dissenting.
1. I must dissent from the majority opinion dismissing this appeal.
A type of non-evolving constancy, permanency, and stability is *556needed in the law, particularly where statutory interpretations are involved distinguishing between direct and discretionary appeals. “The location of such issues on the legal landscape assuages an anxiety over instability and reaffirms the illusion that jurisprudential order is marked by a satisfying security of constancy. In this fashion, the debilitating awkwardness of transition is countered, and the notion is perpetuated that permanency is patently possible.” Sentell, “Claims Against Counties: The Difference a Year Makes.” 36 Mer. L. Rev 1, 42-43 (1984).
The majority opinion in the instant case makes a very practical, profound, pragmatic, and positive approach, yet, in my opinion, what is suggested does not appear to be within the scope and intent of the language and wording of the statute. It proposes, as the test to be used in each case, that one must ascertain whether the “amount placed in controversy” is greater than $2,500, or that amount or less, whereas the statute appears to clearly require only identifying whether or not a money judgment of $2,500 or less exists in a particular case.
Four objections are raised against the majority’s interpretation:
(a) It does not follow the language of the statute. If the General Assembly had meant “amount pleaded or placed in controversy,” they would have used that term instead of “judgment.”
(b) If a claim originally is in the amount of a million dollars and a jury verdict and judgment of the court is rendered in the amount of only $10, the majority is saying there is no money judgment in the amount of $2,500 or less because there is an “amount pleaded or placed in controversy” of over $2,500.
(c) Artful, astute, and able attorneys could always from the inception allege damages in excess of $2,500 and thereby sidestep, subvert, and avoid the use of discretionary appeals, which would be contrary to the intent of the legislature and would lead to absurd and contradictory consequences not envisioned by the lawmakers.
(d) Concern is expressed that the writer’s interpretation would result in discrimination favoring direct appeals when the judgment is on the side of the defendant, but mandating discretionary review procedures when plaintiff obtains a judgment of $2,500 or less. However, it must be remembered that about half the time when plaintiff receives a judgment of $1, $10, $100, $1,000, or other sums of $2,500 or less, this is in actuality a victory or judgment favorable to defendant. The proof of this statement is that plaintiffs appeal from these smaller judgments in their favor about as many times as do defendants. Substance rules over nomenclature. The rule and sword must cut both ways. It does not necessarily discriminate between plaintiff and defendant, but if so, the rule of de minimis non curat lex is applicable.
*5572. Since the writer apparently is all alone in the substantive aspects of this case, it is appropriate to restate the words of Judge Clark: “ ‘Everybody is out of step but Johnny!’ That aphorism appears applicable to this personal plaint wherein this writer as the sole dissenter is compelled to express his views. In doing so I am guided by the philosophy inherent in those words of the Latin poet Horace: ‘The man who is tenacious of purpose in a rightful cause is not shaken from his firm resolve.’ Perhaps personal prejudice prompts private predilections.” City of Jonesboro v. Clayton County, 131 Ga. App. 218, 221 (205 SE2d 475) (1974).
In his first enumeration of error Brown contends that the trial court erred in granting Associates’ motion for summary judgment, granting the writ of possession and dismissing his counterclaim.
The record indicates that Brown executed a loan contract security agreement and a loan disclosure statement for $4,150. The loan was repayable in 36 monthly installments of $115 each. Appellee charged Brown premiums for credit life insurance ($207.47) and credit accident and health insurance ($142.38). These premiums were financed as part of the loan and included in the total to be repaid. The loan was secured by Brown’s automobile, a 1979 Oldsmobile Cutlass. For approximately 18 months Brown made payments on the loan. When he became disabled from an on-the-job injury, he presented a statement of disability to Associates to claim benefits under his credit accident and health insurance, but appellee’s manager denied the claim on the ground that Brown had cancelled this insurance and received a refund of the premium. Brown made several requests that the company honor his insurance policy, but was unsuccessful. At some point, Associates apparently gave him a copy of a cancelled check made payable to him and dated the day after the contract was signed which bears his purported endorsement. In his affidavit opposing the motion for summary judgment, Brown denied cancelling the insurance and receiving the refund. (He claims he attached a copy of this photocopy to Associates’ interrogatories as requested by plaintiff.) This dispute was never resolved and Associates attempted to repossess the automobile for default in Brown’s payments. When Brown refused to release the automobile and demanded that the insurance agreement be honored, appellee refused and eventually filed a writ of possession to the automobile. Brown answered denying the default, and counterclaimed, contending that the contract violated the Industrial Loan Act, OCGA §§ 7-3-14, 7-3-15, by contracting for and charging unlawful amounts; and claimed he was entitled to set off the statutory penalty for violation of the Act against the delinquency which plaintiff claimed was due.
The loan contract and financing statement both contain an acceleration clause which provides: “If any payment is not paid when due, *558the entire unpaid amount of this indebtedness may at the option of the lender become due and payable without demand or notice and if this should occur, borrowers shall receive a pro rata rebate of interest and of the monthly maintenance charge . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The record shows that the accelerated balance was computed by deducting from the gross balance a pro rata portion of the precomputed interest charge, a portion of the maintenance charge and a portion of the credit life insurance premium as determined by the Rule of 78’s. As set forth above, it is apparent that the contract does not provide for a rebate of insurance charges upon acceleration of the note, and the answers to interrogatories are silent as to the refund of the accident and health insurance premium. The affidavit of Associates’ manager does not mention the alleged cancellation and refund. A copy of the loan contract attached to the affidavit bears the notation “can-celled” beside the premium amount for the accident and health insurance.
The note in question shows on its face that appellee sought to contract for the acceleration of life insurance and accident and health insurance premiums in violation of the provisions of the Industrial Loan Act. See G.A.C. Fin. Corp. v. Hardy, 232 Ga. 632 (208 SE2d 453) (1974); Sun Fin. Co. v. Lawrimore, 232 Ga. 637 (208 SE2d 454) (1974). This type of acceleration clause was expressly condemned in Clyde v. Liberty Loan Corp., 249 Ga. 78, 79 (287 SE2d 551) (1982), and the court held that such a contract was null and void. See also Scroggins v. Whitfield Fin. Co., 152 Ga. App. 8 (262 SE2d 168) (1979), wherein this court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the finance company because it failed to prove that in accelerating it made appropriate rebates for unearned life insurance premiums, maintenance fees or interest.
OCGA § 7-3-29 (f), however, provides for a good faith defense if “a contract is made in good faith in conformity with an interpretation of this chapter by the appellate courts of this state or in a rule or regulation officially promulgated by the commissioner after public hearings. . . .’’In the court below, appellee argued that it was entitled to the good faith defense because it submitted its loan forms to the Comptroller General and they were approved by him. This argument was rejected in Aetna Fin. Co. v. Brown, 172 Ga. App. 537 (323 SE2d 720) (1984).
In its brief, appellee argues that OCGA § 7-3-29 (c) provides that there is no liability if any error is corrected within fifteen days after discovery of the error, and claims it did not violate the Code and incurs no penalty with reference to the credit accident and health insurance. The logic of this argument escapes me. If the lender discovered an error in the acceleration clause and refunded the credit accident and health insurance, why did it not also refund the premium for the *559credit life insurance at the same time? This argument is also illogical in the face of appellee’s assertion that Brown requested that the credit accident and health insurance be cancelled.
In view of the holding in Clyde v. Liberty Loan Corp., supra, and its reliance upon Scroggins v. Whitfield Fin. Co., supra, I believe that the loan contract was null and void and that the trial court erred in granting Associates’ motion for summary judgment, granting the writ of possession and dismissing Brown’s counterclaim.
3. I also think that the trial court further erred in ordering payment into the registry of the court of the past due installments of $1,035, and in granting Associates a preliminary writ of possession when Brown failed to do so.
OCGA § 44-14-234 (1) (A) and (B) permits a debtor to retain possession of the secured property pending a final decision if he pays into the registry of the court “(A) [a]ll past due amounts which are admitted to be due and for which there are no allegations of defenses or claims which, if proven, would offset said amounts alleged past due; and (B) [a]ll amounts of unaccelerated payments which become due after the issuance of the summons as said amounts . . . become due.”
As Associates accelerated the entire balance of $1,790.25, there were no unaccelerated payments to become due under subsection B. As for the applicability of subsection A, Brown’s answer denied any past due amounts, raised the defense of violation of the Industrial Loan Act and counterclaimed for a statutory penalty of $2,308.28. He demanded that the penalty be set off against the amount claimed by Associates. As the claimed penalty exceeds the alleged debt, subsection A is likewise not applicable. Accordingly I believe that the trial court erred in granting Associates a preliminary writ of possession. Coppage v. Mellon Bank, 142 Ga. App. 12, 13 (234 SE2d 824) (1977). See also Smalls v. Harrison, 150 Ga. App. 473, 474 (258 SE2d 227) (1979); Foskey v. Bank of Alapaha, 147 Ga. App. 541 (249 SE2d 346) (1978). I would reverse the judgment of the trial court for the reasons set forth.