Respondent Joseph A. Cobbs, Jr., pled guilty to two counts of second degree burglary and two counts of forgery. He was sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years on each burglary charge and seven years on each forgery charge, all of the sentences to run concurrently. On application for post conviction relief (PCR) the convictions were vacated and a new trial granted. We affirm the findings of the PCR court.
Respondent’s mother, Anna Jolley, swore out warrants in October 1983 against respondent for forging two checks which belonged to two of her other sons. The magistrate issued warrants for Cobbs’ arrest in October 1983. These warrants, however, were not executed until September 1985 at the same time the magistrate issued and executed arrest warrants against respondent on the burglary charges.
At the PCR hearing, Ms. Jolley testified that although she had initiated the charges of forgery against respondent, she had subsequently worked out her problems with him and had no desire to see her son prosecuted at the time he pled guilty.
Appointed defense counsel testified that he never attempted to contact the prosecuting witness, Ms. Jolley, concerning this case. Upon noticing that the warrants issued in 1983 were about two years old at the time of execution, defense counsel admitted that he did not seek to determine why *301the warrants were held by the magistrate for such a long time.
One of the burglary charges for which respondent was indicted stemmed from a complaint by Rosa Little regarding an incident which occurred at her home on September 5,1985, at approximately 2:30 A.M.1 At the PCR hearing, the magistrate testified that, although he did not recall the actual act which led to respondent’s arrest for the incident involving Ms. Little, he had signed a commitment order. The order reflects a conviction for an act committed on September 5,1985, at Ms. Little’s residence at approximately 2:30 A.M. and indicates that the magistrate sentenced the respondent on October 22, 1985, to thirty (30) days in the county jail.
Respondent testified that in December 1985, he pled guilty, pursuant to advice of defense counsel, to second degree burglary for the same incident which occurred at Ms. Little’s home on September 5,1985, at approximately 2:30 A.M.
The PCR judge found that respondent received ineffective assistance of counsel for two reasons: (1) defense counsel failed to contact Ms. Jolley to ascertain the circumstances of the forgery charges; and (2) the possibility of a valid double jeopardy defense was not investigated nor explained to the respondent by defense counsel.
In post-conviction proceedings the burden is on the applicant to prove the allegations in his application. Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 334 S.E. (2d) 813 (1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1094, 106 S. Ct. 869, 88 L. Ed. (2d) 908 (1986). “In reviewing post-conviction relief cases, this Court is limited to determining if there is any evidence to support the PCR judge’s findings of fact.” Stone v. State, 294 S.C. 286; 363 S.E. (2d) 903, 286 (1988). If any evidence of probative value exists on the record, this evidence is sufficient to uphold the PCR judge’s findings on appeal. Griffin v. Warden, 277 S.C. 288, 286 S.E. (2d) 145 (1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 942, 103 S. Ct. 255, 74 L. Ed. (2d) 199 (1982).
*302In order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel, respondent must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the respondent of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. (2d) 674 (1984); Butler v. State, supra.
There is evidence in the record indicating defense counsel’s failure to conduct adequate investigations. It is undisputed that respondent’s mother, the prosecuting witness, did not want her son prosecuted on charges of forgery at the time of the guilty plea. Defense counsel could easily have investigated and discovered this fact and taken appropriate actions.
There is also ample evidence in the record to support the PCR judge’s finding that the respondent did not receive the effective assistance of counsel in regard to his conviction on one of the burglary charges. The theory of double jeopardy consists of protection from prosecution for the same offense after conviction. State v. Dasher, 278 S.C. 454, 298 S.E. (2d) 215 (1982). Because the incident which gave rise to respondent’s conviction in magistrate court was the same incident for which respondent pled guilty in circuit court, defense counsel should have investigated the possibility that respondent had already been prosecuted for the offense involving Ms. Little. Information regarding the first conviction was readily discoverable from a review of the commitment form, which noted that respondent had been sentenced in magistrate court for an offense which occurred at the exact time of the incident to which respondent subsequently pled guilty in circuit court.
The record establishes a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the respondent would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. (2d) 203 (1985). Thus, prejudice to the respondent is evident.
Based on the record and our standard of review, we conclude that there is ample evidence to support the PCR judge’s findings.
Accordingly, the order of the PCR court is affirmed.
*303Harwell, Chandler and Toal, JJ., concur. Gregory, C.J., dissenting in separate opinion.The record does not reflect the details of this incident; but the indictment charged as follows: “the accused did commit the crime of housebreaking by... breaking] and entering] in the nighttime the said residence of Rosa Little by taking out the screen and opening her bedroom windows.”