In 1988 appellee Fayette County amended its zoning ordinance by enacting Section 5-47 which identifies and regulates watershed *490protection areas. Under zoning restrictions existing prior to this amendment, appellant’s property could be subdivided into one-acre lots; the amendment required that the affected portions of her property be subdivided into lots no smaller than two acres.
Appellant filed a request for a variance from the application of Section 5-47 with the Board of Zoning Appeals (Board) in which she maintained, inter alia, that Section 5-47 resulted in an unconstitutional taking of her property which could be cured by the granting of a variance. After appellant’s request for a variance was denied by the Board, she filed this action for mandamus against the Board and the County Commission, seeking to have Section 5-47 of the zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional. Additionally, appellant sought an order requiring the Board to issue her a variance.
The trial court concluded that the Board had not acted arbitrarily in denying appellant’s application for a variance, and further found that because appellant had failed to raise the constitutional issues before the County Commission, these issues could not be pursued in the mandamus action. We granted appellant’s application for discretionary appeal.
The rule is that a landowner who makes a constitutional attack on a zoning ordinance must do so before the local governing body — either county commission or city council — in order to afford that body the opportunity to amend the ordinance and bring it within constitutional limits. Village Centers v. DeKalb County, 248 Ga. 177 (281 SE2d 522) (1981). If the governing body fails to amend the ordinance, the dissatisfied landowner may challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance in the superior court.
Where the landowner seeks a variance from the zoning ordinance, maintaining that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to his property and that the granting of a variance will cure the constitutional deficiency, the procedural rules are not as clear.
In some counties in Georgia the landowner makes an application for a variance to the local governing body. See, e.g., Dougherty County v. Webb, 256 Ga. 474 (350 SE2d 457) (1986). In this instance the landowner has the opportunity to raise constitutional issues before the governing body which has the power to correct any constitutional infirmities.
In other counties the landowner requests a variance from an administrative board, such as the Board of Zoning Appeals in this case. Often there is a provision in the zoning ordinance for an appeal to the governing body from the denial of a request for a variance. See, e.g., Intl. Funeral Services v. DeKalb County, 244 Ga. 707 (261 SE2d 265) (1979). Thus, the landowner has the opportunity to present any constitutional issues to the governing body which has remedial powers. This court has held that where the zoning ordinance does not provide *491a means of appeal from the denial of a request for a variance, the landowner travels to superior court by writ of mandamus. City of Atlanta v. Wansley Moving &c. Co., 245 Ga. 794 (267 SE2d 234) (1980).
We have recognized that the powers delegated to a board of zoning appeals are neither judicial nor legislative, but are quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative. Bentley v. Chastain, 242 Ga. 348 (249 SE2d 38) (1978). As such a board of zoning appeals has no authority to pass upon the validity of a zoning ordinance. Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and Planning, § 37.02 (8). However, we hold that where the zoning ordinance requires that an application for a variance be made to an administrative board and does not provide for a means of appeal, the landowner who seeks a variance on the ground that the zoning ordinance is unconstitutional in the special circumstances as applied to his property must raise the constitutional issues before the administrative board in order to later pursue them in a mandamus action. This gives the board the opportunity to grant the variance and thereby remedy any such constitutional deficiency in the ordinance as applied to the landowner’s property, but does not give the board the authority to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance itself.
The record shows that appellant raised the constitutional issues in question before the Board. The record also shows that the Fayette County zoning ordinance does not provide a means of appeal. Therefore it was proper for appellant to file this action for mandamus in superior court. Since the constitutional issues were timely raised, the case must be remanded to the trial court for a determination on the merits.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
All the Justices concur.