dissenting.
Today the Court holds that independent contractors may be terminated solely because of their age or gender. I disagree. The better course of action for the Court would be to hold that such terminations are void for public policy and violate the duty of good-faith and fair dealing implied in every contract.
Public Policy
As the majority recognizes, this Court has held that an employer may be held liable for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee when the motive for the discharge violates public policy. See, e.g. Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Disk, 98 Idaho 330, 333, 563 P.2d 54, 57 (1977); MacNeil v. Minidoka Memorial Hospital, 108 Idaho 588, 589, 701 P.2d 208, 209 (1985). Yet today, the majority “decline[s] the opportunity to expand those holdings to independent contractors.” Maj. 123 Idaho at 653, 851 P.2d at 949. The inquisitive reader may have paused at this point in the majority’s opinion and asked the question: “Why should an at-will employee be treated differently than an at-will independent contractor?” This reader did so and was disappointed to find that this question is left unanswered in the majority opinion. Hence, today issues a majority opinion complete with its holdings wholly unsupported by even a facsimile of a ratio decidendi. I venture to say that Ruggero J. Aldisert would shudder at the thought.2
Perhaps the majority’s lack of discussion is caused by the absence of any sound reason for treating at-will employees differently from independent contractors who, under the terms of a written contract, may be terminated at will. Why should we allow an independent contractor to be terminated for reasons which would be void for public policy if s/he were an employee? And why is the termination of an independent contractor because s/he is thought to be the wrong age or the wrong sex (or, presumably, wrong race, color, or religion) less violative of public policy than the termination of an at-will employee for the same reason(s)? Realistically, there is no reason to permit such disparate treatment, regardless of the legal contortions in which the majority engages or the meaningless factual distinctions the majority advances.
Ironically, if Ostrander were an employee, she would not need to look to the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine because employees are specifically protected against age and gender discrimination by state and federal statute. I would extend the public policies embodied in those statutes to any such circumstances as presented in this case and would hold that at-will termination clauses in independent contractor contracts do not permit ter*656mination of employment on age or gender based reasoning.
Good Faith and Fair Dealing Later in the majority’s opinion, the Court recognizes that we have never decided the issue of whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to contracts involving independent contractors, although we have held it applies to at-will employment contracts. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Company, 116 Idaho 622, 778 P.2d 744 (1989). The majority then goes on to hold that “the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to independent contractors.” Maj. 123 Idaho at 653, 851 P.2d at 949. Again, the majority offers no analysis in support of its holding. •
In my opinion, it makes no sense to say there is no covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Ostrander-Farm Bureau contract when we have consistently held that the implied covenant exists in every contract, see, e.g., Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho 266, 287, 824 P.2d 841, 853 (1991) (commercial transaction); Luzar v. Western Surety, 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984) (surety agreement); White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 96, 730 P.2d 1014, 1016 (1986) (insurance contract), even at-will employment contracts. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 625, 778 P.2d 744, 746 (1989). Certainly, there is a bizarre lack of analysis and consistency in holding that there exists a duty of good faith and fair dealing in a contract between arms-length commercial parties, yet none is to be found in an independent contractor’s contract. At the very least, the majority should hold that there does exist a duty of good faith and fair dealing, even if it does not find that firing on the basis of gender or age implicates that duty.
I am, as was Justice Huntley, “unconvinced there is any difference between employees at will and independent contractors when a bad faith termination is involved.” And, as today’s offering by the majority offers no reason to depart from that view, I believe that “the limited protection afforded by law applies equally to both [employees and independent contractors].” Clement v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 115 Idaho 298, 306, 766 P.2d 768, 776 (1988) (Huntley, J. dissenting).
ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING.
. See generally, Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process (West Publishing Co., 1976).