Allan G. and Brenda Stroh (respondents) are Alabama residents who, having previously adopted T. M. G.’s half-sister, filed a petition to adopt T. M. G. once they discovered his existence. In the course of that adoption proceeding, the trial court ruled that Scott and Traci Edmondson (foster parents) could either intervene in the action or file a separate petition. Although the Department of Human Resources (DHR) intervened in respondents’ case, the foster parents did not, but filed a separate adoption petition eleven months later. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied each adoption petition in a separate order and thereafter denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration and refused to place T. M. G. in their custody while they pursue adoption proceedings in Alabama. The foster parents filed a new adoption petition and moved to consolidate that case with, and to intervene in, respondents’ case. The trial court dismissed both motions, finding that it was without jurisdiction to entertain them, as they were filed subsequent to the final order in respondents’ case. Respondents then appealed. Although the foster parents filed a brief as amicus curiae in that appeal, the only parties of record were respondents and DHR. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with direction that the trial court grant custody to respondents. In re Stroh, 240 Ga. App. 835 (523 SE2d 887) (1999). Only the foster parents petitioned for certiorari, which this Court granted. Respondents filed what is in effect a motion to vacate certiorari, on the ground that the foster parents are not aggrieved parties and, thus, have no standing. The foster parents *895responded that they have proceeded as amicus curiae and should be permitted to appear as interested third parties under OCGA § 5-6-1.
It is this Court’s prerogative to prescribe rules regarding certiorari. Indeed, the only rules of procedure for reviewing a decision of the Court of Appeals by the writ of certiorari are Rules 38 through 45 of this Court. Hawes v. Dinkler, 224 Ga. 785, 786 (1) (a) (164 SE2d 799) (1968). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V; OCGA § 5-6-15; Holliman v. State, 175 Ga. 232 (2), (3) (165 SE 11) (1932). Rule 45 states that “appellant and appellee shall file briefs.” This mandate implies the necessity for the participation of both opposing parties. The Hawes case involved a motion which, like that filed by respondents, requested this Court to vacate a writ of certiorari on the ground that the petitioner had no standing to complain of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and was not an “aggrieved party.” Hawes v. Dinkler, supra at 786 (1). In that case, this Court did not vacate certiorari, but only because it concluded that the petitioner there was in fact an aggrieved party. Hawes v. Dinkler, supra at 787 (1) (b), (c). We have been unable to locate any precedent wherein this Court reviewed by certiorari a case which had no appellant, but instead only a non-party seeking the reversal of a judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The foster parents are not parties to this case, and never have been. Having long ago chosen to leave to DHR the burden of opposing respondents’ adoption proceeding and request for temporary custody, they cannot attempt to intervene after the trial court has entered final judgment and DHR has decided not to petition for certiorari. See Harvey v. Williams, 572 A2d 149, 150-151 (Md. 1990). As for the foster parents’ reliance on OCGA § 5-6-1, that code section permits the appearance of interested third parties in addition to, and along with, the plaintiffs and the defendants. Thus, the foster parents could appear in this case only if DHR had already petitioned for certiorari. The foster parents are indistinguishable from any other non-party who is dissatisfied with a Court of Appeals decision. If the foster parents are permitted to proceed with certiorari, then any non-party who assumes a position contrary to a Court of Appeals decision can petition this Court for certiorari.
Accordingly, we hold that the rules of this Court governing the grant of certiorari have not been satisfied and, therefore, the writ is vacated.
Writ of certiorari vacated.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J., Fletcher, P. J., and Hunstein, J., who dissent.