The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
I.
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS.
This is the second appeal to this Court in this case. The decision in the first appeal is Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 785 P.2d 634 (1990) {Durrant I). In Durrant I, we remanded the case and directed the trial court to reconsider the award of sanctions against the Durrants, Sellers, and their attorney pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1). In doing so, we held that “reasonableness under the circumstances, and a duty to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing an action, is the appropriate standard to apply.” 117 Idaho at 74, 785 P.2d at 638.
*887On remand, the attorney for the Durrants and Sellers submitted an affidavit stating the information the Durrants and Sellers provided their attorney prior to the filing of this action. The attorney for Christensen submitted an affidavit in response. Following oral argument, the trial court issued a memorandum decision and order finding that the Durrants, Sellers, and their attorney acted reasonably under the circumstances, and denying sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1).
Christensen moved to alter or amend the trial court’s order and presented a further affidavit of her attorney in support. Christensen also presented a partial transcript of the hearing concerning the order to show cause and motion to vacate the temporary restraining order that was held pri- or to the appeal in Durrant I. The trial court denied Christensen’s motion to alter or amend the order denying sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1). Christensen appealed.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD AND DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1).
Christensen asserts that in reconsidering the award of sanctions on remand, the trial court did not apply the standard stated by this Court in Durrant I, and abused its discretion in denying the award of sanctions. We disagree.
In Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991), we applied a three-part test to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding whether to award sanctions under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1). Applying the same test in this case, we conclude that the trial court (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
In its memorandum decision and order, the trial court quoted the standard contained in Durrant I for imposition of sanctions under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) and clearly demonstrated that it perceived it had the discretion to award or deny sanctions pursuant to this standard.
In Durrant I, we held that “reasonableness under the circumstances, and a duty to make a reasonable inquiry prior to filing an action, is the appropriate standard to apply.” 117 Idaho at 74, 785 P.2d at 638. In denying the sanctions requested against the attorney for the Durrants and Sellers, the trial court relied, at least in part, on the affidavit of the attorney submitted after our remand in Durrant I. This affidavit contained a summary of the discussions between the Durrants and Sellers and their attorney prior to the filing of the complaint. In its decision, the trial court focused on these discussions. The trial court ruled that the attorney met the “minimum requirement of ‘reasonable inquiry’ ” and had a “ ‘good faith argument’ for his view of what the law is, or should be.” The trial court also found that the complaint was not filed to harass Christensen.
The trial court’s decision denying sanctions against the attorney for the Durrants and Sellers demonstrates that the trial court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any rules applicable to specific choices. The trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
The trial court also found that the actions of the Durrants and Sellers were reasonable under the circumstances and that an award of sanctions against them under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) was not appropriate. Christensen asserts that the affidavit of the attorney for the Durrants and Sellers was hearsay so far as their reasonable inquiry is concerned. We agree. If this affidavit were the only source of evidence concerning the reasonableness and inquiry of the Durrants and Sellers, we would be inclined to reverse the trial court’s denial of sanctions against them. There is, however, other evidence in the record upon which the trial court could have relied.
*888The affidavits of the Durrants and Sellers submitted in support of their petition for a temporary restraining order stated that Christensen had taken steps to deprive them of their water rights and had interfered with their water rights, including blocking headgates, destroying ditches, and “refusing to rotate water use.” The trial court could have concluded from these statements that the Durrants and Sellers reasonably inferred that Christensen was asserting control as an owner over the property contiguous to theirs.
Also, in its findings the trial court referred to the testimony of the Durrants and Sellers at the hearing concerning the temporary restraining order that preceded the first appeal in this case. The record on appeal in this case does not contain the transcript of the testimony of these witnesses. Counsel for the Durrants and Sellers stated at the oral argument in this appeal that the testimony of his clients at the hearing concerning the temporary restraining order supported the trial court’s finding that the actions of the Durrants and Sellers were reasonable under the circumstances. Counsel for Christensen denied this statement.
In Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980), the Court said:
On appeal the appellant must carry the burden of showing that the district court committed error. Error will not be presumed on appeal but must be affirmatively shown on the record by appellant. Where an incomplete record is presented to this Court, the missing portions of that record are to be presumed to support the action of the trial court.
(Citations omitted).
Applying this rule to this case, we presume that the record of the hearing concerning the temporary restraining order supports the decision of the trial court, that the Durrants and Sellers were reasonable under the circumstances, and that sanctions against them under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) were not appropriate.
We conclude that the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. The trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
III.
CONCLUSION.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of sanctions under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(1) against the Durrants, Sellers, and their attorney.
We award costs on appeal, but not attorney fees, to the Durrants and Sellers.
BAKES, C.J., and BISTLINE, BOYLE and McDEVITT, JJ., concur.