A proceeding for a writ of mandate was instituted in the Superior Court of Fresno County to set aside an order of the California State Board of Optometry revoking appellant’s certificate of registration to practice optometry in the state of California. After a hearing the superior court rendered its judgment denying the relief sought and discharging the alternative writ of mandate and the temporary restraining order previously issued against the board. It is from this judgment that an appeal is brought to this court.
The board of optometry made an order revoking appellant’s license after a hearing as provided by sections 3090-3091 of the Business and Professions Code. The complaint before the board alleged violation by appellant of sections 3098 and 3125 of the same code and the board.determined on the evidence introduced that appellant had violated the provisions of said sections.
After the filing of the petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, the respondent board made a motion to strike certain portions thereof and the motion was granted in part. Included in the portions stricken was that part of the prayer which read ‘ ‘. . . and that this court have a hearing and trial de nova.” The only evidence considered by the superior court was the record of the proceedings had before the board, and on this evidence the court concluded that the appellant had violated sections 3098 and 3125.
On the authority of the eases of Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13 Cal. (2d) 75 [87 Pac. (2d) 848], and McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal. (2d) 741 [91 Pac. (2d) 1035, 123 A. L. R. 1205], appellant insists that he had the right to require the trial court in the mandamus proceeding to conduct what would be in substance and effect a trial de nova, in the course of which the parties would not be limited to the record made before the board. We have assumed from the record and for the purpose of this decision that the trial court denied appellant the right to introduce any new and material evidence and compelled him to submit his case solely upon the record and proceedings before the board of optometry. The validity of the judgment appealed from therefore hinges upon the action of the trial court deny*834ing the appellant the right to introduce such evidence. If the order of the trial court in this respect was proper, then the judgment should be affirmed. On the other hand, if the trial court was in error in denying appellant such right, the judgment should be reversed.
The specific ruling in the Drummey case was that on a proceeding in mandate in a superior court questioning the validity of an order by an administrative board revoking or suspending a license to practice a profession, the court had the power to exercise an independent judgment on all of the material facts relative to the issue of whether the petitioner had violated the particular sections of the act governing that particular profession. In the exercise of such independent judgment it was held that the court must consider all material evidence and was not confined to the record of the proceedings before the board. If the court were so confined, it would not be exercising an independent judgment on all the facts material to the issue. It was further held that such independent judgment on the facts by a court was necessary because the entire judicial power of the state is vested in certain enumerated courts by article III, section 1, and article VI, section 1, of the Constitution of this state, and also because the person whose license had been revoked or suspended by the action of the board would otherwise be deprived of a property right without due process of law as guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions.
The necessity for the exercise of an independent judgment on the facts and the receipt of any material evidence regardless of the record of the proceedings before the board is apparent from the following facts. The powers of the government of the state are divided into three separate departments — the legislative, executive and judicial. (Article III, section 1, of the state Constitution.) State-wide judicial power may be exercised by only three enumerated courts, viz., the Supreme Court, the District Courts of Appeal, and the superior courts. (Article VI, section 1, of the state Constitution.) No other body can exercise state-wide judicial power except as the result of constitutional amendment. (Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 319 [153 Pac. 24]; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407 [156 Pac. 491, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 390].) If, therefore, some agency with state-wide jurisdiction, other than one of the enumerated courts, without sanction by constitutional amendment, exer*835cises or attempts to exercise judicial power, such action is in direct violation of the articles of the state Constitution cited above.
It is true that there can be no complete separation of powers of government in an ever changing social order. It is equally true that each department for its own existence must in some degree exercise some of the functions of the others. That there can be no rigid line over which one department cannot traverse has been recognized since the first test of the doctrine of separation of powers. There still remains, however, this unalterable fact: When one department or an agency thereof exercises the complete power that has been by the Constitution expressly limited to another, then such action violates the implied mandate of the Constitution. If, in the instant case, the superior court in the mandate proceedings were limited to the evidence presented before the board, or if the findings of fact by the board were conclusive on the court, then the board would be exercising the complete judicial power reserved to the enumerated courts. The appellant’s right to practice optometry was a vested property right. (Hewitt v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590 [84 Pac. 39, 113 Am. St. Rep. 315, 7 Ann. Cas. 750, 3 L. R. A. (N.S.), 896]; Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247 [187 Pac. 965].) In the proceeding against him by the board all the rights of “procedural” due process were accorded him, viz., notice, right to appear and answer the charges made against him. Witnesses were subpoenaed and evidence was taken. A reporter was present and a record made of the whole proceedings. At the conclusion of the hearing an order was made revoking appellant’s license to practice. This then would be an exercise of the complete judicial power that was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, and appellant would be deprived of his constitutional right unless he had a right to go into a court of law and question the validity of that order by the introduction of any material evidence to prove that he did not commit the acts alleged.
This problem is not a new one and on numerous occasions the courts of this state have been called upon to prevent the complete extinction of the doctrine of separation of powers. In the early case of Pryor v. Downey, 50 Cal. 388 [19 Am. Rep. 656], in declaring a statute unconstitutional which attempted to validate a judgment of a court void for want of *836jurisdiction, the court stated at page 403: “The Legislature of California cannot exercise any judicial function, and no person in this State can be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” And again at page 406: “If we assume the act to have validated the Forster sale . . . then the lands which up to the date of the act . . . belonged to the heirs of Nathaniel M. Pryor, from that date became the property of other persons, and this transfer was accomplished by the legislative act alone. And even if we could indulge the fiction that the parties to be deprived of their estates had notice of the intended act, and a hearing and opportunity to produce witnesses, or to show cause why the act should not be passed, this would have been a species of trial, and the exercise of judicial power hy the Legislature.” [Emphasis added.] And again at page 408: “. . . A judgment must be the result ‘of due inquiry, sufficient to satisfy the discretion and convince the judgment of the officer of the law, in whom the authority and jurisdiction to decide the questions involved have been duly vested.’ (Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen, (Mass.) [361] 380 [79 Am. Dec. 784].)” [Emphasis added.] Chief Justice Beatty in a concurring opinion in Glide v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. 21 [81 Pac. 225], makes the following pertinent observation at page 30: “Vested rights of property and contract rights are placed by the constitution under the protection of the courts, where alone the questions of law and fact upon which they depend can be finally decided.” In Chinn v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. 478 [105 Pac. 580], a statute provided for the formation of an irrigation district, with the right of appeal to the superior court. The superior court refused to act on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional as in violation of article VI, section 1. Mandate was brought to force the superior court to act. The writ was denied and the act held unconstitutional, the court stating at page 480: “It is a well-recognized principle that where the judicial power of courts, either original or appellate, is fixed by constitutional provisions, the legislature cannot either limit or extend that jurisdiction.” Again, in the case of Griffin v. City of Los Angeles, 134 Cal. App. 763 [26 Pac. (2d) 655], it is stated at page 771: “The jurisdiction of superior courts is conferred by the constitution, and cannot be taken away by any act of the legislature. (City of Tulare v. Hevren, 126 Cal. 226 [58 Pac. 530].) ”
The language found in that group of cases involving ques*837tians which arose after the passage of the Workmen’s Compensation, Insurance, and Safety Act of 1913 conclusively determines the issue under discussion here. In annulling an award made by the Industrial Accident Commission because the injury did not arise “in the course of” the employment, the court in the case of Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 319 [153 Pac. 24], had occasion to refer to the constitutional provision giving the legislature the power to create the Industrial Accident Commission and also to article VI, section 1. On page 322 is found the following statement: “The constitutional provision is that the legislature may 'create and enforce a liability on the part of all employers to compensate their employees for any injury incurred by the said employees in the course of their employment.’ It proceeds to declare that the legislature may establish an industrial accident board and empower it to settle disputes concerning the liability which the legislature may create under the authority so given. (Article XX, section 21.) This action by such board would be an exercise of judicial power. For that purpose it is, in legal effect, a court. Section 1 of article VI vests the judicial power of the state 'in the senate, sitting as a court of impeachment, in a supreme court, district courts of appeal, superior courts,’ and such inferior local courts as the legislature may establish. Under this provision the legislature would be without authority to give judicial power to any general state board or tribunal. Except for local purposes the section disposes of the whole judicial power of the state and vests all of it in the courts expressly named therein, leaving none at the disposal of the legislature. Authority to the legislature to create another state tribunal and vest it with judicial power over this new class of cases must be sought for elsewhere in the constitution. It is found only in the aforesaid section 21 of article XX. It follows that this section measures and limits the legislative power in that respect . . .” [Emphasis added.]
The case of Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407 [156 Pac. 491, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 390], is also of particular interest because of statements of the reasons why the action of the Industrial Accident Commission is an exercise of judicial power as stated in the Pacific Coast ease, supra. The court points out that the commission has power to administer oaths, issue subpoenas, take testimony and punish for contempt. Notice is served on the adverse party *838and he is given opportunity to answer. After hearing by the commission, it makes and files its findings of facts and its award. The findings are “conclusive and final.” The court states at pages 412-413: “The commission, in exercising these powers, is performing precisely the same functions that are performed by any court in passing upon questions brought before it. . . . The Industrial Accident Commission is given the power to make binding orders or judgments. . . .
“In the absence of a special enabling provision of the constitution, judicial power could not be vested in the Industrial Accident Commission. Section 1 of article VI of the constitution provides that [quoting the provision]. It is clear that the Industrial Accident Commission is not one of the courts thus designated. It is equally clear that the grant contained in the section of the constitution jtost cited, unless modified by other constitutional provisions, is exclusive.” [Emphasis added.] The court concludes, however, that section 21 of article XX sufficiently modifies section 1 of article VI to permit the Industrial Accident Commission to act as a court.
The language quoted from the above cited eases may be directly applied to the instant situation. The only factual distinction is that in the Industrial Accident Commission hearings the rights of two individuals were involved, whereas in the board hearing in the instant ease the state or an agency thereof is acting against one individual. 'However, in both situations there exists the issue of the deprivation of a property right and the vested interest remains the same whether one private individual is aligned against another or one against the state. Because the state institutes the action it does not follow that the person against whom the action is brought may be finally deprived of a personal or property right by a body other than a court.
The cases involving the powers of the Water Commission are equally applicable to the instant situation. These cases are referred to in the Drummey case, supra, and also in the case of Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 6 Cal. (2d) 557 [59 Pac. (2d) 119], which held that certiorari would not lie to review the rulings of administrative boards. The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Shaw in Tulare Water Co. v. State Water Commission, 187 Cal. 533 [202 Pac. 874], is particularly relied on and is of sufficient materiality *839to be directly quoted here. At page 542 the Chief Justice states: “If the Water Commission is acting judicially it is doing so because it is determining the rights and titles of individuals to private real property, and in that capacity it would be acting as a court as fully as a court of general jurisdiction would be acting when it adjudicates the title to real property. (Citing cases.) ”
11 The effect of section 1, article VI, aforesaid, is to vest in the courts therein mentioned the entire judicial power of the state. It is not within the power of the legislature to vest in any other body any general judicial power to establish and declare the right and title to private property. The Water Commission is not one of the superior courts of the state and could not be made such court or be given the powers thereof, and it is not an inferior court with jurisdiction limited to incorporated cities, or towns, townships, counties, or cities and counties. On the contrary, its jurisdiction is statewide. Consequently, it is not a court which comes within the purview of said section 1 and it is not within the power of the legislature to give that commission such judicial power. (Western etc. Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 413 [Ann. Cas. 1917E, 390, 156 Pac. 491]; Pacific etc. Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 322 [153 Pac. 24].)”
This concurring opinion in the Tulare Water Co. case was expressly approved in Mojave River Irrigation District v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 717 [262 Pac. 724]. In that case a petition for prohibition was brought to prevent the superior court from reviewing an order of the Department of Public Works (Water Division) as provided by section lb of the Water Commission Act. The writ was granted on the ground that the review provided could neither be on certiorari or appeal. It was further determined that the action in the superior court could not be regarded as an original proceeding because the evidence that could be introduced was limited as was the judgment that could be rendered.
Both of the preceding cases were subsequently approved in the case of Yuba River Power Co. v. Nevada Irr. Dist., 207 Cal. 521 [279 Pac. 128]. In that case the plaintiff had applications for appropriation pending and brought suit to quiet title to determine adverse claims to the water so sought as between itself and an upper claimant. In reversing a judgment based upon an order sustaining a demurrer by the *840trial court, this court stated at page 525: “The court in said cause (Tulare Water Co. v. State Water Com., supra) further clearly intimated that neither the question of priority between claimants nor the existence or nonexistence of unappropriated waters in a stream were questions to be finally determined by the water commission. The effect of this holding was sought to be obviated by the enactment of a new section, known as lb (Stats. 1923, p. 162), providing for a hearing by the superior court upon applications for permits to appropriate water. This court, in Mojave River Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. 717 [262 Pac. 724], declared said enactment invalid and sustained the pronouncements of the court in Tulare Water Co. v. State Water Com., supra, to the effect that no judicial power had been or could be lawfully conferred upon the state water commission or its successor. This doctrine is also set forth in Department of Public Works v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. 215 [239 Pac. 1076].)”
The above group of cases cannot be distinguished from the situation in the instant case. Just as a vested property right was there involved so here a vested property right is in existence. Such right cannot be finally destroyed by a nonjudicial body if the action of that body is questioned in a court of law in a mandate proceeding.
The cases interpreting the State Bar Act strengthen our conviction that if finality were given to the action of an administrative agency, such would be an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. In the case of In re Shattuck, 208 Cal. 6 [279 Pac. 998], the constitutionality of the State Bar Act as it read in 1927 was attacked as giving judicial power to the Board of Bar Governors. The act nominally gave the Board of Bar Governors power to disbar or suspend. Section 26 of the State Bar Act provided that “Any person so disbarred or suspended may, within sixty days after the filing of said certified copy of said decision, petition said supreme court to review said decision.” The court in commenting on this section stated at pages 8-9: “The term ‘review’ as used in this and in certain other portions of the act we do not understand to bear the limited significance attributed to the ‘writ of review or certiorari’ as the same is defined and the functions thereof stated in section 1067 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure. To give it such limited meaning would result not only in narrowing the powers of this *841court to the single issue of jurisdiction in the board to make such order, but would also be to consider said board as being invested with judicial functions which, under the inhibition of section 1 of article III of the state Constitution, the legislative department of the state government has no power to repose in such a board. The review of the evidence, findings and conclusions of the Board of Bar Governors which this term contemplates consists, and should consist, in a re-examination by this court of the entire record of the proceedings before said board as these are required to be kept and in due course transmitted to this court under the provisions of section 26 of the State Bar Act.” That the findings of the Board of Bar Governors, although based on conflicting evidence, are not binding on this court; that the court can and sometimes has refused to sustain the findings of the board; and that the court can and does pass upon the weight of the evidence by a review of the whole record is now well established, and it has been so stated in numerous cases. (In re Stafford, 208 Cal. 738 [284 Pac. 670]; Fish v. State Bar, 214 Cal. 215 [4 Pac. (2d) 937]; Clark v. State Bar, 214 Cal. 281 [4 Pac. (2d) 944]; Bentson v. State Bar, 216 Cal. 58 [13 Pac. (2d) 512].) It should be noted here that in disciplinary proceedings this court has confined itself to the record of the proceedings before the Board of Bar Governors. This may be said to be due to the fact that the board is an administrative arm of this court [Fish v. State Bar, supra], and has no effect on our conclusion that in situations snch as the instant one a court may consider any new material evidence.
Such cases as Suckow v. Alderson, 182 Cal. 247 [187 Pac. 965]; Brecheen v. Riley, 187 Cal. 121 [200 Pac. 1042]; Cuffield v. Board of Dental Examiners, 12 Cal. App. (2d) 446 [55 Pac. (2d) 522]; Fuller v. Board, of Medical Examiners, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 734 [59 Pac. (2d) 171], and many earlier eases decided by the various District Courts of Appeal do not affect the views previously expressed. Those cases were considered on review by certiorari and were decided before the the case of Standard Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, became final. [The Fuller case was decided one day after the decision of the Standard Oil Co. case, but no petition for a hearing was made in that ease to this court.] The Standard Oil Co. case decided that certiorari was not and constitutionally could not be the proper method of review. *842That case quotes at length from the case of Van Camp S. F. Co. v. Fish & Game Commission, 75 Cal. App. 764 [243 Pac. 702], wherein it was stated at page 767: “Except for local purposes the section [State Const., art VI, see. 1] disposes of the whole judicial power of the state and vests all of it in the courts expressly named therein, leaving none at the disposal of the legislature.” The Standard Oil Co. case was followed by the ease of Whitten v. California State Board of Optometry, 8 Cal. (2d) 444 [65 Pac. (2d) 1296, 115 A. L. R. 1], in which it was expressly held at page 445 that “in the absence of a constitutional grant of judicial power a state board cannot exercise judicial functions and the legislature is powerless to confer such power upon it.” That case practically overrules the long list of cases relied upon by respondents, such as Suckow v. Alderson, supra, and kindred cases. The Drummey case, supra, holding that a court must exercise its independent judgment on the facts, logically followed the Whitten case.
In the case of Ray v. Parker, 15 Cal. (2d) 275 [101 Pac. (2d) 665], the constitutionality of the Milk Stabilization Act as a whole was under attack, as it had been in the earlier ease of Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brook, 13 Cal. (2d) 620 [91 Pac. (2d) 577]. The court held that, with the exception of the section giving the Director of Agriculture the power to fix damages under certain conditions, the act was a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state. Because of section 737.11 of the act, which gives the director the power to revoke or suspend a milk license “after due hearing upon a verified complaint signed and filed with the director by any interested person, ” it is argued that this case is thoroughly consistent with the respondents’ contention as hereinbefore set out. Neither the facts nor the law of the Ray case warrant this conclusion.
In the present case the board of optometry had made an order revoking the license of appellant. Appellant then instituted an action in the superior court contesting the validity of that order. The question on appeal before this court is the type or extent of “review” that should have been granted appellant in the superior court in determining the question of whether he had committed certain acts in violation of the provisions of the Optometry Act which would justify the revocation of his license. No order of revocation of any per*843son’s license had. been made by the Director of Agriculture in either the Bay case or the Jersey Maid case. Section 735.6 of the milk act provides that any order of the director “may be reviewed by any court of competent jurisdiction.” It would be only after an order of revocation of a license by the director and the contesting of that order by the aggrieved party in a superior court that the question of the scope of the “review” would become the same as that involved in the present case. On the authority of the Drummey case the only type of review that would afford appellant his full constitutional rights would be a complete trial de nova as outlined in the decision in that case. [13 Cal. (2d) 75, 87 Pac. (2d) 848.] It was there said at page 85: “The findings of the board come before the court with a strong presumption of their correctness, and the burden rests on the complaining party to convince the court that the board’s decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence. ’ ’ Undoubtedly, the court in this reference to the “evidence” contemplated not only the record of the proceedings before the board, but such additional evidence as either party desired to introduce before the trial court. It should be noted that the Bay case, supra,, cites and quotes from Agricultural Prorate Com. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. App. (2d) 518 [88 Pac. (2d) 253], in commenting on the type of “review” provided by section 735.6 of the milk act. The court in that case stated at page 524: “It is quite clear it was intended by the right of review that an interested party should have a right to put in issue before a superior court a question arising as a result of the promulgation of any order the commission might make.” After this quotation the Bay opinion cites the Standard Oil Co., Whitten, Drummey and McDonough cases, supra, which, of course, all stand for the propositions that an administrative board cannot exercise full judicial powers; that an administrative board cannot make conclusive findings of fact and thereon base an order which would deprive a person of a property right; and that such a person has the right to a trial de nova in a superior court. In view of the above, it seems idle to argue that the Bay case stands for just the contrary propositions.
Reference is made to the cases of Gaylord v. City of Pasadena, 175 Cal. 433 [166 Pac. 348]; Globe Cotton Oil Mills v. Zellerbach, 200 Cal. 276 [252 Pac. 1038]; and East Bay Mu*844nicipal Utility District v. Department of Public Works, 1 Cal. (2d) 476 [35 Pac. (2d) 1027], cited in the Ray opinion. The Gaylord ease involved the constitutionality of a local ordinance and the powers of the administrator thereunder. This fact alone is sufficient to render impotent any language in the ease which might tend to support the respondents’ position. However, this further observation should be made in regard to the Gaylord case. It is disclosed by the opinion that the findings of the city electrician were questioned in the superior court, and the court determined that the building installations were safe and were not dangerous to life or property. This finding was contrary to the findings made by the city electrician. In other words, the aggrieved party was given a trial de nova in the superior court when he contested the ruling of the administrative agent.
The East Bay Municipal Utility District case is relevant only for its quotation from the Gaylord case; therefore, no comment need be made on it.
The Globe Cotton Oil Mills ease is clearly distinguishable from the situation in the present ease. There the Fish and Game Commission had refused to act on an application for a permit authorizing the petitioner to use a certain quantity of fish in its reduction plant, on the ground that it would be exercising judicial functions to do so. This court ordered a writ of mandate to issue and held that such actions would not transgress upon the exclusive functions of the judicial department. Here we have a “refusal to issue” not a “revocation,” and thus, as was determined in the McDonough case, supra, no property right was involved. But more than that, the petitioner was not contesting the findings of the commission and the order based thereon, but was merely requesting that the commission act in the first instance.
In regard to the numerous eases containing language to the effect that administrative agencies may make findings of fact and the reasons of expediency given therefor, it must again be pointed out that it is not the fact-finding power alone that is involved in the present situation. It is the facts found plus the order based thereon depriving a person of a property right which is the full exercise of the judicial power. If one whose license has been revoked fails to question the order in a court of law, then, of course, the ruling of the administrative board will stand because such failure is an admission of violation. However, if the order is questioned in a *845court of law, then under the Constitution of this state the petitioner must be given a trial de nova on the issues involved.
Up to this point the discussion has been devoted primarily to the necessity of a trial de nova because of the provisions of article III, section 1, and article VI, sgetion 1, of the Constitution of this state. A further reason and one of equal strength is that if binding fact-finding power is conferred upon purely administrative boards, and if the courts in reviewing the administrative boards’ actions do not exercise an independent judgment on the facts as well as on the law, the due process provisions of both the federal and state Constitutions will have been violated. In support of this proposition the Drummey case, supra, cites the cases of Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 [40 S. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908]; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 [52 S. Ct. 285, 76 L. Ed. 598]; and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 [56 8. Ct. 720, 80 L. Ed. 1033]. The actual holdings of those cases and the strength of such holdings in view of numerous other and conflicting opinions by the Supreme Court of the United States (See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co., 18 How. (U. S.) 272 [15 L. Ed. 372]; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548 [17 S. Ct. 966, 42 L. Ed. 270]; Interstate Com. Comm. v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541, 547 [32 S. Ct. 108, 56 L. Ed. 308]; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131,133 [44 S. Ct. 260, 68 L. Ed. 590]; Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U. S. 280 [56 S. Ct. 190, 80 L. Ed. 229]; Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 304 [57 S. Ct. 478, 81 L. Ed. 659]) have been the subject of much discussion by leading authorities in the field of administrative law.
The Crowell v. Benson case, supra, has been considerably weakened by the case of South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U. S. 251 [60 S. Ct. 544, 84 L. Ed. 732]. In the Benson ease the court, per Hughes, C. J., held that there were two jurisdictional” questions of fact: (1) whether the injury occurred upon navigable waters and (2) whether the relationship of master and servant existed, that could not be conclusively determined by the administrative agent. Yet in the South Chicago ease, also written by the Chief Justice, the question of fact of whether a man was a member of the crew of a certain vessel was held to be a question to be finally determined by the administrative agent. It is difficult to recognize any distinction between this latter question of fact and *846the so-called “jurisdictional” facts mentioned above. Obviously, if the man was a member of the crew of the vessel, the administrative agent would not have jurisdiction to make an award under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act. [44 Stat. 1424; 33 U. S. C. and U. S. C. Supp. IV, sec. 901 et seq.]
The opinion in the Drummey case, supra, recognized that there was some confusion in the federal cases, and it must be admitted that the cited cases appear to be exceptions to the general rule which gives federal administrative agencies the power to make conclusive findings of fact. However, this does not detract from the strength of the language of these cases when applied to the question of the powers of state-wide administrative agencies as controlled by the provisions of the Constitution of this state. Article III, section 1, of the federal Constitution vests the judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court and “in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain, and establish.” Under the federal Constitution then, with the exception of the Supreme Court, there are no enumerated courts. Therefore, the question of whether a certain inferior body created by Congress is exercising judicial power becomes relatively unimportant for the reason that if it is acting in a judicial capacity, it may be classified as one of the “inferior courts” which Congress is given the power to create. On the other hand, as previously pointed out, under the Constitution of this state, there are certain enumerated courts which may alone exercise statewide judicial power to the exclusion of all other bodies. Therefore, if a body other than one of the enumerated courts makes findings of fact; on those findings determines that the provisions of a certain statute have been violated; and issues an order or renders a judgment which has the effect of depriving a person of a valuable property right, such action denies the aggrieved party the due process of law guaranteed to him by the state and federal Constitutions, unless such action by such body may be questioned in a court of law. It should always be kept in mind that the evil of administrative action which must be guarded against is not the fact-finding power, but the conclusiveness of the fact-finding power coupled with the order based on the findings made which would deprive a person of a property right. Such is the full exercise of judicial power, and such power in this state can be exercised only by one of the enumerated courts. The language *847of the federal cases cited in the Drummey case, supra, is therefore peculiarly applicable to the powers of restriction on the powers of state-wide administrative boards under the state Constitution. On page 85 of the Drummey case is found a quotation from the case of St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, supra. The quotation is concluded with the following sentence: “Under our system there is no warrant for the view that the judicial power of a competent court can be circumscribed by any legislative arrangement designed to give effect to administrative action going beyond the limits of constitutional authority. ’ ’ Regardless • of the strength or weakness of that sentence in relation to federal administrative agencies, it may be directly applied to administrative agencies of this state. The state Constitution limits the exercise of judicial power to the enumerated courts. The federal cases previously cited, which hold that federal administrative boards may make conclusive findings of fact, are therefore not controlling on this court when the power of a state administrative board is in question.
The distinction between the powers of state-wide administrative boards and federal administrative boards is also existent between boards with state-wide authority in this state and local bodies created by the legislature. By article VI, section 1, of the state Constitution, the judicial power of the state is vested in the enumerated courts, municipal courts as may be established, and “such inferior courts as the legislature may establish in any incorporated city or town, township, county or city and county. ’ ’ This latter provision is similar to the provision in the federal Constitution. Therefore, it has been held that the rulings of local boards acting in a judicial capacity may be reviewed on certiorari. (See Imperial Water Co. No. 1 v. Board of Supervisors, 162 Cal. 14 [120 Pac. 780]; Miller & Lux v. Board of Supervisors, 189 Cal.1 254 [208 Pac. 304]; Ludolph v. Board of Police Commrs., 30 Cal. App. (2d) 211 [86 Pac. (2d) 118]; Nider v. City Commission, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 14 [97 Pac. (2d) 293].) That the rulings of local bodies might be reviewed certiorari was recognized in both the Standard Oil Co. and Drummey cases. Cases in other states holding that state-wide administrative agencies might exercise judicial power and that their rulings might be reviewed on certiorari may be distinguished on the same ground. The Supreme Court of Arizona in the recent case of Batty v. Arizona State Dental Board, 57 Ariz.-[112 *848Pac. (2d) 870], so held and criticized the Standard Oil Co. case. However, the court failed to consider the difference between the provisions of article VI, section 1, of the California Constitution and article VI, section 1, of the Arizona Constitution. The latter provides: “The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, superior courts, justices of the peace, and such courts inferior to the superior courts as may be provided by law.” This provision is quite similar to that of the federal Constitution [art. 1, see. 1] but is clearly distinguishable from article VI, section 1, of the Constitution of this state, which confers upon the legislature the power to establish inferior courts only with local jurisdiction.
Respondent board urges that by not providing for a court hearing after determination by the board, the legislature intended that the board’s action should be final or at least that a court should be confined to a consideration of the evidence introduced at the hearing before the board. As evidence of the legislative intent in such matters, we have only to refer to the act of the last legislature in proposing to the voters of the state a constitutional amendment [Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 8] which purports to give to the legislature the right “to confer power on administrative officers, boards or commissions to make decisions.” If this proposed amendment is adopted by the people, it will authorize the legislature to confer upon such administrative bodies the right to exercise judicial power, the same power the respondent board claims the legislature now possesses. Obviously, the legislature in proposing said constitutional amendment was of the opinion that it now has no such power.
Other questions were raised in the briefs and on oral argument, but they are of minor importance and their determination would in no way affect our decision in this case. In consideration of our decision that the trial court erroneously denied appellant the right to introduce material and competent evidence át the trial of this action in the superior court, it is our opinion that the judgment should be reversed, and it is so ordered.
Shenk, J., Houser, J., and Carter, J., concurred.