(dissenting).
All defendants were entitled to summary judgment, as a matter of law.
School District is entitled to absolute sovereign immunity in tort actions within this state. Holland v. Yankton Sch. Dist., 375 N.W.2d 199 (S.D.1985).
Peterson and Aman were both school administrators, acting for School District, and enjoyed sovereign immunity protection in their decisions and actions in the schoolhouse. Holland, 375 N.W.2d 199; Guillaume v. Staum, 328 N.W.2d 259 (S.D.1982). See also Merrill v. Birhanzel, 310 N.W.2d 522 (S.D.1981). Were this not jur-isprudentially true, both would still be immune based upon exercise of discretionary function of their respective responsibilities.
School districts occupy a unique classification. They are state agencies. Holland, 375 N.W.2d at 199. Administrators are necessarily clothed with discretion to maintain order, supervise teachers, and to generally carry out the policy of the school board. Daily, they superintend the operation of a school. If they become subject to lawsuits for their daily decisions, it will have a chilling effect on employing qualified administrators in South Dakota, and will subject them to personal liability for simply attempting to make a schoolhouse run in an efficient manner. Administrators are involved in policy, every day, and we, in the law, cannot infect their decisions with a daily fear of litigation. While acting in the performance of their duties, they should not be subjected to litigation for exercising their duties/judgment, on a day-by-day basis, to run the affairs which attend school administration. Decisions by school administrators to correct bad situations must be made on the spot, they cannot wait for the school board to caucus and formulate a policy or have a special school board meeting. Administrators are vested with discretionary powers in order that they may address matters which require immediate attention. School board members come from every walk of life and have their own occupations and family needs to attend to and cannot be summoned to caucus on a child who is causing trouble in school or a teacher who is failing his students and the school by improper conduct or teaching methods. Their immunity must be viewed in this light: What is the nature of their function? Sioux Falls Constr. Co. v. City of Sioux Falls, 297 N.W.2d 454, 458 (S.D.1980).
Bego could have walked out of Peterson’s office at any time; this is hardly *814imprisonment.1 Bego admitted, at proceedings below, that Peterson did not restrict his freedom (from whence could arise a question of fact on false imprisonment?); as for being “detained” or “emotionally distressed” in the superintendent’s office, Bego had a duty to review and/or sign the evaluation and leave, but his obstreperousness created a verbal confrontation; it appears Bego visited upon himself — emotional distress — when all he had to do was sign the evaluation and walk out (therefore, no material issue of fact). As for alleged defamation, this supposedly occurred in a music room, during class, and Aman apparently disapproved of the students’ frivolous conduct and Bego’s instruction. True, Aman’s reproach was not tactful, but this is hardly an underpinning for a suit at law for damages.2 Under the majority opinion’s Am.Jur.2d cite, I fail to perceive a question of fact on willfulness or malice. Therefore, other than the immunity issue, which I have touched upon, concerning school administrators, it does not appear to be a question of fact under a theory of intentional tort. Actually, under my theory, this concept need not be reached. And I mention it only because it would appear that there is a far-reaching consequence to the majority holding and, vividly, in my opinion, demonstrates to what end the basic tenet of the majority opinion may reach; yes, right into the music room for a lawsuit and that is a revolutionary overturning of precedent in this Court. See Merrill v. Birhanzel, 310 N.W.2d 522 (S.D.1981) (where sovereign immunity was applied to shield two teachers from a lawsuit involving a student injury suffered in a physical education class), relying on Plumbing Supply Co. v. Board of Educ., 32 S.D. 270, 272-73, 142 N.W. 1131, 1132 (1913).
. Currently, a debate rages. Some courts assert that the victim be conscious of the confinement. The more modern view allows recovery even where the victim was not cognizant of the confinement. 1 F. Harper, F. James and O. Gray, The Law of Torts § 3.6, at 286 (2d ed. 1986). However, it is universally recognized that the victim must have been confined and “the most authoritative modern view is that the plaintiff must be completely confined and any reasonable means of egress known to him will prevent an imprisonment." Id., § 3.7, at 289 (footnote omitted). See Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 11, at 47-49 (5th ed. W. Keeton 1984). As Prosser notes: "It is essential, however, that the restraint be against the plaintiffs will; and if one agrees of one’s own free choice to surrender freedom of motion, as by remaining in a room or accompanying another voluntarily, to clear oneself of suspicion or to accommodate the desires of the other, rather than yielding to the constraint of a threat, then there is no imprisonment." Prosser, id., § 11, at 49 (footnotes omitted). In our case, Bego had before him, in plain view, an open door. Additionally, the facts are clear that Peterson never indicated to Bego that the latter must remain in the office and if Bego did remain, he apparently did so for personal reasons, and not against his will.
. The subject of "qualified privilege” was fully addressed by this writer in an unanimous opinion in Uken v. Sloat, 296 N.W.2d 540, 542-43 (S.D.1980). Surely, a superintendent may make criticism and comments concerning teachers under his command, be it to his staff, the school board, the teacher itself, or correcting a teacher in front of his/her students without fear of reprisal of a lawsuit. When a teacher permits frivolity or "goofing around,” and a superintendent steps in to correct it, this is the kind of superintendent we need in South Dakota schools. Again, Aman could have been more tactful and perhaps call the teacher aside and chastise him rather than to rebuke him to the students and while the teacher was temporarily absent. Malice should not be inferred from such a classroom situation. Aman was entitled to summary judgment on the defamation cause of action based upon SDCL 20-11-5. Teachers are not exempt from criticism because of the public nature of the teaching profession. In making this remark to these students. Aman was acting in a discretionary function. If Aman did nothing, he was answerable to his board for neglecting his duties; if he did do something to correct, on the spot, a bad situation, he ends up as a defendant in a lawsuit. Aman was neither diplomatic nor tactful, but he did have the fortitude to rectify and amend. If his words were too harsh, one might consider them as punishment, in a sense, in front of the class. To ameliorate the situation, Aman could have rectified the situation by speaking to the teacher, rather than to the class. However, administrative posts in high school settings are stressful and classroom settings require spontaneous action.