dissenting, with whom CARDINE, Justice, joins.
Two fundamental questions are presented in this appeal. First, whether the district court had jurisdiction to enter an amended judgment and, second, whether the amended judgment corrected a clerical error and preserved the intent of the original judgment. In my opinion, a careful review of the record demonstrates both the requisite jurisdiction and intent of the district court necessary to affirm the amended judgment. See Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A.-Lander, 713 P.2d 228, 233-34 (Wyo.1986).
I. JURISDICTION
A judgment granting Donna May Johnson (wife) a divorce from Thomas R. Johnson (husband) was filed on December 29, 1987. Paragraph 7 of the. judgment awards the wife “one third (⅛) of the pension proceeds when said pension proceeds are drawn * * * ” by the husband. If the wife remarries, her share is diminished to “one sixth (Vc) of said pension proceeds.”
On April 4, 1988, the husband’s employer informed the wife of deficiencies in the documentation which prevented assignment of the pension share to her. For unexplained reasons, no attempts to correct the deficiencies were made until a Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce was filed by the wife on November 17, 1989. Extended negotiations between the parties failed to produce a settlement. Ultimately, a hearing was held on February 6, 1992 to consider both the wife’s petition for modification and a petition for modification of alimony filed by the husband.
The majority assumes the district court premised its jurisdiction on the wife’s modification petition. The district court specifically, and properly, declined to hear evidence on the wife’s petition to modify the property settlement. At the hearing, the *9district court acknowledged Wyoming precedent which precludes modification of property settlements. Pavlica v. Pavlica, 587 P.2d 639 (Wyo.1978).
Instead, the district court requested the preparation of an amended order to correct the deficiencies. The district court, essentially, acted on its own motion under W.R.C.P. 601 to correct what the district court termed a “technical problem” with the judgment. W.R.C.P. 60, in pertinent part, permits the district court to correct clerical mistakes:
(a) Clerical Mistakes. — Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
In Matter of Kimball’s Estate, 583 P.2d 1274, 1278 (Wyo.1978), this court defined a clerical mistake as, “a mistake or omission that prevented the judgment as entered from accurately reflecting the judgment that was rendered[.]”
The central purpose of W.R.C.P. 60(a) is to “effectuate the contemporaneous intent of the court and ensure that the judgment reflects the intent.” Spomer v. Spomer, 580 P.2d 1146, 1149 (Wyo.1978). In Forney v. Minard, 849 P.2d 724, 728 (Wyo.1993) and Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Wyo.1987), this court acknowledged that a district court possesses the power to amend a judgment to reflect the proper value of an asset and the subsequent distribution of the property. See Kane v. Kane, 706 P.2d 676, 679 (Wyo.1985). The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to amend the judgment.
II. AMENDED JUDGMENT
After the district court declined to hear the wife’s modification petition, her counsel made an offer of proof. It was during this exposition that the colloquy regarding “gross” or “net” pension benefits developed. In reviewing the transcript, it is clear that no “meeting of the minds” occurred between the parties on the meaning of the terms. The assumption of the majority opinion is that such an agreement was necessary. This is incorrect. In correcting a judgment, the central issue is effectuating the original intent of the district court. Spomer, 580 P.2d at 1149. The question then is not what interpretation the parties place on the district court’s use of the terms “gross” and “net,” but what meaning the district court intended for those terms in the amended order.
The original judgment pronounced that the wife was entitled to a share in the husband’s pension. The size of the wife’s share depended on her future marital status. The wife’s share, one-third or one-sixth, remained the same under both the original judgment and the amended judgment. There was no modification of the property settlement in this regard.
The correct focus then is on the intent of the district court in the original judgment in stating the wife was entitled to a share in the “pension proceeds when said pension proceeds are drawn * * In its opinion letter granting the divorce, the district court noted:
It is unfortunate that the parties did not produce any evidence pertaining to the present value of the pension plan. The Court, therefore, is left to its own devices to attempt to do equity. Accordingly the wife will be entitled to share in one-third of the pension proceeds when drawn by the husband.
(Emphasis added.) The language of the opinion letter and the original judgment are consistent, the wife’s pension share is a fraction of the proceeds drawn by the husband. The verb “draw” means to withdraw money from an account. Black’s Law Dictionary 494 (6th ed. 1990). Under the terms of the original judgment, the wife obtained a share of whatever amount the husband received regularly or in due course from his pension. See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 381 (1986).
*10At the hearing, the district court succinctly stated the intent of the original judgment:
[I]t was my intent that when Mr. Johnson retires, that if he gets a thousand dollars a month pension, he has to pay $330 over to Mrs. Johnson. It was no less complicated than that. I made the decision that if, as, and when it’s drawn it would be shared on a one-third, two-third basis.
The language of the amended judgment, with its definition of “gross,” complies with the intent of the district court as stated in the original judgment:
It is the specific intention of this Court that the former spouse alternate payee’s share of the participant’s pre-retirement or post-retirement pension benefits shall be computed on the basis of the gross amount of the participant’s monthly pension benefit amount, “gross” being defined as the amount the participant receives AFTER making an election regarding a survivor annuitant.
In briefing to this court and in the offer of proof made to the district court, the wife argued that her share of the pension would be impermissibly reduced by the amount of pension funds used to create an annuity. During the offer of proof, the district court addressed the possibility of pension reductions to create an annuity:
It was my intention, based on the evidence adduced at that time, that Mrs. Johnson get one-third, Mr. Johnson get two-thirds. There was no evidence adduced as to these variations that you now bring up, and therefore, I cannot choose the rules of the game. Had that evidence been adduced as to these variations with respect to survivor annuities, then, of course. But Mr. Johnson hadn’t even remarried, so it was obvious that that evidence wasn’t available to be presented. It’s simply beyond the court’s power to go back and reopen the case. I can’t do it, res judicata precludes me.
The district court properly limited its judgment to provide “clear and timely finalization * * * ” of the divorce proceeding. Broadhead v. Broadhead, 737 P.2d 731, 737 (Wyo.1987).
III. CONCLUSION
The majority is sanctioning an impermissible modification of a property settlement by reversing the district court. I would affirm the district court in all respects.
. Same as present W.R.C.P. 60, effective March 24, 1992.