On Appellant’s Petition for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
The petitioner argues that the effect of our original opinion (215 Or 412, 332 P2d 1075) is to hold that a property settlement agreement made in contemplation of a divorce is never subject to challenge or rescission if its execution was induced by fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence. We of course recognize the rule that the remedy of rescission is open to a party who has been induced to enter into a settlement agreement by inequitable conduct of the other party. *416Beaman v. DeShazor, Jr., 197 Or 669, 675, 255 P2d 157; Taylor v. Taylor, 154 Or 442, 445, 60 P2d 942; Feves v. Feves, 198 Or 151, 159, 254 P2d 694. While the allegations of the amended complaint in this case intended to charge misrepresentations, coercion, nndne influence and duress on the part of the defendant are of a somewhat nebulous character, yet in the absence of demurrer, we have concluded that they are sufficient. We, therefore, withdraw our former opinion, and have re-examined the testimony to determine whether the charges are sustained.
We are confirmed in our former conclusion that the plaintiff’s suit is without merit. There is a complete absence of proof that plaintiff’s execution was the product of misrepresentation, coercion, undue influence or duress upon the part of the defendant. It was she who initiated the divorce proceedings in February, 1954. The negotiations for the settlement reached late in April of that year were the result of many conferences in the intervening time, with ample opportunity to her for investigation, inquiry and reflection, and with no record of defendant’s refusal to make a full disclosure of his financial status. We note, too, that at approximately the time the agreement was signed, defendant suggested a reconciliation.
We are not impressed with the claim that plaintiff’s mental health during this period had any bearing on the ultimate outcome. Although there was no medical testimony of any kind, we have no doubt that Mrs. Payne was nervous and upset, but, apparently, to no greater degree than a normally sensitive person would be when confronted with a domestic crisis of this kind, and never to the extent that it impaired her competency to negotiate as she did.
The petition is denied.