dissenting.
Baker lifted up the edge of the plywood covering the trash chute opening and stepped forward to push the plywood up while it blocked his view of where he was stepping. He blindly walked into the opening and fell through because he never looked under the plywood to see that the opening in the concrete floor lay beneath. Baker knew when he lifted up the plywood that Harcon, Inc. had framed the floor to leave an opening in that area for the trash chute. He knew because he was the construction supervisor who told Harcon to frame out the *757trash chute opening. He knew because he marked the location on the floor where he directed Harcon to frame the trash chute opening. He knew because he saw the framed-out opening in the floor at that location before the concrete was poured around it. Moreover, when Baker saw the plywood which covered the trash chute opening, it was plainly visible that there was no uncovered trash chute opening in the area, so he had to know there was a covered or obscured opening somewhere in the area. These are undisputed facts.
Decided March 30, 2010 Reconsideration denied April 14, 2010. Wilson & Epstein, Warner R. Wilson, Jr., for appellants.“As a matter of contributory negligence, it is the rule in this state that, if the plaintiff, in the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the accident, he is denied recovery. OCGA § 51-11-7.” Union Camp Corp. v. Helmy, 258 Ga. 263, 267 (367 SE2d 796) (1988). Even if Harcon was negligent or violated OSHA regulations by covering the trash chute opening with the plywood, the above facts plainly, palpably, and undisputably show that ordinary care required Baker to simply look under the plywood for the opening he knew was located in that area before blindly walking forward. His failure to do so was contributory negligence which barred his recovery as a matter of law. Englehart v. OKI America, 209 Ga. App. 151, 154 (433 SE2d 331) (1993).
I agree with the special concurrence that Englehart should not be disapproved or overruled, and that, contrary to the majority opinion, Englehart did not hold or suggest that every construction worker who takes a step on a job site without first looking has failed as a matter of law to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. Englehart held that an experienced construction worker, who was working on the second floor of a building where several openings were placed in the floor for the eventual installation of heating and air conditioning systems, failed as a matter of law to exercise ordinary care for his own safety when he removed plywood covering one of the openings and stepped into the opening. Id. at 151, 153-154. In the present case, Baker undisputably had knowledge that the trash chute opening was in the area where he lifted up the plywood. Accordingly, the present facts make a stronger case for finding contributory negligence than those in Englehart, and demand the conclusion that Baker failed as a matter of law to exercise ordinary care for his own safety. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Harcon. I respectfully dissent.
*758Gray, Rust, St. Amand, Moffett & Brieske, Michael J. Rust, Korey M. Carter, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Frank M. Lowrey TV, for appellee.