¶ 1 Defendant Kathy Sparks appeals from a decision of the trial court granting sum*1045mary judgment in favor of plaintiff Malibu Investment Company on Malibu’s eviction claim under the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act, and denying her own motion for summary judgment under the state and federal fair housing acts.
BACKGROUND
¶2 On July 1, 1994, Kathy Sparks purchased a mobile home located at Malibu’s Byde-A-Wyle Haciendas Mobile Home Park (the “Park”). That same day, Sparks entered into a month-to-month agreement with the Park to lease the space on which her mobile home was located. The lease agreement required Sparks to abide by the Park’s rules and regulations, which were attached to the lease agreement. She signed a copy of the rules and regulations, acknowledging that she read and understood them.
¶3 From the date she signed her lease, Sparks resided at the Park with her two daughters. In December 1996, one of Sparks’ daughters gave birth to a baby boy. The Park manager was aware that the child resided in Sparks’ mobile home with Sparks and her two daughters.
¶ 4 In March 1997, pursuant to the lease agreement which permitted the adoption of new rules at any time, the Park adopted new rules that were scheduled to take effect in May 1997. Sparks received a copy of the new rules and regulations, and she acknowledges that she read and understood them.
¶ 5 On July 9, 1997, the Park served Sparks with two notices of rules violations — a seven-day notice and a sixty-day notice— both signed by the manager of the Park. Both notices informed Sparks that she was in violation of numerous Park rules related to the repair and maintenance of her mobile home and mobile home space.
¶6 The seven-day notice listed fourteen rules violations related to repair and maintenance. After enumerating the specific rules that Sparks allegedly violated, the notice explicitly instructed Sparks to remove nonpatio furniture from her deck, resod the yard, trim a tree that was overgrown onto a neighbor’s property, replace a broken back door, remove hard water stains from windows, replace broken windows, replace broken shutters, remove a run-down wooden fence from the back yard, clean and paint an air conditioner, replace a damaged water heater door, replace damaged siding, sweep out a gutter, keep the lawn trimmed, and stop parking a car on the grass. After listing these numerous maintenance violations, the notice also included a provision stating:
You are violating Rule 7 # 3 because you have more people living in the home than you are registered with. This rule says that no occupation by more than one family without permittion from management [sic]. You must cure this by removing evry body [sic] except for you & your 2 daughters.
The seven-day notice further stated that if Sparks failed to either cure the violations within seven days or obtain a written agreement with the Park allowing for a variance, the Park would commence eviction proceedings against her pursuant to the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-16-1 to -15.1 (1994 & Supp.1999). The sixty-day notice listed numerous additional rules violations and also afforded Sparks the opportunity to seek a variance from the rules or a variance from the time period she had to cure the violations.1
¶ 7 Sparks admits she neglected to cure all of the violations listed in the seven-day notice. Sparks also neglected to obtain a variance from the rules violations listed in the seven-day notice or from the seven-day cure period. Instead, she merely claims that she left a telephone message for the Park manager.2
*1046¶ 8 Accordingly, on July 25, 1997, Malibu filed a complaint in Third District Court seeking to evict Sparks from the Park for breach of the lease and failure to comply with the seven-day notice. On October 22, 1997, after the sixty-day period expired, Malibu amended its complaint to include Sparks’ failure to comply with the sixty-day notice as additional grounds for eviction.3
¶ 9 Sparks defended against Malibu’s eviction action by contending that she did not breach her lease agreement. In the alternative, Sparks alleged that she was excused from complying with the two notices because the notices were (1) unconscionable, (2) a breach of contract, (3) a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (4) a violation of the state and federal fair housing acts. Sparks also filed a counterclaim setting forth discrimination claims under the fair housing acts. Malibu moved for summary judgment on its eviction claim on the basis of the undisputed fact that Sparks, by her own admission, failed to cure the many rule violations set forth in the seven-day and sixty-day notices. Additionally, Sparks filed her own motion for summary judgment on the fair housing violations she alleged in her counterclaim.
¶ 10 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Malibu on its eviction claim because of the undisputed facts that Sparks violated Park rules and failed to cure them.4 Additionally, the court concluded that the alleged fair housing violations were no defense to the eviction action: “[A]ny alleged discrimination does not estop the Park from terminating the leasehold for Mrs. Sparks’ failure to abide by the rules.” The court also denied Sparks’ motion for summary judgment on her fair housing counterclaim, concluding that Sparks lacked standing to pursue a claim under either fair housing act. Regardless of standing, the court also concluded that Sparks’ arguments under the fair housing acts “lack[ed] any factual or legal basis to grant summary judgment.”
¶ 11 Sparks appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Malibu on its claim to evict her and its denial of her motion for summary judgment on her fair housing counterclaim. Sparks contends that the trial court erred in granting Malibu’s motion for summary judgment because (1) issues of fact remain as to whether Malibu’s enforcement of its rules was unconscionable and in bad faith; and (2) Malibu’s fair housing act violations are a complete defense to eviction. In addition, Sparks alleges that the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment on her fair housing counterclaim because, she contends, the seven-day notice and Malibu’s rule restricting mobile home occupancy to one family violated the fair housing acts. Thus, the two issues we review are whether the trial court correctly concluded that Malibu was entitled to summary judgment on its eviction claim, and whether the trial court correctly concluded that Malibu did not violate the fair housing acts.
*1047STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 12 We review the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment for correctness and accord no deference to the trial court’s conclusions of law. See Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, ¶ 12, 979 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1999). A party is entitled to summary judgment only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
ANALYSIS
I. MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY ACT
¶ 13 Sparks claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Malibu on its eviction claim under the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act (the “MHPRA”). Sparks argues that summary judgment in favor of Malibu was error because she “substantially complied with all proper requests” listed in the seven-day notice. She also claims that issues of fact remain as to whether Malibu’s enforcement of its rules was in bad faith. We examine these allegations under the MHPRA.
A Substantial Compliance
¶ 14 The purpose of the MHPRA is twofold: first, to provide park owners with speedy and adequate remedies against residents who violate the terms of their tenancy; and second, to protect park residents from actual or constructive eviction by park owners. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-2 (1994). One of the protections afforded to park owners under the MHPRA is the ability to “promulgate rules related to the health, safety, and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and upkeep of such park.” Id. § 57-16-7(1)(a) (Supp.1999). The MHPRA also provides a procedure through which a park owner may enforce park rules, provided that the rules satisfy the requirements of section 57-16-7(l)(a). The MHPRA provides in pertinent part:
(1) An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a mobile home park may be terminated by mutual agreement or for any one or more of the following causes:
(a) failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home park rule:
(i) relating to repair, maintenance, or construction of awnings, skirting, decks, or sheds for a period of 60 days after receipt of a notice of noncompliance from the mobile home park; or
(ii) relating to any other park rule for a period of seven days after receipt of notice of noncomplianee from the mobile home park....
Id. § 57-16-5(l)(a). Thus, so long as the park rule at issue is “related to the health, safety, and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and upkeep of such park,” id. § 57-16-7(l)(a), the park owner may enforce the rule by serving a notice that complies with section 57-16-5(l)(a). The notice must “set forth the cause for the notice and, if the cause is one which can be cured, the time within which the resident has to cure.” Id. § 57-16-6(2). If the resident fails to cure a violation listed in a notice that meets these statutory requirements, a park owner may terminate the lease and commence eviction proceedings. See id. § 57-16-15.1.
¶ 15 In the case before us, Sparks admits that she failed to cure all of the violations listed in the seven-day notice within the seven-day period and that she failed to submit a written request for a variance. The seven-day notice directed that Sparks trim her tree so that it did not overhang a neighbor’s mobile home, pursuant to a Park rule stating that “[e]ach resident shall ... control the growth of all trees ... to preserve the appearance of the space and to avoid fire or other health and safety hazards.” Sparks admits that she failed to trim her tree within the seven-day period and that she did not obtain a variance allowing her more time to perform this task.
¶ 16 In addition, the seven-day notice directed Sparks to replace her damaged back door, replace broken windows, and clean and paint her air conditioner pursuant to a Park rule that states: “The exterior of the manufactured home, accessory structures and skirting must be maintained in a well kept fashion. No cracked glass, broken doors or *1048windows will be allowed.... Visible or unsightly rust, corrosion, fading, blistering, or cracking on painted surfaces is not allowed.” Sparks admits that she failed to cure these violations within the seven-day cure period. These rules regarding home and yard maintenance satisfy section 57-16-7(l)(a) because they are “related to the health, safety, and appropriate conduct of residents and to ... maintenance and upkeep.” Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-7(l)(a) (Supp.1999). Thus, these rules violations constituted undisputed justification for eviction pursuant to the MHPRA.5
¶ 17 Sparks’ contention that she has “substantially cured” the rules violations in the seven-day notice fails to satisfy her burden in responding to Malibu’s summary judgment motion. Even if we were to assume that she “substantially cured” the violations by curing some but not all of them, the MHPRA permits park owners to demand strict compliance with all legitimate park rules, as the court of appeals correctly recognized in Crescentwood Village, Inc. v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah Ct.App.1995).
B. Bad Faith
¶ 18 Sparks also contends on appeal that summary judgment was precluded because Malibu enforced Park rules in bad faith, in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Sparks’ bad faith defense is based in part on her belief that Malibu singled her out for violations that were widespread throughout the rest of the Park. In support of her bad faith defense, Sparks points to a “survey” of the Park that she conducted on February 16,1998, in which she discovered “many mobile homes in the Park that were in similar or worse condition than Kathy Sparks’ mobile home.” Sparks contends that her “survey” is sufficient to create an inference that Malibu evicted her in bad faith.
¶ 19 As a general rule, every contract is subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, under which both parties to a contract promise not to “intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party’s right to receive the fruits of a contract.” St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991). However, we also have stated that “we will not interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves. Nor will we construe the covenant ‘to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties.’ ” Brown v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998) (quoting Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991)) (other citations omitted).
¶ 20 The lease agreement between Sparks and Malibu permits Malibu to terminate the lease “unilaterally” for failure to follow Park rules. As we have concluded, Malibu’s eviction proceedings were proper under the lease and the MHPRA because Sparks failed to cure violations of Park rules and failed to submit a proper request for a variance. Moreover, nothing in the lease agreement or the MHPRA would require Malibu to commence eviction procedures against other residents of the Park prior to bringing an action to evict Sparks. Under these circumstances, Sparks’ “survey” of the Park is immaterial to whether Malibu is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its action to evict Sparks.6
II. FAIR HOUSING ACTS
¶ 21 We now examine whether the trial court properly found that Malibu did not *1049violate the Federal Fair Housing Act (the “FFHA” or “Title VHP), 42 U.S.CA. §§ 3601-3631 (1994),7 and the Utah Fair Housing Act (the “UFHA”), Utah Code Aim; §§ 57-2-1 to -14 (1994 & Supp.1999). Sparks contends that summary judgment in favor of Malibu on its eviction claim was error because Malibu violated the fair housing acts. She also alleges that the trial court erred in denying her own motion for summary judgment on her counterclaim for relief under the fair housing acts. Whether Malibu violated the fair housing acts is dispositive of both Sparks’ defense and counterclaim.
¶ 22 In her defense and counterclaim, Sparks contends that Malibu discriminated on the basis of “familial status” under the fair housing acts. “Familial status” discrimination, under both the FFHA and the UFHA, generally refers to discrimination in regard to housing against a child being domiciled with a parent or legal guardian.8 See 42 U.S.CA. § 3602(k) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-2(14) (Supp.1999). Sparks argues that Malibu discriminated against her grandchild on the basis of familial status by requiring her (in the seven-day notice) to remove everyone except for Sparks and her two daughters,9 and by establishing a rule restricting mobile home occupancy to one family per mobile home (the “one-family rule”),10 which allegedly discriminates against “multi-generation” families, such as that of Sparks. Specifically, Sparks contends that the seven-day notice is a “discriminatory action” in violation of section 3604(b) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(l)(b) of the UFHA, and that the notice and the one-family rule are “discriminatory statements” in violation of section 3604(c) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(2) of the UFHA. Before addressing either of these allegations and the corresponding statutes in detail, we must determine whether Sparks has standing to raise her defense or counterclaim under the FFHA and the UFHA.
A. Standing Under the Fair Housing Acts
¶23 The trial court determined that Sparks lacks standing to sue under the FFHA or the UFHA. Malibu contends that we should uphold the trial court on this issue because the definition of “familial status” under the acts does not include Sparks. According to Malibu’s argument, “familial status” refers to a child domiciled with a parent or guardian, and Sparks is not the parent or guardian of her adult daughter’s child. See 42 U.S.CA. § 3602(k) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-2(14) (1994). To determine *1050standing, we look to those provisions in the acts describing those who may bring suit.
¶ 24 Both the FFHA and the UFHA grant standing to “aggrieved person[s].” 42 U.S.C.A. § 3613(a)(1)(A) (1994); Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-12(1) (Supp.1999). The FFHA defines “aggrieved person” to include
any person who—
(1) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or
(2) believes that such person will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(i) (1994). Similarly, the UFHA defines the term to include
any person who:
(a) claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice; or
(b) believes that he will be injured by a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-2(1) (Supp.1999).
¶25 In the instant case, Sparks asserts that she has been, or will be, injured by Malibu’s discriminatory practices based on familial status because, as she alleges, Malibu’s seven-day notice mandated either the removal of her grandson or the eviction of Sparks, her two daughters, and her grandson. This alleged injury is sufficient to make Sparks an “aggrieved person” under the FFHA. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979); Mountain Side Mobile Estates v. Secretary of HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1249 (10th Cir.1995). We hold that such alleged injury is also sufficient to qualify Sparks as an “aggrieved person” under the UFHA. Thus, Sparks has standing to raise a defense or counterclaim under the FFHA and the UFHA. We next consider whether Sparks’ contentions under those acts withstand summary judgment.
B. Sparks’ Allegation of Discrimination Under Sections S604.(b) and 57-21-5(1) (b)
¶ 26 Sparks first asserts that Malibu took a discriminatory action on the basis of familial status, in violation of section 3604(b) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(l)(b) of the UFHA, when Malibu issued the seven-day notice. Section 3604(b) states that it shall be unlawful
(b) [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of sendees or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(b) (1994) (emphasis added). The analogous Utah provision, section 57-21-5(l)(b), states in pertinent part:
(1) It is a discriminatory housing practice to do any of the following because of a person’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, familial status, source of income, or disability:
[[Image here]]
(b) discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of the sale or rental of any dwelling or in providing facilities or services in connection with the dwelling....
Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-5(l)(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
¶ 27 Federal courts have explained that a plaintiff may recover under section 3604(b) by successfully alleging either of two theories.11 The appropriate theory depends upon the manner in which the alleged discrimination occurred. The first theory is disparate treatment, which requires a plaintiff to show that the landlord has intentionally treated the plaintiff differently from other persons or groups. See Harris v. Itzhaki 183 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.1999); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 *1051(10th Cir.1995). The second theory is disparate impact, which instead involves a policy or practice of the landlord that is not intentionally discriminatory but is neutral on its face. See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501; Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15, 109 S.Ct. 276, 102 L.Ed.2d 180 (1988) (per curiam). Disparate impact theory requires a plaintiff to show that the landlord’s rule or policy, when applied, results in a discriminatory effect; that is, the policy affects one group or class of people differently from another group or class of people. See Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 933-34. Thus, whether a plaintiff alleges discrimination based on familial status, race, national origin, or any of the other bases listed in section 3604(b), a plaintiff must show either (1) intentional disparate treatment, or (2) disparate impact, without proof of discriminatory intent. See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1501.12
¶28 In the case before us, Sparks fails to distinguish whether her discrimination claim is for disparate treatment or disparate impact. Citing disparate impact eases, Sparks merely contends that Malibu’s one-family rule and the seven-day notice “had a discriminatory effect” upon her. Regardless, Sparks’ allegation of a 3604(b) violation fails under either a disparate impact or a disparate treatment theory. Sparks’ claim fails under a disparate impact argument because she points to no general policy of Malibu that has caused a differential impact on a particular group or class of people. “[Discriminatory impact cannot be established where you have just one isolated decision.” Coe v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir.1981); see also Michigan Protection & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Babin, 799 F.Supp. 695, 706 (E.D.Mich.1992) (“Plaintiffs complain about a single allegedly discriminatory transaction. As such, the scope of this case is too narrow to qualify as one involving a discriminatory impact.”), aff'd, 18 F.3d 337, 348 (6th Cir.1994). The single act of Sparks’ eviction, including the purported “discriminatory effect” therefrom, is insufficient to constitute a disparate impact.
¶29 Sparks’ claim also fails under disparate treatment theory because she fails to refute valid justifications Malibu presented for her eviction. A plaintiff can show disparate treatment through one of two methods. The first method, also known as the “direct method,” requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant has taken an action that is explicitly, facially discriminatory. See Kormoczy v. Secretary, HUD, 53 F.3d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1995); Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1500 & n. 16. The defendant must then show that it would have taken action against the plaintiff anyway. See Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 824. The “direct method” does not apply in the case before us because Sparks has failed to establish that the seven-day notice demonstrates, on its face, an intent to discriminate. The ambiguous directive in the seven-day notice fails to so demonstrate.
¶ 30 Even if the “direct method” were applicable to the case before us, as Justice Durham suggests, no dispute of material fact would preclude summary judgment in favor of Malibu. Justice Durham’s conclusion to the contrary ignores Sparks’ burden in contesting summary judgment. When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the party opposing summary judgment must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
¶ 31 Applying rule 56 and the “direct method” to the instant case, no dispute of material fact exists, even assuming Sparks has shown that the notice constituted facial discrimination. See Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 824. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Malibu presented numerous good-faith bases for evicting Sparks, and argued (as Kormoczy and Justice Durham would require) that it would have evicted Sparks even if her family were not “multi-genera-tional.” The burden in opposing summary judgment then shifted to Sparks to show that *1052Malibu would not have evicted Sparks if her family were not “multi-generational.” To show that her eviction was based entirely on her “multi-generational” family, Sparks necessarily had to controvert Malibu’s justifications for evicting her. She utterly failed to meet her burden in this regard. Indeed, she has openly admitted that she failed to cure numerous violations of her lease agreement with Malibu. Thus, Sparks has failed to show that Malibu would not have taken the same action against her absent the fact of her “multi-generational” family. As a result, under the “direct method,” any dispute as to Malibu’s purported discriminatory intent in issuing the seven-day notice is immaterial and does not preclude summary judgment.
¶ 32 The second method through which a plaintiff may establish disparate treatment requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant’s purported justification for an allegedly discriminatory action is merely a pretext for discrimination. See Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305-06; see also Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56,101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (Title VII); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (Title VII). If a plaintiff then fails to produce evidence of pretext, the plaintiffs disparate treatment claim fails as a matter of law under either Title VII or Title VIII. See, e.g., Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305-06 (finding for defendant under Title VIII because defendant asserted valid justification for alleged discrimination and plaintiff failed to show evidence of pretext); Shumway v. UPS, 118 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.1997) (notwithstanding evidence of discrimination, affirming summary judgment in favor of employer under Title VII because employee failed to show that employer’s justification for discharge was pretextual); Essex v. UPS, 111 F.3d 1304, 1309 (7th Cir.1997) (same); Murray v. City of Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1421-22 (10th Cir.1995) (same). Thus, if a landlord presents multiple good faith justifications for an eviction, the tenant must show that the justifications are merely a pretext for discrimination. Otherwise, any alleged instance of discrimination is immaterial and the tenant cannot recover under a disparate treatment theory.
¶33 In this case, Malibu has set forth multiple valid, good-faith justifications for evicting Sparks. Therefore, to recover for disparate treatment, Sparks must show that Malibu’s justifications for evicting her are merely a pretext for discrimination. Sparks has failed to do so. She admits that she failed to cure all of the violations listed in the seven-day notice. Thus, because Sparks has failed to show pretext, the alleged discrimination by Malibu in the seven-day notice is immaterial, and Sparks’ allegation that Malibu violated section 3604(b) and its Utah Code counterpart, section 57-21-5(l)(b), fails as a matter of law.
C. Sparks’ Allegation of Discriminatory Statements Under Sections 8601(c) and 57-21-5(2)
¶ 34 Sparks also alleges that Malibu’s one-family rule and the seven-day notice are statements indicating discrimination on the basis of familial status in violation of section 3604(c) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(2) of the UFHA. However, these allegations are not properly before this court. Sparks did not raise any claim or defense under sections 3604(c) and 57-21-5(2) before the trial court and therefore waived any right to raise such a claim or defense in appealing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. See Certified Sur. Group, Ltd. v. UT Inc., 960 P.2d 904, 906 n. 3 (Utah 1998); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996). Thus, Sparks’ argument under section 3604(c) of the FFHA and section 57-21-5(2) of the UFHA fails.
CONCLUSION
¶ 35 We conclude that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Malibu on its eviction claim. In addition, the trial court properly denied Sparks’ summary judgment motion on her fair housing counterclaim. Because we conclude that Sparks does not prevail on any of her grounds for appeal, she is not entitled to attorney fees.
¶ 36 Chief Justice HOWE and Justice STEWART concur in Justice RUSSON’s opinion.. The violations listed in the sixty-day notice included the failure to install a shed, a carport, handrails on the back steps, a bottom track for the home’s skirting, and a painted rear deck with an awning, rails, handrails, carpet, and skirting.
. Malibu denies that Sparks left a message at the Park office. Regardless, while both notices informed Sparks that she could request a variance in the rules or a longer cure period, the lease provided:
If, at any time, a Lessee believes the Park has not fulfilled any obligations the Park may have to Lessee or other homeowners, Lessee agrees to immediately give the Park written notice specifying what Lessee believes the Park *1046has failed to do and indicating what Lessee believes the Park has to do in order to fulfill these obligations.
Thus, it was Sparks’ duty under the lease to notify the Park in writing if Sparks had believed, for example, that any of the rules violations listed in the seven-day or sixty-day notice were unjustified. Such a written complaint could also have sought to clarify Malibu's intention in requiring Sparks to remove everyone except herself and her two daughters from the mobile home.
. Sparks failed to cure any of the violations listed in the sixty-day notice and also failed to obtain a variance from the rules violations or the cure period under tire sixty-day notice. She argues that Malibu's filing of this eviction action after the seven-day period expired but before the sixty-day period expired placed her in an untenable position with regard to the sixty-day notice and that to require her to comply with the sixty-day notice while eviction was pending under the seven-day notice would be unconscionable. However, we do not reach this argument because, as we discuss below, Sparks’ admitted failure to cure all of die violations listed in the seven-day notice is dispositive of whether summary judgment was proper on Malibu’s eviction claim.
. The trial court denied Sparks' summary judgment motion "for all of the reasons set forth in [Malibuj's Reply Brief” and granted Malibu's summary judgment motion "for all of the reasons set forth in [Malibuj's memorand[aj.” Thus, we summarize the reasons listed in Malibu's reply memorandum in support of its summary judgment motion and memorandum in opposition to Sparks’ summary judgment motion.
. As to the ten other violations listed in the seven-day notice, Sparks claims to have fully cured three and partially cured four, and she claims that three are invalid. The allegedly cured violations include (1) cleaning her gutters, (2) removing nonpatio furniture from her deck, and (3) mowing, watering, and trimming her lawn. With respect to the allegedly partially cured violations, Sparks claims that (1) rather than removing an old wooden fence, she repaired it, (2) rather than replacing bent siding, she fixed large dents, (3) rather than replacing a bent water heater door, she repaired it, and (4) rather than removing hard water stains from the windows, she washed the windows. She claims that three of Malibu’s demands were invalid because (1) the rules did not require her to resod her yard, (2) she had permission to park on her lawn, and (3) her shutters were not broken.
. For these same reasons, Sparks' arguments regarding "justified expectations” and uncon-scionability are without merit.
. The Federal Fair Housing Act was passed as Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
. Specifically, the FFHA defines "familial status" as follows:
(k) "Familial status” means one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 18 years) being domiciled with
(1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or individuals; or
(2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody, with the written permission of such parent or other person.
42 U.S.C.A. § 3602(k) (1994). The UFHA provides essentially the same definition:
(14) (a) “Familial status” means one or more individuals who have not attained the age of 18 years being domiciled with:
(i) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or individuals; or
(ii) the designee of the parent or other person having custody, with the written permission of the parent or other person.
(b) The protections afforded against discrimination on the basis of familial status shall apply to any person who:
(i) is pregnant;
(ii) is in the process of securing legal custody of any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years; or
(iii) is a single individual.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-21-2(14) (Supp.1999).
. Malibu explains that this provision in the seven-day notice was prompted by reports that numerous unrelated, unauthorized persons were living with Sparks in her mobile home in violation of Park rules. Sparks disputes this contention and claims that the eviction was prompted by Malibu’s desire to remove Sparks’ grandchild from the Park. Malibu concedes knowledge that Sparks' grandchild resided with Sparks and denies that the seven-day notice was premised upon a desire to rid the Park of Sparks’ grandchild. However, this dispute is not material to our conclusions as to the correctness of summary judgment.
. Malibu’s one-family rule states in full, "No subletting, renting, or occupation by more than one family per home will be permitted, except with express written approval from management.” The rule does not otherwise define what constitutes a family.
. The language and apparent policy of section 57-21-5(l)(b) of the UFHA are so similar to that of section 3604(b) of the FFHA that it is appropriate to look to federal law as persuasive authority when interpreting the UFHA. Other states have similarly relied on FFHA case law when interpreting their own fair housing acts. See, e.g., Chestnut Realty, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 201 Conn. 350, 514 A.2d 749, 754 (1986); State v. Keding, 553 N.W.2d 305, 307 (Iowa 1996).
. We note that the federal courts look to Title VII employment discrimination cases for guidance regarding housing discrimination claims under Title VIII. See Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir.1997); Mountain Side, 56 F.3d at 1251 n. 7. The disparate impact and disparate treatment analyses under Title VIII are analogous to those under Title VII.