Opinion by Chief
Judge STERNBERG.In this negligence action against the Pikes Peak Family Counseling and Mental Health Center, Inc., (the Clinic) and several of its employees, plaintiff, Evelyn Marie Halverson, appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants upon remand from this court. We again reverse and remand with directions to reinstate plaintiff’s complaint.
The complaint alleged that in March of 1987, while plaintiff was an inpatient at the Clinic, she was sexually assaulted by anoth*234er inpatient who had a history of violent behavior. Plaintiff asserted that defendants were negligent in failing to protect her and in failing to supervise and control the attacker after they had notice of his dangerous proclivities and his prior aggressive behavior toward plaintiff.
Initially, in reliance on § 13-21-117, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A), the trial court dismissed plaintiffs complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On appeal, while the panel did not agree upon the applicability of the statute, this court reversed, all panel members agreeing that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to state a claim. See Halverson v. Pikes Peak Family Counseling & Mental Health Center, Inc., 795 P.2d 1352 (Colo.App.1990) (Halverson I). Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the complaint.
Upon remand, defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that plaintiff had failed to provide facts to support her claim that defendants knew of the attacker’s alleged threats or aggressive behavior toward plaintiff. They further argued that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning defendant’s lack of knowledge of the attacker’s threats or aggressive behavior toward plaintiff and that, therefore, defendants were immune from liability as a matter of law pursuant to § 13-21-117.
Following the submission of additional briefs by both parties, the trial court concluded that, under § 13-21-117, defendants had no duty to warn or protect plaintiff unless plaintiff herself had told them that her attacker had made a serious threat. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendants’ motion based upon its determination that plaintiff had not communicated to defendants a serious threat of imminent physical violence from her attacker.
I.
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for defendants based upon there being no indication in the record that plaintiff had told defendants of the attacker’s threat of imminent physical violence. We agree that this construction of § 13-21-117 was erroneous.
As pertinent here, § 13-21-117 provides as follows:
No ... mental health professional and no mental health hospital, community mental health center or clinic, institution, or their staff shall be liable for damages in any civil action for failure to warn or protect any person against a mental health patient’s violent behavior, nor shall any such person be held civilly liable for failure to predict such violent behavior, except where the patient has communicated to the mental health care provider a serious threat or imminent physical violence against a specific person or persons, (emphasis supplied)
Based upon the plain meaning of the language adopted by the General Assembly, we conclude that the exception was not intended solely to require the attacked victim to communicate the violent threat. Instead, the exception is broad enough to apply when the violent patient’s threats have been communicated to the health care provider. Halverson I, supra (Criswell, J., specially concurring); see also Dice, The Duty to Warn and the Liability of Mental Health Care Providers, 16 Colo.Law. 70 (January 1987).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by construing § 13-21-117 to place this burden of communication upon the victim.
II.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in holding that the statute abrogated a mental hospital’s duty to provide a safe environment for its patients. However, we are unable to address that contention because the previous opinion in this case (Halverson I) constitutes the law of the case. See Governor’s Ranch Professional Center, Ltd. v. Mercy, Inc., 793 P.2d 648 (Colo.App.1990).
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to reinstate the complaint and for *235further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
NEY, J., concurs. DAVIDSON, J., specially concurs.