dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s determination that the there was no evidence to support appellant’s request to charge on voluntary manslaughter. Accordingly, I dissent to the affirmance of appellant’s malice murder conviction.
Voluntary manslaughter occurs when one kills another human being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder, if the killer “acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person. . . .” OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). In a murder trial, if there is any evidence, however slight, as to whether the offense is murder or voluntary manslaughter, the jury should be instructed on the law of both offenses. Henson v. State, 258 Ga. 600 (5) (372 SE2d 806) (1988).17 It is a question of law whether there is slight evidence that the defendant acted as the result of sudden, violent and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation. Gooch v. State, 259 Ga. 301 (3) (379 SE2d 522) (1989). However, it is *625for the fact-finder to determine the sufficiency of the provocation and the questions of reasonable fears and “cooling time.” Hagans v. State, 187 Ga. App. 216 (3) (369 SE2d 536) (1988).
‘“While words and threats alone are generally not sufficient provocation, the issue of whether a reasonable person acts as the result of an irresistible passion may be raised by words which are connected to provocative conduct by the victim.’ ” Veal v. State, 250 Ga. 384 (1) (297 SE2d 485) (1982). The evidence in the case at bar reflects that, shortly before emergency personnel found the victim fatally stabbed, appellant called her sister and told her that the victim had threatened her with a knife and had cut her. The day-long argument between appellant and the victim, the threatening gestures made by the victim toward appellant, and the victim’s infliction of injury upon appellant within minutes of the fatal stabbing constitute evidence of words and provocative conduct which raise the question whether a reasonable person acted as the result of an irresistible passion. Washington v. State, 249 Ga. 728 (3) (292 SE2d 836) (1982). Slight evidence being present, it was error for the trial court to refuse to permit the fact-finder to determine whether the provocation was sufficient and whether appellant’s response was the sudden, violent passion that would be aroused in a reasonable person.
Restricting itself only to evidence that appellant and the victim had quarreled the morning the victim was killed, the majority opines that the trial court could have concluded, as a matter of law, that the “cooling off” period between the morning provocation and the evening killing reduced the evidence of provocation to something below the “slight evidence” which authorizes the giving of a requested charge. As indicated above, there was more evidence of provocation than the argument the parties had had earlier that morning. Furthermore, Aldridge v. State, 258 Ga. 75 (2) (365 SE2d 111) (1988), cited by the majority in support of its theory, involved provocation that occurred 3¥2 days before the victim was killed. While I would agree that a cooling period of half a week is, as a matter of law, too long to sustain the conditions for voluntary manslaughter, that is not the situation here where there is evidence of provocation minutes before the fatal blow was struck. The majority recognizes that there was evidence that the victim had threatened and cut appellant with a knife, but concludes that there was no evidence that this provocation caused appellant to be “passionate.” It is for the properly-instructed jury, not the appellate court, to determine if the provocation was sufficient and whether appellant’s response was the sudden, violent, irresistible passion that would be aroused in the reasonable person.
Because I believe the slight evidence necessary to support the request to charge voluntary manslaughter was present in this case *626and the fact-finder was wrongfully denied the opportunity to consider whether appellant’s actions constituted voluntary manslaughter, I respectfully dissent.
Decided March 8, 1999. Patricia F. Angelí, for appellant. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Erman J. Tanjuatco, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Frank A. Ilardi, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this dissent.
In Gooch v. State, 259 Ga. 301, n. 2 (379 SE2d 522) (1989), this Court pointed out to trial courts that the better practice would be to charge voluntary manslaughter in all cases in which it was requested by the defendant since giving such a charge on request cannot be reversible error and would vastly reduce the appellate expense and delay of litigating and deciding the sometimes difficult question which we are now facing — whether there is sufficient evidence to support such a charge.