holding that the DNA testimony in this case was properly admitted into evidence. I disagree, however, with the majority’s use of the Frye test, and instead would apply a relevancy test as to novel scientific principles. Such , a test in this situation would allow the jury to hear any debate as to the statistical principles involved in interpreting DNA test results and apply that debate to the weight the evidence should be given.
. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) determines the genetic makeup of all living things. Every human has DNA, which is contained in the nucleus of his or her cells. The DNA is divided among forty-six chromosomes, half of which are inherited from each parent, constituting twenty-three pairs. Each chromosome is composed of thousands of genes, and each of a pair of chromosomes contains the same genes. Alleles are the polymorphisms, or variations, of a given gene, i.e. for the gene of haircolor, an allele may be for brown or black or blond coloring, determined by different DNA patterning. Thus each individual, having received a half of a pair of chromosomes from each parent, has two alleles for the same gene. Some of these alleles are more polymorphic in composition than others, and DNA testing targets these "hypervariable” alleles. See maj. op. at 885-886.
. Further evidence of the conflict between the Frye test and the Rules of Evidence may be found in the fact that the United States Supreme Court recently heard oral argument as to the standard to be applied when determining the admissibility of scientific test results concerning birth defects allegedly caused by the drug Bendectin. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 92-102, argued Mar. 30, 1993. At trial, the district court utilized the Rules of Evidence in determining that the testimony was not sufficiently reliable for admission into evidence. 727 F.Supp. 570 (S.D.Cal.1989). The trial court ruling was affirmed under the Frye test. 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.1991).
. Because this number is reliable, I do not believe it is necessary for us to address the viability of the "ceiling principle,” as the majority opinion does. Maj. op. at 894 n. 19. The application of this principle will not alter the legal effect of the statistical probability of a match. The majority uses the example that, under the “ceiling principle," the probability of 1 in 830,-000,000 may actually be 1 in 8,300,000. Id. I would like to point out that while the difference between those two probabilities may be important for scientific purposes, either number still gives substantially more than a 99 percent certainty of no person other than the defendant matching the DNA sample for legal purposes. From an evidentiary standpoint, either statistic expresses a high degree of certainty. As long as both numbers are reliable, although one arguably may be “more reliable” than the other, the difference between the two (1 in 830,000,000 and 1 in 8,300,000) should go to the weight, not the admissibility of the DNA evidence.