Margaret E. Payne, the plaintiff-appellant, and A. C. Payne, the defendant-respondent in this matter, were divorced in Lane County, Oregon, on May 4, 1953.
Prior thereto and in contemplation of a severance of their marital union, the parties entered into a separation and property settlement agreement on April 23, 1953. This, among other things, provided for alimony in the amount of $10,000 and certain divisions of property. The agreement was approved by the court in the divorce decree and declared binding upon both parties.
Mrs. Payne, more than two years after the entry of decree in the divorce matter, instituted the instant suit for the purpose of rescinding the agreement of April 23, 1953. She alleges that the settlement agreement was grossly inadequate and unfair and was not the act of the plaintiff. Her prayer is for a redetermination of the financial status of the parties as of the date of the settlement agreement, and predicated upon such findings, for an order equitably redistribuí*414ing the assets. In essence, she seeks a modification of the divorce decree, for such -would he the result to the extent her prayer for relief was granted. From a decree dismissing her complaint, the plaintiff appeals.
In view of the reasons for our holding, it is unnecessary for v. to supply a recital of plaintiff’s alleged reasons for bringing this suit.
Beginning with Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Or. 141, 149, 60 P 597, 61 P 136, 48 LRA 766, this court for more than a half century has consistently held that a decree approving and carrying into effect the terms of an agreement between husband and wife respecting a property settlement which has been approved by the court cannot thereafter be modified by the court without the consent of the parties. Geis v. Gallus, 130 Or 619, 278 P 969; Beaman v. DeShazor, Jr., 197 Or 669, 674, 255 P2d 157; Feves v. Feves, 198 Or 151, 160, 254 P2d 694. An exception, however, is made to the rule respecting possible modification of that part of a settlement relating to alimony. Prime v. Prime, 172 Or 34, 49, 139 P2d 550; Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Or 193, 196, 165 P2d 772, 166 ALR 666.
Eequests for modifications of divorce decrees are addressed to the court granting the decree. To the limited extent that plaintiff may prove herself entitled to such modifications, she should seek her relief in the original divorce proceeding.
Affirmed.
*415William K. Shepherd, Portland, for the petition.