(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion in this case because I believe the learned trial judge properly concluded it his duty to direct a verdict in favor of defendant. By his memorandum decision he made it clear that his only reason for permitting the case to go to the jury, after defendant moved for a directed verdict, was the opinion of this court in Davis v. Skille (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 482, 490, 107 N. W. (2d) 458, which recommended that in “close cases” a trial court reserve its ruling on motions for directed verdict until after return of the verdict. This is what the trial judge did in the instant case.
It is difficult to find a causal relationship between plaintiff Sachse’s injuries and defendant Mayer’s failure to warn plaintiff of the dangers accompanying use of the power saw in a tree. Sachse had used power saws in his shop course at Shorewood high school and further learned of their dangerous nature while operating them many times during the three years prior to the accident. He testified that he knew this particular power saw was “a dangerous piece of machinery.” Sachse further knew that in order to operate the saw while up a tree he would have to hold the saw with both hands and *466grip the tree with his legs alone. Therefore, any warning given by Mayer would not have increased Sachse’s knowledge of the danger involved.
Nevertheless, even if it be assumed that the causation issue with respect to Mayer’s failure to warn Sachse was for the jury, no reasonable basis existed for a jury to conclude that Sachse’s negligence was less than that of Mayer. Mayer’s negligence, if any, consisted of his failure to warn Sachse about a danger of which Sachse already knew at the time of the accident. On the other hand, Sachse’s negligence consisted of climbing the tree with the power saw in operation and then releasing his grip on the tree with his hands in order to operate the saw knowing full well of the dangers involved. Furthermore, Sachse did this without even asking Mayer whether he wished this standing tree to be cut up.
If there ever was a case in which the injured plaintiff’s negligence exceeded the defendant’s as a matter of law, this is the case. While this court holds that the comparative-negligence issue is for the jury in the great majority of situations, it has not hesitated to hold that a plaintiff’s negligence equaled or exceeded defendant’s in the extraordinary situations in which the facts required such a result. Crawley v. Hill (1948), 253 Wis. 294, 34 N. W.(2d) 123; Quady v. Sickl (1952), 260 Wis. 348, 51 N. W. (2d) 3; Hephner v. Wolf (1952), 261 Wis. 191, 52 N. W. (2d) 390; Klein v. Montgomery Ward & Co. (1953), 263 Wis. 317, 57 N. W. (2d) 188; Frei v. Frei (1953), 263 Wis. 430, 57 N. W. (2d) 731; Sparish v. Zappa (1956), 273 Wis. 195, 77 N. W. (2d) 416; Powless v. Milwaukee County (1959), 6 Wis. (2d) 78, 94 N. W. (2d) 187; Kornetzke v. Calumet County (1959), 8 Wis. (2d) 363, 99 N. W. (2d) 125; and Bembinster v. Aero Auto Parts (1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 252, 107 N. W. (2d) 193.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment for dismissal of plaintiff’s action.
*467I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hallows concurs in this dissent.