concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in full with the majority’s decision to affirm Ross’s conviction, but I dis*532agree that the district court violated its duty under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B) and, for this reason, dissent from the court’s decision to vacate Ross’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B) requires a district court to “rule” on “any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter.” At sentencing, Ross argued that the intended loss should have been zero because he “never intended a loss with regard to the bank.” When presented with this credibility-based (rather than a fact-based) argument, the court reasonably adopted the jury’s assessment of Ross’s credibility. In doing so, the district court responded to the only issue raised by Ross and thus satisfied its duty to “rule” on this “controverted matter.”
This is not a case where the district court “summarily adoptfed] the factual findings in the presentence report or simply declare[d] that the facts [were] supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” See United States v. Solorio, 337 F.3d 580, 598 (6th Cir.2003). Ross did not contest or ask the court to recalculate the loss figure in the presentence report, but merely argued that he did not intend a loss to the bank. Under these circumstances, the court was under no duty to make an independent loss calculation. The issue before the district court was clear: If Ross intended a loss (i.e., if he sought to defraud the banks), then the loss calculation in the presentence report was correct. If, however, he did not intend a loss (i.e., if he did not seek to defraud the banks), then the loss calculation would be zero. Perhaps, the district court found this argument to be baffling in light of the fact that Ross had been found guilty of bank fraud, one of the elements of which — as the majority opinion correctly explains with regard to Ross’s claim of insufficient evidence — is the “intent to defraud.” See also United States v. Everett, 270 F.3d 986, 989 (6th Cir.2001). The court nevertheless addressed Ross’s argument, adopted the jury’s adverse credibility finding, and sentenced Ross as prescribed in the guidelines. Under these circumstances, that is all Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(i)(3)(B) required.